Hartford Ind. Co. v. Wolbarst

47 Citing cases

  1. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Tringali

    686 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1982)   Cited 12 times
    In Tringali, the tortfeasor Makua intentionally drove his car against a stationary motorcycle on which Tringali was a passenger.

    However, that case was decided on other grounds, so we must ourselves address a question of first impression in the law of Hawaii. In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 1948, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a policy which provided that it complied with "the provision of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of any state" covered injuries where a collision was intended by the insured. The relevant law was that of New Hampshire, and it spoke of "bodily injuries . . . accidentally sustained" (emphasis supplied).

  2. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer

    177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949)   Cited 116 times
    Applying Virginia law, court noted "there can be no doubt" that automobile insurance policy was not intended to cover assault and battery, and thus, insurer was not obligated to defend or indemnify insured

    They contend that this statute was passed to afford redress for persons injured by the operation of motor vehicles, rather than to furnish indemnity to the owners thereof, and hence the phrase "caused by accident" in the statute and in policies issued under it should be construed from the standpoint of the injured parties as in the cases last cited; and they point out that this interpretation has been given and the injured party has been allowed to recover from the insurer for intentional injuries inflicted by the insured in Massachusetts and in New Hampshire under somewhat but not wholly similar acts. Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 9 N.E.2d 544, 111 A.L.R. 1038; Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151. The flaw in the argument is that the rulings referred to apply to policies issued under the requirements of motor vehicle financial responsibility statutes, and not to policies voluntarily procured as in the case at bar.

  3. Farm Bureau c. Ins. Co. v. Garland

    126 A.2d 246 (N.H. 1956)   Cited 8 times

    While the Financial Responsibility Act was "designed . . . to regulate . . . the rights and obligations of insurers issuing policies to comply with the statute" (Hartford c. Ind. Co. v. Come, 100 N.H. 177, 184), its primary purpose was by that means "to provide compensation for innocent persons who might be injured through faulty operation of motor vehicles." Hartford Ind. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 43; Hardware c. Cas. Co. v. Tobyne, 98 N.H. 318, 322. It is not to be presumed that by indicating policy provisions which should satisfy the financial security features of the statute, the Legislature intended to forbid provisions which would furnish broader coverage and hence do more to accomplish the legislative purpose than the provisions specified in the statute. Section 1 of the statute defines the type of policy which will qualify as security under the statute.

  4. Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Morrill

    100 N.H. 239 (N.H. 1956)   Cited 18 times
    Finding that although an insured's failure to notify the insurance company could not avoid coverage as against the injured parties, the insurer had the right to reimbursement from the insured for payments made because of a state financial responsibility act

    The fundamental purpose of the Law is to furnish compensation for innocent persons who may be injured by the negligent operation of motor vehicles. Hartford Ind. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 43. This purpose is not to "be lettered by independent restrictions." American Mut. c. Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 95 N.H. 200, 204.

  5. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin

    97 N.H. 196 (N.H. 1951)   Cited 46 times
    In Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 200, it was said: "In order to establish coverage for a motor vehicle, it must be described or referred to in the policy and capable of being identified as such."

    Phoenix Ind. Co. v. Conwell, 94 N.H. 146, held that rights under the minimum limits of liability required under the provisions of paragraph VII of section 1 of chapter 122 become absolute upon the occurrence of an accident and cannot be defeated by any terms of the policy." Hartford Ind. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 43, 44. Whatever the rights of the plaintiff may be against the named insured the condition or provisions of IV (a) (4) of the policy cannot be used to defeat or avoid coverage so far as the injured defendants are concerned. With respect to them, the liability of the plaintiff becomes absolute upon the happening of the accident.

  6. American Surety Company of New York v. Gold

    375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1967)   Cited 32 times
    Noting that the estoppel doctrine is not applied if its effect will be to permit some transaction barred by statute or public policy

    To hold to the contrary would impugn the integrity of the jury system. Appellee Dearmore suggests that in any event, any notion that Kansas public policy forbids the enforcement of this insurance contract was superseded by the Kansas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Kansas Statutes § 8-722 et seq., at least insofar as policies complying with the Act (as did this one) are concerned. This Act provides in § 8-750(b) that for a policy of insurance to be evidence of financial responsibility, it "shall insure * * * against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such vehicle * * *". Appellee's argument is based on Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151, in which the New Hampshire court held that the similar financial responsibility act of that state superseded state public policy forbidding insurance against damages for injuries intentionally inflicted insofar as a policy complying with the New Hampshire Act was concerned. Appellant argues that if the New Hampshire Act had this effect on damages for injuries intentionally inflicted, a fortiori the Kansas Act must have a similar effect on damages for injuries inflicted by gross and wanton conduct.

  7. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Ledesma

    214 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1954)   Cited 26 times
    Applying New Mexico law

    By that provision the pertinent provisions of the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which is contained in sections 68-1007 to 68-1043, inclusive, New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1941, were effectively incorporated into the policy and the liability of the garnishee is the same as though the policy had been written under and in compliance with such act. Newton v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 4 Cir., 107 F.2d 164, certiorari denied, 309 U.S. 673, 60 S.Ct. 616, 84 L.Ed. 1018; New York Casualty Co. v. Lewellen, 8 Cir., 184 F.2d 891; Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151; Traders General Insurance Co. v. Pioneer Mutual Compensation Co., 127 Colo. 516, 258 P.2d 776; Landis, for Use of Talley v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 347 Ill. App.? 560, 107 N.E.2d 187. Section 68-1009 of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of New Mexico provides that whenever the commissioner of the motor vehicle department is required under any law of the state to suspend or revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of any person, upon receiving record of the conviction of such person for any offense under the motor vehicle laws of the state, he also shall suspend any and all of the registration certificates and registration plates issued for any motor vehicle registered in the name of the person so convicted as owner, except that he shall not suspend such evidence of registration if such owner has previously given or shall within forty-five days give and thereafter maintain financial responsibility in the manner thereinafter specified in the act.

  8. Jespersen v. Colony Ins. Co.

    CIVIL 21-cv-846-JL (D.N.H. May. 22, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Courts have also consistently held that the “purpose of the New Hampshire Financial Responsibility Act was fundamentally to provide compensation for innocent persons that might be injured through faulty operation of motor vehicles.” Hartford Acc.& Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 43 (1948)

  9. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company v. Butler, (S.D.Ind. 1985)

    615 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ind. 1985)   Cited 9 times
    Construing Indiana law

    Other jurisdictions which require such insurance, recognizing that its purpose is to provide broad protection, have held that injuries suffered as the result of an intentional act by the insured are caused "by accident" and thus are covered by policies utilizing such language. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Tringali, supra; Sciascia v. American Insurance Company, supra; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151, 153 (1948). The general rule of insurance law that voids a policy indemnifying an insured against liability for his willful wrong does not apply to compulsory automobile liability insurance because "[t]he statute itself is declaratory of public policy applicable to compulsory insurance and supersedes any rule of public policy which obtains in ordinary insurance law."

  10. New Zealand Insurance Company v. Holloway

    123 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. La. 1954)   Cited 25 times

    Accordingly, we conclude the law to be as follows: Hartford Accident Indemnity Company v. Wolbarst, 1948, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151. For a résumé of the New Jersey law on this point read Continental Casualty Company v. Lanzisero, 1935, 119 N.J. Eq. 166, 181 A. 170. Century Indemnity Company v. Simon, D.C. 1948, 77 F. Supp. 221.