Hart v. Frost

5 Citing cases

  1. Geofredo v. Starwood Capital Group, LLC

    2011 Mass. App. Div. 221 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

    Man/rates v. LawrencePlaza Ltd. Partnership, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 413 (1996), quoting Mathis v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 409 Mass. 256, 264 (1991). But the "right to amend a complaint is not automatic," Hart v. Frost, 1993 Mass. App. Div. 185, quoting Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 167 (1983); and the refusal to permit an amendment will be affirmed on appeal when the judge's findings, or the record itself, indicates that the ruling was justified on the basis of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party [, or the] futility of. . ." amendment.

  2. Public Works Sup. Co., Inc. v. Kevton Corp.

    2004 Mass. App. Div. 167 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 1 times

    Id. To the extent Atlantic argues that our decisions in Hart v. Frost, 1993 Mass. App. Div. 185 and Brossi v. Fisher, 1999 Mass. App. Div. 99 support its contrary argument, we note that both were written prior to Ravnikar. Thus, as PWS's contract claims in Counts I and II of its complaint are within the traditional jurisdiction of the District Court, its G.L.c. 149, § 29 bond claim against Atlantic may also be decided in the District Court.

  3. Hickey v. Grandine

    1998 Mass. App. Div. 93 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 1 times

    1. Pursuant to G.L.c. 231, § 103, the plaintiff's commencement of this personal injury action in the Concord Division of the District Court Department constituted a waiver of her right to a Superior Court jury trial as a matter of law. Thayer v. Clerk ofthe District Court of Barnstable, 421 Mass. 1001, 1001-1002 (1995); Hart v. Frost, 1993 Mass. App. Div. 185, 186. She could have regained that right only by complying with the requirements of § 103.

  4. Chapian v. Car Wash Systems, Inc.

    1996 Mass. App. Div. 98 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    00 threshold amount for the statutory removal in the first instance of District Court actions to the Superior Court, the defendants were not required to file a request for a Superior Court trial within twenty-five days of service of the plaintiffs' complaint. See, e.g., Hart v. Frost, 1993 Mass. App. Div. 185. 186. On the basis of the complaint alone and before the filing of their answer.

  5. Grant v. Dibitetto

    1996 Mass. App. Div. 56 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    By commencing this action in the District Court Department and failing to file the necessary G.L.c. 231, § 103 claim within thirty days, the plaintiff initially waived his right to a Superior Court jury trial. Thayer v. Clerk of Dist. Court ofBarnstable, 421 Mass. 1001, 1001-1002 (1995); Hart v. Frost, 1993 Mass. App. Div. 185. The defendant's counterclaim, however, effectively "revived" the plaintiff's right to such jury trial. Haddad v. Pulaski, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 964 (1994).