Latham v. State, 195 Ga.App. 355, 356(2), 393 S.E.2d 498 (1990). See also Hart v. State, 185 Ga.App. 141, 142–143(4), 363 S.E.2d 599 (1987) (“The State is entitled to inform the jury of all the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime or crimes charged [,] and we find no error in admitting this evidence as part of the res gestae even though it may have incidentally placed the defendant's character in evidence.”) (punctuation omitted).

Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 539, 544 (4) ( 630 SE2d 410) (2006).Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141, 142 (4) ( 363 SE2d 599) (1987).McGuire v. State, 266 Ga. App. 673, 678 (4) (a) ( 598 SE2d 55) (2004).

See Hart v. State. This enumeration fails. Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141 (1) ( 363 SE2d 599) (1987). 3.

"Evidence as to whether appellant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs on the night in question was part of the res gestae of the crimes and was admissible as such." Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141, 143 (4) ( 363 S.E.2d 599) (1987). The logic of this general rule is particularly clear in a case such as this one, where the state of mind of the accused is pivotal.

]" Akins v. State, 184 Ga. App. 441 (1) ( 361 S.E.2d 707) (1987). 7. The appellant contends that the court erred in charging the jury on conspiracy. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy may be proved although not alleged in the indictment, see Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 599) (1987); and "where the evidence in a criminal case shows that two or more persons were concerned in the commission of an alleged crime, it is not harmful error for the trial court to charge ... the jury on the law of conspiracy." Battle v. State, 231 Ga. 501-502 ( 202 S.E.2d 449) (1973).

The trial court did not err in admitting appellant's own evidence that he had been free-basing cocaine the night before the killing until 2:00 or 3:00 a. m. and again on the day of the killing until 1:00 p. m. Appellant stabbed Kaigler at about 5:30 p. m. This evidence, as part and parcel of the crime and as res gestae, was admissible under Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 408 ( 330 S.E.2d 686) and Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141, 142 ( 363 S.E.2d 599), even though the killing does not appear to have directly involved drug usage and even though the evidence incidentally puts appellant's character in issue. The trial court, having determined the evidence was admissible on grounds of relevancy (see OCGA § 24-2-1), properly instructed the jury that they would be the determiners of whether this evidence was in fact relevant, and appellant did not object to the charge or suggest a better one. Surrounding circumstances constituting part of the res gestae may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact, and their admissibility is within the discretion of the trial court; it does not matter that the act does not establish directly the main offense.

The evidence adduced at this hearing authorized the trial court to find that appellant's in-custody statement had been freely and voluntarily made after he had been given the Miranda warnings. Under these circumstances, the statement was properly admitted into evidence for the jury's consideration. See Hagans v. State, 187 Ga. App. 216, 217 (2) ( 369 S.E.2d 536) (1988); Garcia v. State, 187 Ga. App. 166, 167 (2) ( 369 S.E.2d 776) (1988); Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141, 142 (3) ( 363 S.E.2d 599) (1987). 4. As to the "peeping Tom" charge, appellant enumerates as error the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

Thus, the evidence authorized a charge on the law of conspiracy. See generally Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 599) (1987). 2.

The trial court did not err in admitting [defendant's] in-custody statement into evidence.' Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141, 142 ( 363 S.E.2d 599) (1987). Accord Gaines v. State, 179 Ga. App. 623 (1) ( 347 S.E.2d 673) (1986); see also Sanders v. State, 182 Ga. App. 581 (1) ( 356 S.E.2d 537) (1987); Grayer v. State, 181 Ga. App. 845 (4) ( 354 S.E.2d 191) (1987); Newsome v. State, 180 Ga. App. 243 (3) ( 348 S.E.2d 759) (1986); Jones v. State, 178 Ga. App. 15 (2) ( 342 S.E.2d 5) (1986).

]' [Cit.] Thus, the evidence authorized a charge on the law of conspiracy, and the trial court so charged." Hart v. State, 185 Ga. App. 141 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 599) (1987). "[W]here the evidence in a criminal case shows that two or more persons were concerned in the commission of an alleged crime, it is not harmful error for the trial court to charge [as to parties to a crime] or to charge the jury on the law of conspiracy.