A proceeding to challenge a prison disciplinary determination "must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the petitioner" (CPLR 217 [1]; see Matter of Stevens v Bell, 197 A.D.3d 1474, 1475 [2021]; Matter of Gillard v Annucci, 175 A.D.3d 768, 768 [2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 907 [2020]). Such determination, in turn, becomes final and binding when the aggrieved party receives notice thereof (see Matter of Gillard v Annucci, 175 A.D.3d at 768; Matter of Harvey v Bradt, 91 A.D.3d 1222, 1222 [2012]). Petitioner does not dispute that the challenged determination became final and binding on June 5, 2019 and, therefore, the "statutory deadline" for the commencement of this proceeding was October 5, 2019.
“The four-month limitations period within which to commence a proceeding of this nature began to run when petitioner received notice of the adverse disciplinary determination” (Matter of Spencer v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 78 A.D.3d 1342, 1343, 909 N.Y.S.2d 687 [2010] ; see CPLR 217[1] ). The record lacks any support for petitioner's claim that he requested an extension of time and he did not commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding until February 13, 2015, rendering the proceeding untimely as to the first determination (see Matter of Harvey v. Bradt, 91 A.D.3d 1222, 1222, 936 N.Y.S.2d 920 [2012] ). With regard to petitioner's challenge to the second determination, the petition fails to raise any specific allegation challenging that determination.
As CORC did not address the issue of timeliness, and the determination only became final and binding upon petitioner following CORC's denial, the inquiry as to timeliness is limited to the CPLR article 78 proceeding. This proceeding was timely commenced within four months after CORC's determination ( seeCPLR 217; Walton v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 N.Y.3d 186, 194–195, 831 N.Y.S.2d 749, 863 N.E.2d 1001 [2007];Matter of Harvey v. Bradt, 91 A.D.3d 1222, 1222, 936 N.Y.S.2d 920 [2012] ). Turning to the merits, we have previously held that respondent is empowered to encumber inmate accounts for the purpose of satisfying court ordered restitution payments, as this “manifestly serves a legitimate penological goal, and is consonant with [respondent's] broad power[s]” (Matter of Nardi v. LeFevre, 235 A.D.2d 602, 603, 652 N.Y.S.2d 133 [1997],lv. denied89 N.Y.2d 817, 659 N.Y.S.2d 857, 681 N.E.2d 1304 [1997] ). Here, respondent has been collecting funds from petitioner's account in accord with the provisions of Directive No. 2788, i.e, 20% of his payroll receipts and 50% of his outside receipts.