Opinion
3:18-cv-00039-RAW
2019-12-04
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Garret S. SELTERS, Bryan Selters, Anthony D. Selters, and Sherman M. Shannon, Defendants.
Shawn Smith, Shawn Smith, Attorney at Law PLLC, Ames, IA, Eric David Puryear, Eric Steven Mail, Puryear Law PC, Davenport, IA, for Defendants.
Shawn Smith, Shawn Smith, Attorney at Law PLLC, Ames, IA, Eric David Puryear, Eric Steven Mail, Puryear Law PC, Davenport, IA, for Defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ROSS A. WALTERS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment by Defendant Garret Selters [51] and Defendants Bryan and Anthony Selters [52] as potential beneficiaries under Linda Selters' life insurance policy. The Motions are fully submitted on the briefing filed.
This case was initiated by Plaintiff Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company ("Hartford") as an interpleader action regarding $33,000 in remaining policy benefits owed to the beneficiaries of Linda's life insurance policy. [1, 12]. Linda's policy provided for $100,000 in total benefits. The primary beneficiaries of the policy were her three sons, who were to take the following percentage of the benefits: Garret (33%), Anthony (33%), and Bryan (34%).
Following Linda's death, Hartford paid both Bryan and Anthony their respective shares of the benefits. Hartford declined to dispose of the remaining $33,000 presumptively owed to Garret because he had been charged with first degree murder in the killing of Linda. Recognizing that the Felonious Death statute codified in pertinent part at Iowa Code Section 633.535 —which treats a named beneficiary of a life insurance policy who "intentionally and unjustifiably" causes the death of the person upon whose life the policy is issued as predeceasing the decedent—may bar Garret from taking benefits under the policy, Hartford commenced this suit to determine the legal rights of the policy's beneficiaries.
Bryan and Anthony cross-claimed [32] against Garret alleging § 633.535(3) disqualifies him as a beneficiary under the Hartford policy. Garret now moves for summary judgment by asserting that the Felonious Death statute has no application in this case and he should thus take his 33% share pursuant to the terms of the policy. [51]. Garret is principally arguing that the Felonious Death statute has no application because he was legally insane at the time of Linda's killing, and thus could not have "intentionally" caused or procured her death. Bryan and Anthony have also moved for summary judgment and assert that the Felonious Death statute bars Garret from taking under Linda's policy regardless of whether he was insane at the time of Linda's killing. [52].
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the affidavits, pleadings, and discovery materials demonstrate "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Schueller v. Goddard , 631 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Myers v. Lutsen Mtns. Corp. , 587 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2009) ); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if it has a real basis in the record." Hartnagel v. Norman , 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). A "genuine issue of fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ " Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party resisting summary judgment, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them, Hustvet v. Allina Health System , 910 F.3d 399, 406 (8th Cir. 2018), that is, "reasonable inferences that may be drawn without resorting to speculation." Hitt v. Harsco Corp. , 356 F.3d 920, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2004) ; see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Howard v. Columbia Public Schl. Dist. , 363 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2004) ("unreasonable inference or sheer speculation" not accepted as fact). The resisting party must "go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Rouse v. Benson , 193 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 1999). There "must ... be enough evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to find for "nonmovants on the required elements of their claims." Rooney v. Rock-Tenn Converting Co. , 878 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 2018).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Criminal Complaint Affidavit
On the basis of a criminal complaint affidavit, Bryan and Anthony contend the following facts concerning Linda's death are undisputed. On the morning of October 17, 2017, the Burlington Police received a 911 call for help from Linda at her home in Burlington, Iowa regarding her son Garret. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶¶ 2-3) ; (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 3). Linda reported that Garret suffered from schitzophrenia and was having an "episode" and being aggressive towards her and needed officer help dealing with him. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 3); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 3).
Bryan and Anthony's statement of undisputed facts offers descriptions of what is listed in the state's criminal complaint affidavit as to what was found at the scene of the crime, and states that Garret killed his mother by striking her with an electric guitar. Garret responds that he cannot admit any of these allegations "because the criminal case was never tried and Garret never entered a guilty plea." See (Garret Response Stmt. of Facts [54-1] at 1-3). The lack of a criminal conviction or guilty plea does not constitute grounds for blanket denials of the facts included in the criminal complaint affidavit. Garret's denials do not "show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). This is a civil case with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Garret does not argue that there are factual deficiencies in the affidavit, nor that the facts denied "cannot [be] produce[d] in admissible evidence." Id.
Officers arrived at the scene some point after. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 4); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). Upon arrival, Garret was in the front yard and was "highly upset, pacing back and forth, unintelligible at times and spontaneously stated ‘I just killed my mom’ multiple times." (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 5); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). Garret also "advised he had been hearing voices telling him to kill" Linda. (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). Neighbors also witnessed Garret pacing on the front porch and yelling "I just killed my mom" before officers arrived. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 7); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). Officers found Linda inside the home lying face down on the second floor landing, bleeding profusely from an injury to the back of her head. (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). Garret was detained and transported to an emergency room where he was given medications to calm him down. (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). Linda was transported to the hospital, where her condition deteriorated and she was disconnected from life support. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 6); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4).
Officers searched Linda's home pursuant to a warrant and located an electric guitar near the bottom of the stairs to the second floor with cracks in it and what appeared to be human hair in those cracks. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 9); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). A large amount of blood in a circular pattern was found at the top of the stairs. (Bryan and Anthony of Facts [52-1] ¶ 10); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4).
B. Criminal Proceedings
On October 18, 2017 Garret was ordered to undergo a competency evaluation at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center and was found incompetent to stand trial. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶¶ 13-14); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). His competency was restored on March 26, 2018. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 14); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 8). Criminal proceedings were reinstated on April 23, 2018. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶ 15); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 8).
On May 10, 2018, pursuant to Garret's notice that he would be raising the defenses of legal incapacity and diminished capacity, the court approved the state's request for an insanity evaluation to be performed at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center ("IMCC"). (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 8). The IMCC filed a report in which the examining psychiatrist determined that Garret was "legally insane at the time of the homicide, that ‘he was unable to form criminal intent,’ and that ‘He did not have the capacity to form a criminal plan.’ " (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 9). The psychiatrist specifically concluded that "during the brief time which the alleged crime was committed, [Garret] was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act he was committing" or "distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to that act." (Id. )
The actual IMCC report has not been included in the record of this case. Instead, the Court is apprised of the contents of the IMCC report and any quotes or conclusions therein only by the state's references to them in its motion to dismiss.
Both Garret and the state filed motions to dismiss which discussed the availability of the defenses of legal insanity and diminished capacity. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶¶ 16-18); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 5, 9). The state's motion to dismiss specifically indicated Garret had already been civilly committed for long term hospitalization and treatment, and thus did not pose a risk to the safety of the community while in a secure mental health treatment facility. (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 9). The court granted the state's motion to dismiss on November 13, 2018. (Bryan and Anthony Stmt. of Facts [52-1] ¶¶ 19); (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 11-12).
IV. DISCUSSION
Both Garret and Bryan and Anthony argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In essence, the parties have framed their positions as a legal dispute as to whether an individual who was legally insane at the time he caused the death of another could have acted "intentionally and unjustifiably" within the meaning of the Felonious Death statute.
"The Iowa Felonious Death statute... codifies the long established public policy that a murderer may not benefit from his crime." Salak v. Protective Life Ins. Co. , 19 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956 (S.D. Iowa 1998). The statute disqualifies any beneficiary of a life insurance policy "who intentionally and unjustifiably causes or procures the death of the ... person upon whose life the policy is issued" from taking the benefits of the policy. Iowa Code § 633.535(3) (emphasis added). The statute outlines the procedures to be used to determine whether a beneficiary is disqualified on these grounds. See Iowa Code § 633.536. Generally, whether the beneficiary intentionally and unjustifiably caused or procured the death of the decedent is to be decided "by any court of competent jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence separate and apart from any criminal proceeding arising from the death." Id. One notable exception is that "[a] person convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter of the decedent is conclusively presumed to have intentionally and unjustifiably caused the death" of the decedent. Id.
The parties concede that the issue of whether Iowa's Felonious Death statute disqualifies a beneficiary who was legally insane at the time they caused or procured the death of the decedent is one of first impression in Iowa. Although Garret was never actually adjudicated to be insane at the time of Linda's killing, the parties almost solely rely on persuasive authority from other jurisdictions in which the court determined the legal impact on their respective slayer statute of a beneficiary having been found not guilty of homicide by reason of insanity.
Garret spends a considerable portion of his briefing arguing that Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Costello , 557 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1996), an Iowa case which briefly discussed the effect of mental illness on an intentional-act exclusion, is persuasive because it directly confronts a similar issue. (Garret Response Brief [54] at 2-6). Although the Iowa Supreme Court ultimately found that the insured was not mentally ill, Garret urges that Costello is persuasive by representing that the Iowa Supreme Court stated "[I]f an insured is insane or suffering from mental illness, then the insured's act is not intentional under the intentional-act exclusion." (Id. at 4) (alteration by Garret). The Court does not find Costello to be persuasive because the Iowa Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt any position as to the relevance of insanity or mental illness: "One line of authority takes the view that , if an insured is insane or suffering from mental illness, then the insured's act is not intentional under the intentional-act exclusion.... Perhaps some future case will provide a basis for us to consider [the issue]." Costello , 557 N.W.2d at 287, 288 (emphasis and alterations added).
Garret argues that a beneficiary who was insane at the time he caused the death of the decedent categorically prevents the beneficiary from having acted "intentionally" under the Iowa Felonious Death statute. Garret supports this assertion by urging the Court to follow what he describes as the "Majority Rule" that an insane person is not disqualified by a slayer statute. (Garret Brief [51-3] at 4). It appears that a majority of states that have faced the issue have determined that their slayer statute does not disqualify a beneficiary who was insane at the time he killed the decedent. See Estate of Armstrong v. Armstrong , 170 So. 3d 510, 515 (Miss. 2015) (listing a number of cases from various states). With that said, "there is no uniformity in the manner of reaching" the result in the "Majority Rule" jurisdictions. Ford v. Ford , 307 Md. 105, 512 A.2d 389, 399 (Md. App. 1986).
For example, some of the courts, especially in those jurisdictions which apply the M'Naghten definition of insanity, reason that under that test a person found to be insane is, in fact, acquitted of the criminal charge. Since he was not guilty of committing the homicide, the rule is not invoked. A popular reason given is that under the definition of insanity applicable, be it M'Naghten's or one predicated upon a mental disease, defect or disorder, a killer within that definition could not entertain the requisite intent to make his act criminal so that the homicide was not intentional or unlawful or felonious. In some of the states in which the slayer's rule speaks in terms of a "conviction" and the insanity statute permits a verdict of guilty but precludes the imposition of punishment, as does ours, the courts have concluded that since no criminal sentence may be entered on the guilty verdict, there is no judgment in the criminal cause and the killer does not stand "convicted."
Id. at 124, 512 A.2d 389 ; e.g. , Turner v. Estate of Turner , 454 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he equitable doctrine which bars a person from profiting from his wrongful conduct is of no application here."); In re Vadlamudi's Estate , 183 N.J.Super. 342, 443 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1982) (holding that prior precedent established that an insane slayer could take from the decedent, despite a subsequent legislative enactment of a slayer statute requiring only "intentional" killing, because the slayer is equally incapable of forming the requisite intent under the criminal or civil standard). Bryan and Anthony argue "there is no exception in the statute for insanity," and therefore a killing was intentional under the statute "where there is no claimed accident or justification." (Bryan and Anthony Brief [52-3] at 6). In support of this position, they principally urge the Court to apply the Illinois Court of Appeals' interpretation of Illinois' slayer statute as set forth in Dougherty v. Cole , 401 Ill.App.3d 341, 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d 16 (2010). The operative language in the Illinois statute is virtually identical to that in Iowa's Felonious Death statute in disqualifying those who "intentionally and unjustifiably" cause the death of another. Id. , 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d at 19. In Dougherty , the court had to determine whether a beneficiary who stabbed his mother to death while hearing voices that she was the enemy and was found not guilty of first-degree murder by reason of insanity was nevertheless disqualified under Illinois' slayer statute. Id. , 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d at 18. The court held that he was. Id., 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d at 22. The court first relied on the fact that the statute was amended in 1983 so that, rather than disqualifying beneficiaries "convicted" of murdering the decedent, the statute disqualified a beneficiary who "intentionally and unjustifiably" caused the death of the decedent. Id. , 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d at 19-21. The court also relied on legislative history, in the form of a statement by a legislator during debate, that the amendment was meant to apply to "acquitted, insane killers who killed intentionally and unjustifiably." Id. , 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d at 21-22. The court ultimately found that because the beneficiary testified that he was cognizant he was killing his mother, he acted intentionally and unjustifiably. Id. , 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d at 21, 22.
Bryan and Anthony urge the Court to apply the Dougherty approach and hold that Iowa's Felonious Death statute "appl[ies] to insane killers" based on the similarities of the Illinois and Iowa statutes. (Bryan and Anthony Brief [52-3] at 6). While retaining the subchapter title "Felonious Death," Iowa's statute was similarly amended in 1987 to enlarge the former disqualification for beneficiaries who "feloniously" took the life of the decedent, to beneficiaries who "intentionally and unjustifiably" caused the death of the decedent. See Iowa Probate Code subchapter XI, §§ 633.535 et. seq. Bryan and Anthony thus argue that the "Iowa legislature adopted the act in nearly identical language to that of the act in Illinois ... for that to have happened by chance would be nearly impossible" and as a consequence there is "no reason why the Iowa courts should take a different approach to interpreting the same law." (Bryan and Anthony Brief [52-3] at 8). Bryan and Anthony further argue that the facts of Dougherty are "strikingly similar" to this case because Garret likewise "knew he was killing his mother, but the voices were telling him (allegedly) to do it." (Id. at 7).
Though the Iowa slayer statute is a civil statute, the Iowa Supreme Court has consistently held that it is penal in nature and should be strictly construed. See Salak , 19 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (listing and discussing cases from the Iowa Supreme Court). The Iowa Legislature's decision to remove the prior disqualification for "felonious" killings and replace it with "intentionally and unjustifiable" killings by a preponderance of the evidence standard does not alter the fact that the statute "imposes a forfeiture of a property right which becomes vested upon the death of the ancestor or testator." In re Kuhn's Estate , 125 Iowa 449, 101 N.W. 151, 152 (1904). Indeed, the Iowa Legislature expressly incorporates the criminal law by according conclusive presumptions to convictions for murder and voluntary manslaughter, all of which require proof of specific or general intent to take the life of another. Iowa Code § 633.536.
The conclusive presumption for murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions, together with the fact that in almost any context intentionally and unjustifiably causing the death of another is a crime, make it appropriate to consider the Felonious Death statute in pari materia with the criminal code for guidance on the issue of intent. See Boyd v. Boyd , 149 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1335 (N.D. Ala. 2016) (applying the same principal to Alabama's slayer statute). By its own terms, the statute plainly disqualifies only those beneficiaries who "intentionally" cause or procure the decedent's death. Arguably, use of the word "intentionally" could signal disqualification requires proof of specific intent to cause the decedent's death, but for present purposes the Court will take the reference as broad enough to embrace both specific and general intent.
Specific intent exists "when from the circumstances the offender ... subjectively desired the prohibited result," whereas general intent is present "when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result."
State v. Benson , 919 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. Fountain , 786 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010) ). " ‘[K]nowledge’ corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent." Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey , 444 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) ). See also In re Estate of Ivy , 433 Ill.Dec. 336, 131 N.E.3d 1181, 1197 (Ill. App. 2019) (interpreting Illinois' slayer statute post- Dougherty as requiring specific intent to kill, as opposed to the specific intent to cause great bodily harm). General intent requires that the person is aware he was doing the act and did it voluntarily. Iowa Crim. Jury Inst. 200.1 (2018). Thus, to have intentionally caused Linda's death, Garret must have had the "subjective desire" to bring about that result when he struck her with the guitar, or with awareness of what he was doing voluntarily struck her in circumstances in which death could be reasonably expected to result.
Under Iowa's version of the M'Naghten rule, "[a] person shall not be convicted of a crime if at the time the crime is committed the person suffers from such a diseased or deranged condition of the mind as to render the person incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act the person is committing ...." Iowa Code § 701.4. "To know and understand the nature and quality of one's acts means a person is mentally aware of the act(s) being done and the ordinary and probable consequences of them." Iowa Crim. Jury Inst. 200.10 (2018). In the Court's judgment, a person who is incapable of being aware of the acts he is committing and the ordinary and probable consequences of them cannot be said to have acted with a purpose to cause death or voluntarily with awareness of what he was doing and the expected consequences. It follows that if Garret was insane when he struck Linda with the guitar, he was not capable of intentionally causing her death within the meaning of § 633.535. This interpretation accords with the strict construction to be given to the Felonious Death statute, the language in the statute, and is consonant with criminal law concepts of intent, as well as being in general accord with the majority of jurisdiction which have addressed similar issues. For these reasons it would likely meet with approval by the Iowa Supreme Court.
The record before the Court is very limited, perhaps understandable for practical reasons. It contains only the criminal complaint originally charging Garret with willful injury and the subsequent motions to dismiss and order of dismissal in the criminal case. The criminal complaint is supported by the affidavit of the presenting law enforcement officer and evidently was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe Garret committed the assault which resulted in the death of his mother. The facts recited in the affidavit are detailed in the Statement of Material Facts [52-1] filed by Bryan and Anthony. Garret's raw denials in response are, as previously noted, insufficient to raise a genuine issue about the circumstances of the assault and the results of the criminal investigation. More specifically, Garret has not responded to his brothers' Statement of Material Facts derived from the criminal complaint affidavit with references to evidentiary material to support his denials as required by LR 56(b), nor has he explained why he is unable to present facts to support his denials. Accordingly, the material facts of the incident laid out by Bryan and Anthony in items 1-11 of their statement are deemed admitted. Id. The admitted facts warrant summary judgment in favor of Bryan and Anthony establishing that Garret unjustifiably caused the death of his mother by striking her on the head with a guitar, but they are not sufficient to conclusively establish he acted "intentionally."
The Murder in the First Degree charge came some six weeks after the incident. (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 5).
Some of the circumstances relating to the killing lead to an inference that Garret acted intentionally to cause Linda's death: the call to the police, the manner and apparent force with which Garret struck Linda, and his statements about hearing voices and awareness that he had killed his mother. Other factors point to a finding that Garret did not intentionally kill Linda, namely the IMCC psychiatrist's opinion that he was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act he was committing and met the "criteria for an Insanity Defense." (Garret App'x. [51-2] at 11). The criminal complaint affidavit also contains elements which support the psychiatrist's opinions. Garret's behavior may be seen as consistent with a schizophrenic episode at the time of his assault. When the police showed up, Garret was highly upset, unintelligible, spontaneously interjecting that he had killed his mother, and it was felt necessary to take him to the ER for medications to "calm him down."
The fact that the psychiatrist's opinions were recited in the State's motion as a reason to dismiss the murder charge and was relied on by the Iowa District Court in granting the motion are sufficient indicia of reliability to establish a genuine issue about whether Garret was insane, but the psychiatrist's opinion is not conclusive. The Court has only the psychiatrist's conclusion, not the full report, it is not sworn to, and in light of Garret's observed conduct at the time, would not support summary judgment on the issue of intent.
As noted previously, Bryan and Anthony's motion relies on the Illinois Court of Appeals' opinion in Dougherty . As Dougherty made clear, and was reiterated in Estate of Ivy , the court did not hold that the mere killing of another constitutes an "intentional" killing, or that legal insanity was otherwise completely irrelevant. Dougherty held that an acquittal on the grounds of insanity did not prevent the beneficiary from being found to have acted intentionally, despite the beneficiary acting on the direction of a voice in his head telling him to kill his mother, because he was cognizant that he was killing a person as he did so. The Dougherty court found the element of intent was satisfied because the beneficiary "testified he knew the person he beat and stabbed was the decedent and he knew he was trying to kill the decedent when he grabbed the knife and stabbed her." Estate of Ivy , 433 Ill.Dec. 336, 131 N.E.3d at 1202 (discussing the holding of Dougherty ).
Bryan and Anthony argue that the facts of this case mirror the facts in Dougherty and thus entitle them to an entry of judgment as a matter of law. They assert that, like Dougherty , Garret "knew he was killing his mother, but the voices were telling him (allegedly) to do it." (Bryan and Anthony Brief [52-3] at 7). There is no comparable evidence in this case to the definitive testimony given in Dougherty . See Estate of Ivy , 433 Ill.Dec. 336, 131 N.E.3d at 1203 (discussing the significance of the testimony in Dougherty ). Garret has not "testified" that he was aware he was going to kill Linda as he struck her with a guitar. Instead, he told police officers, while highly upset and frequently unintelligible, that at some point in time "he had been hearing voices telling him to kill his mother." (Bryan and Anthony App'x. [52-2] at 4). This is not an admission that Garret knew he was going to kill Linda at the time he struck her. Indeed, the statement lacks any temporal connection between when Garret heard the voices and when he struck Linda.
The Court is also not convinced that the statement of a single Illinois legislator made in connection with the enactment of Illinois' slayer statute in 1983 can be imputed to the legislative intent of the Iowa Legislature in enacting Iowa's similar statute four years later in 1987. If, as apparently the case in Illinois, the Iowa Legislature had intended the 1987 amendments to Iowa's Felonious Death statute to extend its benefits bar "to acquitted, insane killers who killed intentionally and unjustifiably," Dougherty , 343 Ill.Dec. 16, 934 N.E.2d at 22, it could have easily said so by extending the § 633.536 conclusive presumption to those found not guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter solely by reason of insanity, or otherwise addressing the status of insane persons who kill. It did not do either, leaving such persons in the same position as any other un-convicted person alleged to have intentionally and unjustifiably caused the death of a person described in the statute. There is no indication the Iowa Legislature had insane killers in mind when it amended Iowa's Felonious Death statute.
Factually and legally, the holding in Dougherty does not support summary judgment in favor of Bryan and Anthony on the issue of intent.
V. CONCLUSION
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Bryan and Anthony Selters [52] is granted in part and denied in part . The Motion is granted to the extent that the movants have shown there is no genuine dispute about the facts that Garret Selters unjustifiably caused the death of his mother, Linda Selters, by striking her on the head with a guitar. Those facts are established. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g). The Motion is denied with respect to the issue of whether Garret Selters intentionally caused the death of his mother, a fact genuinely in dispute. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Garret Selters [51] is denied .
Subject to further consideration and pretrial conference with counsel, the Court presently anticipates the sole triable and determinative issue is whether at the time he struck his mother, Garret Selters was insane because he suffered from a "diseased or deranged condition of the mind so as to render [him] incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act [he was] committing." On this Garret Selters will have the burden of proof.
The Court questions whether proof alone of the second prong of the insanity defense, inability to distinguish between right and wrong, would negate intent under § 633.535. A person who is unable to distinguish between right and wrong may nonetheless be fully aware of the injury causing act he is doing, or specifically intend its result.