Opinion
CLAIM NO. E216944
OPINION FILED JULY 25, 1994
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by RICHARD S. MUSE, Attorney at Law, Hot Springs, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by JIM TILLEY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes on for review by the Full Commission from the decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed on July 20, 1993 finding that claimant proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he sustained a compensable heart attack within the course and scope of his employment on October 9, 1992.
After carefully conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that his October 9, 1992 heart attack was causally related to either his September 9, 1992 admittedly compensable work-related injury or his employment. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
As stated, claimant sustained an admittedly compensable injury in September of 1992. As a result of said injury, claimant did not miss the requisite amount of work to entitle him to temporary total disability benefits. The claim was accepted as compensable and all benefits related thereto have been paid. In October of 1992, claimant sustained a heart attack. Claimant maintains that the heart attack is causally related to his September 9, 1992 compensable injury. Respondent controverts claimant's contention. A hearing was held and an Administrative Law Judge found that claimant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that there is a causal connection between his compensable injury and his October 1992 heart attack. However, the Administrative Law Judge did find that claimant proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that his October 9, 1992 heart attack arose out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. It is from this determination that respondent has appealed.
The burden of proving the job relatedness of any alleged injury rests upon the claimant, Pearson v. Faulkner Radio Service, 220 Ark. 368, 247 S.W.2d 964 (1952); and there is no presumption to this effect, Farmer v. L.H. Knight Co., 220 Ark. 333, 248 S.W.2d 111 (1952). Indeed, the party having the burden of proof on the issue must establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. A.C.A. § 11-9-704 (c)(2) (1986). In determining whether a claimant has sustained his or her burden of proof, the Commission shall weigh the evidence impartially, without giving the benefit of the doubt to either party. A.C.A. § 11-9-704;Wade v. Mr. C Cavenaugh's, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989); and Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987). Additionally, claimant must establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that there is a causal connection between his employment and the stress-related heart attack. C.J. Horner Co. v. Stringfellow, 286 Ark. 342, 691 S.W.2d 861 (1985); Latimer v. Sevier Co. Farmers Cooperative Inc., 233 Ark. 762, 346 S.W.2d 673 (1961); Young v. Heekin Canning Co., 13 Ark. 199, 681 S.W.2d 419 (1985); and Reynolds Metals Co. v. Robins, 231 Ark. 158, 328 S.W.2d 489 (1959). Furthermore, the causal connection cannot be based upon speculation or conjecture. Arkansas Dept. of Correction v. Glover, 35 Ark. App. 32, 812 S.W.2d 692 (1991). There is no compensation for heart attacks that are merely contemporaneous with or coincidental to the claimant's employment. Robins, supra; Latimer, supra; Horner, supra; and Young, supra. Also, a claimant must establish through testimony by medical experts that job-related stress or tension caused or contributed to the heart attack in order to secure a finding of compensability.Terry Hitchcock v. Cigna Ins. Co., FC Opinion filed August 6, 1987 ( D600576), and Donna Davis v. Cleburne Co., FC Opinion filed August 6, 1987 ( D601062).
A review of the evidence indicates that claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that his October 9, 1992 heart attack is causally related to his employment with respondent. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. A review of the evidence indicates that claimant has numerous factors which ultimately caused his heart attack. For example, claimant has a history of smoking for 43 years. Claimant continued to smoke up until the date of his heart attack. Additionally, claimant has a 10 year history of diabetes and high blood pressure. Also, claimant has significant coronary artery disease. He has a family history of heart problems, including a mother who has heart palpitations, a father who died of a heart attack, and several siblings who have had heart attacks or bypass procedures. Each of the above-referenced factors contributed to claimant's heart attack.
A review of the deposition of Dr. Parkhurst shows that claimant's job is a very low stress job which most likely did not contribute to his heart attack. Claimant was a flagman. In fact, Dr. Parkhurst specifically stated that claimant's job as a flagman would "be low on the list of something that would precipitated heart attack."
The aforementioned establishes that claimant had a pre-existing heart disease with numerous contributing factors. Claimant had a minimal stress job that was unlikely to cause or contribute to his heart attack. Furthermore, there is insufficient testimony in the record that show other factors related to claimant's job, such as extreme temperatures or increased mental or physical pressures, to suggest a stress-related causal connection. Simply because claimant began to experience chest pains while on the job is not enough to find claimant's heart attack compensable under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority finding that claimant's October 1992 heart attack was not causally related to his employment.
In September 1992 claimant sustained injuries when the large asphalt spreader on which he was riding was hit by an automobile. Claimant testified that he experienced chest pains radiating into his left upper extremity following this accident. In a report dated January 20, 1993, Dr. Bruce Murphy, the cardiologist who treated claimant, stated the following:
It is very clear from the record that his chest pain in September of 1992 was likely cardiac. This episode of chest pain, which was apparently misdiagnosed as being musculoskeletal pain, was provoked by the accident while on the job. Less than a month later Mr. Hartmann had a myocardial infarction and presented with an abnormal EKG like he had when he presented in September after his motor vehicle accident. I think it is certainly noteworthy that his episode of unstable angina, or pre-infarction angina that occurred in September, was likely related to his job. It is very clear from the record that it was provoked by the accident. Less than a month later he had a myocardial infarction and of course this also occurred while at work. It seems likely to me that the events are related (that his episodes of coronary insufficiency were provoked by either work or the accident at work).
Based on claimant's credible testimony and the opinion of his treating physician, I find that claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his heart attack was causally related to the employment.
PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner