Opinion
No. HDSP-127220
September 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant seeks to dismiss this summary process action against her alleging that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff disagrees and asserts that the termination of the defendant's tenancy due to serious nuisance, as alleged in the notice to quit and the complaint, is sufficient under the facts as alleged by the plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff, Hartford East Apartments, operates an apartment building located at 886 Main Street in East Hartford. The tenants in the building are elderly and/or handicapped. The defendant, Sondra Eaton, is a tenant at 886 Main Street, living in Unit 411.
The defendant, who is diagnosed with a schizo-affective disorder, stabbed and seriously wounded a health-care worker who was present on the premises on the morning of December 8, 2003. Following the incident, the plaintiff began eviction proceedings against the defendant. The plaintiff contends that as a result of the incident, the tenants and employees are subject to a serious and immediate danger posed by the presence of the defendant. The plaintiff contends that in the course of its eviction of the defendant, it provided her with a sufficient description of the alleged facts indicating that the defendant's behavior constitutes a serious nuisance under Connecticut law.
The defendant filed this motion to dismiss alleging that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this summary process action. The defendant asserts that the conduct of the defendant does not support a claim of serious nuisance as defined by Connecticut General Statutes § 47a-15. At best, the defendant argues that her alleged conduct might constitute nuisance.
If the defendant's constitutes nuisance, then, the plaintiff has failed to exhaust the remedies available to a tenant under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff failed to deliver a pre-termination notice as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15.
Section 47a-15 provides that before a landlord may proceed with an eviction action based on allegations of breach of a tenant's responsibilities, the landlord must first deliver to the tenant a notice specifying the alleged breach and offering a 15 day period to remedy. Kapa Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn.Sup. 274 (1979). Delivery of the "Kapa" notice is a mandatory precondition to a summary process action and the failure to comply with this notice deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Marrinan v. Hamer, 5 Conn.App. 101 (1985). Because the plaintiff has failed to allege exhaustion of the remedies available under § 47a-15, the notice to quit, insofar as it is based on the defendant's breach of the lease by causing a nuisance, is premature.
The portion of the statute that defines nuisance in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15 allows the tenant to remedy his or her breach. The section requires that before a landlord or her legal representative may commence a summary process action, the landlord must deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying: (1) what the tenant did to cause the breach; and (2) setting forth the date of termination of the rental agreement. This rule applies when the tenant is materially non-compliant with his or her responsibilities as a tenant, as set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-11, and when the non-compliance is in regard to the rules and regulations adopted in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-9.
In some instances, the tenant may remedy a breach. If the tenant does remedy the breach by making repairs or paying damages (as in the case of a physical destruction of the premises) then the rental agreement does not terminate. If the breach can be remedied by the tenant, and is not remedied within the 15-day period allotted by the statute, then the rental agreement between the landlord and the tenant is terminated. However, the fight of a tenant to remedy the breach is limited.
The plaintiff, however, claims that the defendant's behavior constitutes a serious nuisance as set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15, not just nuisance. Therefore, if the defendant's conduct constitutes serious nuisance, the court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
The notice to quit was issued on December 30, 2003. As the reason for the termination of the tenancy, the plaintiff alleged in the notice to quit, "termination due to a violation of Paragraph 23c(6)(a) and 23c(6)(b) specifically a stabbing incident that occurred on December 8, 2003."
Paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges: "Defendant's right to occupy has terminated due to a violation of § 47a-15 of the Connecticut General Statutes Serious Nuisance and Paragraphs 23c(6)(a) and 23c(6)(b) of the lease in connection with a stabbing incident that took place on or about December 8, 2003."
The defendant argues that this statement does not allege facts that fall within the definition of serious nuisance.
Serious nuisance is defined as:
(A) inflicting bodily harm upon another tenant or the landlord or threatening to inflict such harm with the present ability to effect the harm and under circumstance which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such a threat will be canned out. (B) substantial and willful destruction of part of the dwelling unit or premises, (C) conduct, which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord, or, or (D) using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for prostitution or the illegal sale of drugs . . . (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15) (Emphasis added.)
The defendant stabbed a man on the premises who was a health care worker. A witness testified that he saw the defendant with the knife after the stabbing occurred.
Following the stabbing incident, the defendant was served with a notice to quit possession and a notice of termination. (Exhibits B and C). In the notice of termination, the defendant was given the opportunity to object, in writing, to the commencement of the eviction, proceedings against her. (Exhibit C) In her defense, she claimed that the victim's behavior "tormented and antagonized" her. (Defendant reply to notice, 1/2/04).
The plaintiff maintains that this conduct, the stabbing of a person at these premises, constitutes a serious nuisance as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15, because it presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of the other tenants and the landlord. The plaintiff argues that although the non-tenant health care worker was the ultimate victim, anyone could have been the target of the defendant's aggressive conduct because the conduct was based on a very abnormal perception of the circumstances around the defendant. Therefore, other tenants and the landlord could have been the defendant's victims. In addition, the plaintiff argues, there is nothing that these at risk individuals can do to reduce their risk of being attacked by the defendant, who responds to mild, friendly behavior with extreme violence.
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff failed to establish that alleged behavior meets the definition of serious nuisance. The plaintiff called one witness to support its allegation. The witness, a maintenance worker, testified that he did not see the incident and that he, the defendant, and the victim were the only persons in the area outside the building. Further, he testified that immediately after the incident, he went back to work sweeping. By his conduct after the incident, the defendant argues that the witness did not feel threatened by the incident because he returned to his work and there were no other persons present.
According to the defendant, the court must look to the plain language of the statute to determine whether the facts as alleged fall within the statutory definition of serious nuisance. The Legislature has recently announced that statutes must be interpreted by looking at their plain language. Public Act 03-154 which became effective on October 11, 2003, provides:
AN ACT CONCERNING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.
Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2003) The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the. meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. CT Page 15309
PA 03-00154 HB-05033 Approved June 26, 2003, Effective October 1, 2003.
The plaintiff, in its complaint, alleges that the defendant violated § 47a-15(C). The defendant contends that subsection C applies only to "conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord." The witness could only testify that an incident occurred, but he did not see it.
The plaintiff requests that in determining whether § 47a-15(C) was intended by the Legislature to apply to the facts of this case, all factors, including the persons residing at the premises and the nature of the incident should be considered. First, the co-tenants of the defendant are elderly and/or mentally handicapped persons. The plaintiff argues that unlike the health-care worker who was victimized, these individuals may lack the physical and/or mental capacity to fend off a violent attack or a mortal blow. Second, the landlord, by taking this action to evict the defendant, is in a position that is inherently antagonistic to the tenant. The plaintiff and its employees face the greatest risk of being attacked by the defendant because without provocation, the defendant has already attacked and seriously wounded one person.
The evidence, the plaintiff asserts, is sufficient to show that the defendant's conduct, an unprovoked stabbing of a health care worker, presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of the other tenants or the landlord. The plaintiff cites, Housing Authority of City of Stamford v. Morrow, 1995 WL 348025 (Conn.Super.), where a tenant with a mental disability assaulted a fellow tenant with a butcher knife in the hallway of a multi-family housing project. The plaintiff in the case sought an eviction of the defendant because the stabbing incident violated a portion of her lease.
The court found that the defendant's conduct, the knife assault, amounted to a serious nuisance as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15. The defendant in Morrow, supra, argued that the equities should be balanced in her favor, namely because; (1) she was elderly; (2) had a mental disorder; (3) the basis of the eviction was a part of her mental disorder; and (4) the eviction would leave her homeless. The court held that the plaintiff's equitable considerations outweighed those of the defendant, since: (1) the plaintiff was obligated to enforce the terms of its lease as well as the requirements of the Connecticut General Statutes for the purpose of providing quiet enjoyment to the other tenants of the premises; and (2) the tenant had an equal obligation of good faith and fair dealing to the landlord. In so holding, the court noted that in such a situation, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15 does not require a corrective opportunity offered by a "Kapa" notice (citing to Kapa Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn.Sup. 643, 647 (1981) and that "the landlord has the obligation to enforce the terms of the leases of other tenants and to provide an atmosphere of safety, tranquility, enjoyment. The actions of the defendant [were] in violation of that atmosphere." Other tenants and the landlord were endangered by the actions of the defendant.
Finally, the defendant alleges that the notice to quit is vague and lacks specificity and, therefore, it cannot serve as a basis for bringing this summary process action. Subsection (b) of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-23 requires that a notice to quit possession must state the reason for the termination of the tenancy. The failure to clearly specify the reason for the eviction deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Bank of Hartford, Inc. v. Bultron, SPH 9206-65684 (December 3, 1992 (H-997) (Holzberg, J.); 93-CBAR-0067.
The notice to quit alleges, "a stabbing incident that occurred on December 8, 2003," as the reason for the termination of the tenancy. The reason alleged in the notice to quit is specific enough to apprise the defendant of the conduct alleged by the plaintiff so they she could properly prepare a defense.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff has established sufficient allegations that meet the statutory definition of serious nuisance. Because the reason for the termination of the lease is predicated on serious nuisance, there is no requirement that the plaintiff provide the defendant a pre-termination notice. In addition, the reason stated on the notice to quit possession is not vague and provides the defendant sufficient information to prepare a proper defense of the allegation.
The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied and the objection to the motion by the plaintiff is sustained.
BY THE COURT:
Angel L. dos Santos, Judge