Hart v. Ferguson

5 Citing cases

  1. Reckard v. Ryan

    288 P. 1053 (Or. 1930)   Cited 2 times

    That issue must be determined in a separate action. As stated in Hart v. Ferguson, 73 Okla. 293 ( 176 P. 396): "It is the unbroken line of decisions that, unless especially provided by statute, in an action of unlawful or forcible detainer, possession of the land is the only recovery that can be had. No question of rent, or damage to the land, is involved."

  2. Schuminsky v. Field

    1980 OK 22 (Okla. 1980)   Cited 2 times
    Finding that a tenant's counterclaims based on landlord's alleged breaches of a lease agreement could not be asserted in the landlord's forcible entry and detainer case but could be brought by a separate action

    However, in 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 28, at p. 992, Set-off, Counterclaim or Recoupment, it is stated that, in the absence of statutory authority, generally no set-off, counterclaim, cross-complaint or cross-demand in the nature of a recoupment can be interposed in forcible entry and detainer proceedings. In an early decision of this Court, Hart v. Ferguson, 73 Okla. 293, 176 P. 396, 397 (1918), it was recited that earlier in Oklahoma Territory pursuant to a statute then and there in effect the plaintiff could recover damages in a forcible entry and detainer case. In Hart, however, this Court said that pursuant to Revised Laws of 1910, in such an action, possession of the lands and costs only could be recovered.

  3. State ex Rel. Siegel v. Strother

    365 Mo. 861 (Mo. 1956)   Cited 22 times

    ex rel. Damon v. McQuillin, 246 Mo. 674, 152 S.W. 341; Smith v. Smith, 327 Mo. 632, 37 S.W.2d 902; Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 935. (15) A special statutory proceeding (absent a statutory provision to the contrary) cannot be joined with any other cause of action. Baradaa v. Citizens of Carondelet, 16 Mo. 323; Dalton v. State Highway Comm., 27 S.E.2d 1; State ex rel. Anderson v. Dinwiddie, 359 Mo. 980, 224 S.W.2d 985; Boudreau v. Riverland Levee Dist., 184 S.W.2d 403; MacKenzie v. Porter, 91 P. 916; City of Superior v. Douglas County Tel. Co., 141 Wis. 363, 122 N.W. 1023; Union Lime v. Railroad Com., 144 Wis. 523, 129 N.W. 605; Clayton v. City of Henderson, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 87, 44 S.W. 667; Abernathy v. South W. Ry. Co., 150 N.C. 97, 63 S.E. 180; Shunick v. Thompson, 25 Ill. App. 619; Brush v. Fowler, 36 Ill. 53; Ow v. Wickham, 38 Kan. 225, 16 P. 335; Tyler v. McKenzie, 43 Colo. 233, 95 P. 943; Beman v. Rocky Ford Nat. Bank, 100 Colo. 64, 65 P.2d 708; Hart v. Ferguson, 73 Okla. 293, 176 P. 396; Thompson v. Reynolds, 53 Utah 437, 174 P. 164; Sharpe v. Sharpe, 134 Mo. App. 278, 114 S.W. 584; State ex rel. Rodgers v. White, 239 Mo. App. 839, 201 S.W.2d 781; Fawkes v. Fawkes, 204 S.W.2d 132; Harmonizing Rule No. 3.02(a) of Sup. Ct. of Mo. (16) The doctrine of relation back, recognized in will contests, is a common law principle, not founded on any provision of the general code. 37 C.J. 1068, 1069. (17) The right to amend the pleadings in a will contest is a common law rule of practice, not merely a rule established by the general code.

  4. Schuman v. Brown

    68 P.2d 779 (Okla. 1937)   Cited 1 times

    The term "proper case" may quite properly, and we think logically, refer to actions on appeal bonds in ordinary appeals from justice of the peace courts. In Hart v. Ferguson, 73 Okla. 293, 176 P. 396, it was held that in an action for the forcible entry and detention, or detention only, of real property the only recovery that can be had by the complainant must be for the possession of the land in controversy and costs. That on appeal from the justice of the peace court the authority of the appellate court is limited to that of the justice of peace. Nichols v. Rennie, 117 Okla. 155, 245 P. 593.

  5. Nichols v. Rennie

    245 P. 593 (Okla. 1926)   Cited 2 times

    This contention must be sustained. In the case of Hart v. Ferguson, 73 Okla. 293, 176 P. 396, after a review of the authorities generally, it was held that in an action for the forcible entry and detention, or detention only, of real property, the only recovery that can be had by the complainant is for possession of the lands in controversy and costs. In McDonald v. Stiles, 7 Okla. 327, 54 P. 487, in the body of the opinion.