A municipality has no authority to amend a zoning ordinance subject to a collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city and the property owner. Hartnett v. Austin, (Fla.), 93 So.2d 86; Baylis v. Mayor City Council of City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429; Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill.2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219; Lewis City of Jackson, Miss., 184 So.2d 384; Yokley on Zoning Law and Practice, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 7-8; The Law of Zoning and Planning by Rathkopf, (Vol. 3, 74-12, 74-13, 74-15, 74-16). An ordinance amending a zoning ordinance must be clear, precise, definite and certain in its terms and the determination of whether property covered by the amendment has a new zoning classification must not be be left to the uncertainty of proof by extrinsic evidence.

"In accepting these donations and entering into or approving these agreements the trustees of the Village undoubtedly did what they believed was best for the whole community, but it placed them in the questionable position of bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing on the merits of the requested amendment." The basic policy at issue here was convincingly stated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Hartnett v. Austin (Fla. 1956), 93 So.2d 86, 89 (decided in banc): "In exercising its zoning powers the municipality must deal with well-defined classes of uses. If each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter into private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of community planning and zoning would collapse.

Because much criticism has been mounted against the practice, both by commentators and the courts of some of our sister States, further exposition is in order. (See, e.g., Babcock, The Zoning Game, chs 1, 3; Basset, Zoning, ch. 9; Crolly, The Rezoning of Properties Conditioned on Agreements with Property Owners — Zoning by Contract, NYLJ, March 9, 1961, p 4, col 1; Scott, Toward a Strategy for Utilization of Contract and Conditional Zoning, 51 J Urban L 94; Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 Md. L Rev 121; Note, Three Aspects of Zoning; Unincorporated Areas — Exclusionary Zoning — Conditional Zoning, 6 Real Prop, Prob Tr J 178; Comment, The Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning, 12 UCLA L Rev 897. For judicial criticism, see e.g., Allred v City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432; Baylis v City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164; City of Farmers Branch v Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288 [Tex]; Ford Leasing Dev. Co. v Board of County Comrs., 186 Col 418; Hartnett v Austin, 93 So.2d 86 [Fla]; Haymon v City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 [Tenn]; Houston Petroleum Co. v Automotive Prods. Credit Assn., 9 N.J. 122; Sandenburgh v Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372; Ziemer v County of Peoria, 33 Ill. App.3d 612.) Probably the principal objection to conditional rezoning is that it constitutes illegal spot zoning, thus violating the legislative mandate requiring that there be a comprehensive plan for, and that all conditions be uniform within, a given zoning district.

We further note that there is a distinction in the cases relied on by the County when there is a proceeding in which a plaintiff seeks to enforce an existing zoning ordinance, such as a violation of a setback requirement, special damage is necessary, and no special damage is necessary when a plaintiff seeks to have an act of a zoning authority declared void or is within the immediate area to be affected. Hartnett v. Austin, Fla. 1956, 93 So.2d 86; Josephson v. Autrey, Fla. 1957, 96 So.2d 784. In other words, we hold special damage must be shown when a taxpayer or property owner seeks to enjoin the violation of an existing ordinance [i.e. Boucher v. Novotny, Fla. 1958, 102 So.2d 132; Conrad v. Jackson, Fla. 1958, 107 So.2d 369], but need not be shown if the taxpayer or property owner is within the affected range of the property which requires actual notice before the rezoning made may be considered by the legislative body [Hartnett v. Austin, supra; Elwyn v. City of Miami, Fla.App. 1959, 113 So.2d 849; Friedland v. City of Hollywood, Fla.App. 1961, 130 So.2d 306; Vol. 3, American Law of Zoning, Anderson, § 21.05, p. 558], or when he seeks to review an alleged void act.

Some courts have held that such agreements invalidate rezoning action, but some of the recent decisions are to the contrary. The plaintiffs cite cases from New Jersey, Maryland, and Florida in which rezoning has been held invalid where such agreements were involved. See, Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Assn., Inc. (1952), 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319; Baylis v. City of Baltimore (1959), 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429; Hartnett v. Austin (1956), (Fla.), 93 So.2d 86. The defendants cite cases from New York, Massachusetts, and Maryland where rezoning has been held valid even though protective covenant agreements were involved. See, Church v. Town of Islip (1960), 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680; Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. City of Newton (1962), 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118; Pressman v. City of Baltimore (1960), 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379. See, also, Town of Somerset v. County Council for Montgomery County (1962), 229 Md. 42, 181 A.2d 671; Pecora v. Zoning Commission of Town of Trumbull (1958), 145 Conn. 435, 144 A.2d 48; Johnson v. Griffiths (1955), (Ohio App.), 141 N.E.2d 774. We conclude that under the facts and circumstances in this case the protective covenant agreement executed by the applicants did not invalidate the action of the city council which rezoned a part of the Waxenburg land.

. The court cited to Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956) which explained: A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance subject to various covenants and restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city and the property owner.

When Morgran sought to have Orange County abide by its agreement, the county disavowed the contract as a void effort to engage in contract zoning.[1] Contract zoning is, in essence, an agreement by a governmental body with a private landowner to rezone property for consideration. This practice has long been disapproved in Florida in cases such as Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956) and Chung v. Samsota County, 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Orange County's position is that its agreement to "support and expeditiously process" Morgran's rezoning application is unambiguously void as a matter of law, since this agreement with Morgran requires the County to contract away its police powers. Orange County also contended that suit was precluded by virtue of the terms of paragraph 3(i) of the Developer's Agreement:

Roy P. Cookston Burt Bruton, Zoning Law, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 581, 589 n.34 (1981). In Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956), the Florida Supreme Court declared a zoning ordinance invalid because it was conditioned upon separate collateral agreements with the developer. The court also noted:

They have also been found improper in several states. Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Lower Gwyneddl Twp., 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960); (superseded by statute as stated in Russell v. Penn Township Planning Com., 22 Pa.Cmwlth. 198, 348 A.2d 499); Summerell v. Phillips, 282 So.2d 450 (La. 1973); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956). The Eves case, supra, was based upon the concept that the "floating zone" was contrary to the comprehensive plan required of zoning.

Plaintiffs as abutting home owners were entitled to maintain the suit challenging the propriety, authority for and validity of the ordinance granting the variance. Wags Transportation System, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 751; Hartnett v. Austin, Fla. 1956, 93 So.2d 86. See generally Foss, Interested Third Parties in Zoning, 12 U.Fla.L.Rev. 16 (1959). But "unnecessary hardship" as used in the city charter, and as contemplated in this sense, has been given a special and limited meaning.