Code Ann. § 6-501. Hartford Acc. c. Co. v. Cohran, 106 Ga. App. 14, 17 ( 126 S.E.2d 289) (1962); Jones v. Cannady, 78 Ga. App. 453 (1) ( 51 S.E.2d 551) (1949). When the appeal of a probate proceeding is docketed with the clerk of the superior court there is no problem with the clerk determining that it is an appeal case, and the type of action involved. It being the express command of the statute that appeal cases be tried by a jury at the first term after the appeal has been entered, it would appear the duty of the clerk to place the same upon the trial calendar for the first term after docketing. If it cannot be reached at that term, or should the court otherwise defer the matter, neither party should be penalized because it has not been reached.
Such an allowance is within the court's discretion, and the trial court must find that the services were truly extraordinary and not merely duties ordinarily incident to the administration of the estate. See Hartford Accident c. Co. v. Cohran, 106 Ga. App. 14, 21 ( 126 S.E.2d 289) (1962); Adair v. St. Amand, 136 Ga. 1, 8 ( 70 S.E. 578) (1911). OCGA § 53-6-147 provides for the reimbursement of the administrator's actual expenses for required "travel out of his county in the discharge of his duty."
Such a discharge, therefore, would constitute an irregularity sufficient to demand the re-opening of the estate, even if the discharge was obtained in accordance with all the requirements of Code Ch. 113-23 as to notice, hearing, etc., a showing of fraud not being essential. Hartford Accident c. Co. v. Cohran, 106 Ga. App. 14, 15 (2) ( 126 S.E.2d 289). 3. While it does not appear in the record that the alleged order of the court of ordinary, discharging the defendant administrators prior to 12 months from their qualification, was before the superior court in the trial of the defendants' de novo appeal from the judgment of the court of ordinary setting aside the above order, there remained in the case the issues of the existence and the date of the alleged order, the allegations as to which were denied by the defendant's answer.
The Georgia law provides for commissions for representatives of estates and for extra compensation that may be allowed by the ordinary, or by the superior court on appeal, for services of the executor that were reasonable and necessary to the sound administration of the estate. Code §§ 113-2001-113-2008; Hartford Acc. c. Co. v. Cohran, 106 Ga. App. 14, 21 ( 126 S.E.2d 289). The law also provides for "expenses of such agents as the administrator finds it necessary to employ for the estate" as necessary expenses of administration. Code § 113-2009.