Opinion
Civil Action 6:23-cv-6754-DCC-KFM
10-01-2024
Sherita R. Hart a/k/a Sherita R. King,[1] Plaintiff, v. Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon Logistics, Inc., Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 40). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases involving litigation by individuals proceeding pro se and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed her complaint on December 19, 2023 (doc. 1). On January 12, 2024, the undersigned issued an order directing the plaintiff to bring her case into proper form, including providing documents for the United States Marshals Service to effect service (doc. 8). When the defendant failed to timely provide these forms, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation on February 14, 2024, to the Honorable Donald C. Coggins, Jr., United States District Judge, that the case by dismissed based in part on a lack of complete diversity jurisdiction, as three of the named defendants were South Carolina residents (doc. 14). Before Judge Coggins ruled on the report and recommendation, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 12, 2024, removing the three South Carolina defendants (doc. 23). Accordingly, Judge Coggins issued a text order finding the report and recommendation moot and recommitting the case to the undersigned for pretrial matters (doc. 28). On May 9, 2024, the undersigned authorized service on the defendants Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon Logistics, Inc. (doc. 32). The defendants timely appeared, and their motion for an extension to answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint was granted on June 4, 2024 (doc. 36). On June 24, 2024, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss the amended complaint based on the applicable statute of limitations (doc. 40). By order filed June 25, 2024, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if she failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion (doc. 43). The plaintiff filed her response in opposition to the motion on August 5, 2024 (doc. 49). The defendants thereafter filed a reply on August 12, 2024 (doc. 50). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for consideration.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant to her amended complaint, she was a subscriber to the Amazon Prime service operated by the defendants, providing her home address for package deliveries (doc. 23, amend. comp. ¶¶ 13-14). Her former husband, Joseph L. King, was employed as a package deliveryman for subcontractor Dunamis Coalitions, Inc., which handled package deliveries ordered through Amazon Prime (id. ¶ 15). At all times relevant to her allegations and in the performance of his job, King wore a uniform bearing the corporate logo of the defendants (id., ¶ 17). The plaintiff alleges that King had “dangerous proclivities” of which the defendants should have been aware and that on December 8, 2020, he battered and injured her at her home. Despite his arrest that day and the entry of a no-contact order, King re-entered the plaintiff's house on December 9 and 26, 2020, by breaking a window, and on the 26th violently restrained and sexually assaulted her (id. ¶¶ 20-24). She alleges causes of action against the defendants for negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, negligent retention, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (id. ¶¶ 25-47). As set forth above, the plaintiff filed her initial complaint here on December 19, 2020 (doc. 1) and her amended complaint on March 12, 2024 (doc. 23).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The defendants seek dismissal of the plaintiff's claims based on the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. “[A] motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests the sufficiency of the complaint, generally cannot reach the merits of an affirmative defense, such as the defense that the plaintiff's claim is time-barred.” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). As a result, district courts may only resolve a statute of limitations defense at the motion to dismiss stage “if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.' ” Id. (quoting Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)). Here, the plaintiff's factual allegations in her amended complaint create the clear appearance that her claims may be untimely. As such, the undersigned finds that the issue is properly considered here.
The plaintiff's claims are subject to South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530(5) (stating that actions for “any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not enumerated by law” have a statute of limitations of three years), 15-3-535 (“[A]ll actions initiated under Section 15-3-530(5) must be commenced within three years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action.”). See Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 284 F.R.D. 352, 357 (D.S.C. 2012) (“South Carolina law provides for a three-year statute of limitations on actions for negligence, negligent misrepresentation.” (citations omitted)); Terry v. Allen Univ., No. 2014-UP-192, 2014 WL 2721805, at *1 n.2 (S.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2014) (noting that S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5) sets a three-year statute of limitations for claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress). The discovery rule determines the date of accrual of the claims. See Benton v. Roger C. Peace Hosp., 443 S.E.2d 537, 539 (1994). “The statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action reasonably ought to have been discovered,” i.e., “when the facts and circumstances of the injury would put a person of common knowledge on notice that some right has been invaded or the claim against another party exists.” Id. (citations omitted).
The undersigned finds that the plaintiff's claims are barred as untimely under the three-year statute of limitations. As set out in her own allegations, the plaintiff was well aware by at least December 8, 2020, that her former husband Joseph L. King (1) had “dangerous proclivities”; (2) was working for a subcontractor delivering packages for the defendants; (3) wore an Amazon uniform; and (4) was involved in assaultive conduct, having been arrested on December 8, 2020, for battering and injuring her. As the defendants argue, the plaintiff was personally aware of all the facts necessary to establish her claims against the defendants no later than December 8, 2020, and she waited more than three years - until December 19, 2023 - before filing her case here.
The plaintiff argues in opposition to the motion to dismiss that the December 8, 2020, date is arbitrarily applied and that the “totality of the events pled in the [a]mended [c]omplaint” should be considered (doc. 49, p. 5). However, this argument fails to change the analysis, as December 8, 2020, remains the date that she discovered the underlying facts supporting her claims. As the Honorable Sherri A. Lydon, United States District Judge, has cited in a discovery rule analysis applying South Carolina law:
“According to the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action reasonably ought to have
been discovered.” Bayle v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 542 S.E.2d 736, 740 (App. 2001). The question is objective, rather than subjective. Joubert v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 341 S.C. 176, 534 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2000). “In other words, whether the particular plaintiff actually knew he had a claim is not the test. Rather, courts must decide whether the circumstances of the case would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded, or that some claim against another party might exist.” Young v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrs., 333 S.C. 714, 511 S.E.2d 413, 416 (App. 1999).Harrell v. BMW of North America, LLC, 517 F.Supp.3d 527, 537 (D.S.C. 2021). Given this legal standard, the plaintiff was plainly on notice of her potential claims against the defendants on December 8, 2020.
The plaintiff appears to argue that her claims should not be considered time-barred because the undersigned authorized service of her subsequent amended complaint upon the defendants (doc. 49, pp. 5-6). However, the defendants are not prevented from raising a timely affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations based on the court's handling of pretrial matters. To hold otherwise would result in the statute of limitations being dependent on the actions of the court, rather than the timeliness of the actions of the complaining party, where the legislature obviously intended it to be. Further, the plaintiff appears to suggest that a second amended complaint - one that eliminates the December 8th date - should be authorized (id., pp. 4-5). However, such a pleading would be futile, as the applicable discovery rule date for the statute of limitations would not change or vanish with its omission from fresh pleadings. Accordingly, to the extent the plaintiff moves to amend her complaint for a second time (id.), the undersigned recommends that motion be denied.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 40) be granted and the plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint (doc. 49) be denied.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).