63 ; Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 847, 848, 912 N.Y.S.2d 67 ). By contrast, "[q]uestions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process have been recognized as matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators, particularly in the absence of a very narrow arbitration clause or a provision expressly making compliance with the time limitations a condition precedent to arbitration" ( Matter of Enlarged City School Dist. of Troy [Troy Teachers Assn.], 69 N.Y.2d 905, 907, 516 N.Y.S.2d 195, 508 N.E.2d 930 ; see Matter of Triborough Bride & Tunnel Auth. [Dist. Council 37 of Am. Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., AFL–CIO], 44 N.Y.2d 967, 969, 408 N.Y.S.2d 328, 380 N.E.2d 160 ; Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park v. Floral Park Police Benevolent Assn., 131 A.D.3d at 1242, 17 N.Y.S.3d 463 ; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d 731, 732, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ). As the CBA does not specify that timely commencement of the grievance is a condition precedent to arbitration, the issue of whether Local 628 timely initiated the grievance at step one must be resolved by the arbitrator, not the court (see Matter of Board of Educ. of Schenectady City School Dist. [Schenectady Fedn. of Teachers], 61 A.D.3d 1175, 1176, 876 N.Y.S.2d 562 ; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d at 731–732, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ; cf. Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., 78 A.D.3d at 848, 912 N.Y.S.2d 67 ; Matter of Serringer v. Board of Trustees of Vil. of Tuxedo
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the petition to compel arbitration is granted, and that branch of the respondent's cross motion which was to dismiss the petition is denied.Questions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process have been recognized as matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by an arbitrator (see Matter of Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v. 55 Liberty Owners Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 247, 252, 793 N.Y.S.2d 831, 826 N.E.2d 802 ; Matter of Enlarged City School Dist. of Troy [Troy Teachers Assn.], 69 N.Y.2d 905, 907, 516 N.Y.S.2d 195, 508 N.E.2d 930 ; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d 731, 732, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ). Here, the respondent's contention that only the Herricks Teachers' Association, and not the petitioner individually, may seek arbitration of the issues relating to the subject settlement agreement raises a question of procedural arbitrability that must be resolved by the arbitrator (see Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d at 732, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ; see also Matter of Board of Educ. of Schenectady City School Dist. [Schenectady Fedn. of Teachers], 61 A.D.3d 1175, 1176, 876 N.Y.S.2d 562 ).
to determine” (Matter of Village of Chester v. Local 445, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 118 A.D.3d 1012, 1013, 988 N.Y.S.2d 652; see Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 847, 848, 912 N.Y.S.2d 67). By contrast, “[q]uestions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process have been recognized as matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators, particularly in the absence of a very narrow arbitration clause or a provision expressly making compliance with the time limitations a condition precedent to arbitration” ( Matter of Enlarged City School Dist. of Troy [Troy Teachers Assn.], 69 N.Y.2d 905, 907, 516 N.Y.S.2d 195, 508 N.E.2d 930; see Matter of Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. [Dist. Council 37 of Am. Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., AFL–CIO], 44 N.Y.2d 967, 969, 408 N.Y.S.2d 328, 380 N.E.2d 160; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d 731, 732, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347). As the CBA does not specify that a grievance must be personally pursued by an aggrieved member as a condition precedent to arbitration, the issue as to whether the PBA complied with the grievance process is one of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrator ( see Matter of Board of Educ. of Schenectady City School Dist. [Schenectady Fedn. of Teachers], 61 A.D.3d 1175, 1176, 876 N.Y.S.2d 562; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d at 731–732, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347; cf. Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., 78 A.D.3d at 847–848, 912 N.Y.S.2d 67; Matter of Serringer v. Board of Trustees of Vil. of Tuxedo Park, 265 A.D.2d 561, 561–562, 697 N.Y.S.2d 124). The CBA provides that “[p]rescribed time limits shall be considered as statutes of limitations.
Thus, the only issue is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate this particular grievance (seeMatter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist. v. Deer Park Teachers' Assn. , 77 A.D.3d at 748, 909 N.Y.S.2d 738 ). The arbitration provision of the CBA at issue is broad, and there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute, which involves the SOC's claim that its members are entitled to certain payments for retroactive salary increases, and the general subject matter of the CBA (seeMatter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.] , 93 N.Y.2d at 143, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463, 710 N.E.2d 1064 ; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO , 55 A.D.3d 731, 731, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ). Although some uncertainty exists as to whether the subject matter of the dispute is encompassed within the salary provisions of the CBA or whether the parties contemplated that a separate agreement would be required for wage increases to be paid retroactively, any alleged ambiguity in the CBA "regarding the coverage of any applicable provision is ... a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator to resolve" ( Matter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist. v. Deer Park Teachers' Assn. , 77 A.D.3d at 749, 909 N.Y.S.2d 738 ; seeMatter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. v. Watertown Educ. Assn. , 74 N.Y.2d 912, 913, 549 N.Y.S.2d 652, 548 N.E.2d 1303 ).
The Village failed to demonstrate that arbitration of the grievance is prohibited by statutory or public policy (seeMatter of New York City Tr. Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL–CIO, 99 N.Y.2d 1, 6–7, 750 N.Y.S.2d 805, 780 N.E.2d 490 ; cf.Matter of County of Erie v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 815, 19 N.Y.3d 1070, 1071–1072, 955 N.Y.S.2d 823, 979 N.E.2d 1150 ), and PFFA's grievance was reasonably related to the general subject matter of the CBA. Therefore, the question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA is a matter of contract interpretation and application reserved for the arbitrator (seeMatter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d 731, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ). The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.
The court also correctly held that the Association's grievance was reasonably related to the general subject matter of the CBA and that, therefore, the question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA is a matter of contract interpretation and application reserved for the arbitrator (see Matter of Village of Garden City v. Local 1588, Professional Firefighters Assn., 132 A.D.3d 887, 889, 18 N.Y.S.3d 151 ; Matter of Professional Firefighters Assn. of Nassau County, Local 1588, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters, AFL–CIO v. Village of Garden City, 119 A.D.3d 803, 803, 989 N.Y.S.2d 327 ; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d 731, 731, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ; see also Prudenti v. County of Suffolk, 142 A.D.3d 1150, 1152–1153, 38 N.Y.S.3d 238 ). Accordingly, upon reargument, the Supreme Court properly adhered to its original determination denying the Village's petition to permanently stay arbitration and granting the Association's motion to compel arbitration.
By confirming an arbitration award which directed the petitioner to cease and desist from assigning bargaining unit work to volunteers, this Court has implicitly acknowledged the arbitrability of that specific issue (see id ). The grievances were reasonably related to the general subject matter of the CBA and, therefore, the petitioner's management rights granted under Article XVII, and “the question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA [are] a matter of contract interpretation and application reserved for the arbitrator” (Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d 731, 731, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347 ; see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 N.Y.2d at 143, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463, 710 N.E.2d 1064 ; Board of Educ. of Lakeland Cent. School Dist. of Shrub Oak v. Barni, 49 N.Y.2d 311, 314, 425 N.Y.S.2d 554, 401 N.E.2d 912 ; Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v. Amalgamated Tr. Union of Am., AFL–CIO, Local 1056, 284 A.D.2d 466, 726 N.Y.S.2d 694 ; Matter of Greenburgh Eleven Union Free School Dist. v. Greenburgh No. 11 Fedn. of Teachers, Local 1532 AFT, AFL–CIO, 266 A.D.2d 213, 697 N.Y.S.2d 695 ).
whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute, a court “is merely to ‘determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA’ ” (Matter of City of Johnstown [ Johnstown Police Benevolent Assn.], 99 N.Y.2d at 279, 755 N.Y.S.2d 49, 784 N.E.2d 1158, quoting Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [ Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 N.Y.2d 132, 143, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463, 710 N.E.2d 1064). Here, the arbitration provisions of the CBA are broad, and there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute, which involves a claim for approval of graduate credits for compensation, and the general subject matter of the CBA ( see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [ Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 N.Y.2d at 143, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463, 710 N.E.2d 1064;Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v. Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL–CIO, 55 A.D.3d 731, 731, 865 N.Y.S.2d 347;Matter of Board of Educ. of Enlarged City School Dist. of City of Newburgh v. Newburgh Teachers' Assn., 146 A.D.2d 769, 769, 537 N.Y.S.2d 250). Although some uncertainty exists as to whether the subject matter of the dispute is encompassed within the provision governing payments for approved graduate credits or the exclusion from arbitration of matters involving the Board's discretion, any alleged ambiguity in the CBA “regarding the coverage of any applicable provision is ... a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator to resolve” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist. v. Deer Park Teachers' Assn., 77 A.D.3d 747, 749, 909 N.Y.S.2d 738;see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. v. Watertown Educ. Assn., 74 N.Y.2d 912, 913, 549 N.Y.S.2d 652, 548 N.E.2d 1303;Matter of Town of Ramapo v. Ramapo Police Benevolent Assn., 17 A.D.3d 476, 478, 793 N.Y.S.2d 449;Incorporated Vil. of E. Hampton v. East Hampton Vil. Police Benevolent Assn., 149 A.
As the present dispute involves the interpretation of the evening meeting provision of the CBA, such a reasonable relationship exists. Whether respondent complied with the requirements of the grievance process and whether the CBA required that all affected parties be named in the grievance are issues of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator to resolve ( see Matter of Enlarged City School Dist. of Troy [Troy Teachers Assn.], 69 NY2d 905, 907; Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 55 AD3d 731, 732).