Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-06754-DCC-KFM
02-14-2024
Sherita Hart; Plaintiff; v. Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon Logistics, Inc.; Dunamis Coalition, LLC; Joseph King; Donald Frazier; Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by a non-prisoner. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on December 19, 2023 (doc. 1). By order filed January 12, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring her case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 8). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, bringing her case into proper form. However, for the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this matter be summarily dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief from the defendants for violation of her right to privacy, negligent hiring & supervision, assault, battery, criminal sexual conduct, false imprisonment, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (id. at 2). The plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction based on her federal claim and the Declaratory Judgment Act (along with supplemental jurisdiction) (id. at 3-4). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants Amazon.com, Amazon Logistics, and Dunamis (hereinafter collectively “Amazon”), had a joint database of customers' information that is supposed to be kept private (id. at 7-8). The plaintiff contends that Mr. King (her exhusband) worked as a delivery driver for Amazon and was able to illegally access her private information at Amazon so he could stalk and harass the plaintiff, including by mailing her packages through Amazon Prime and calling her while he was working (id. at 7-9). The plaintiff contends that Mr. King has a criminal record, which should prevent him from working for Amazon and that Amazon did not fire Mr. King even after she informed Amazon of his “dangerous proclivities” (id. at 9).
The plaintiff contends that Mr. King attacked her on December 8, 2020, and was arrested for battery (id. at 9-10). The Anderson County Court issued a no contact order for Mr. King after the attack, but Mr. King still attacked the plaintiff on December 9, 2020 (id. at 9-10). Mr. King also attacked the plaintiff on December 26, 2020 (id. at 10-11). The plaintiff was forced to constantly move around with her children to hide from Mr. King because he continued to stalk and harass her (id. at 11-14). The plaintiff also contends that Mr. Frazier helped Mr. King harass and stalk her and that Mr. Frazier was a violent man who had improperly touched female children in the past (id. at 13-15). The plaintiff contends that in July 2021, she took steps to prevent her residential location from being disclosed to government agencies, courts, family members, and friends (id. at 12). The plaintiff kept her Amazon Prime service and disclosed her location to Amazon (id.).
The plaintiff's first cause of action is right to privacy based on her First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment rights (id. at 15-16). The plaintiff contends that Amazon unlawfully allowed Mr. King to access her address (as provided in her Amazon Prime account) because he was employed as an Amazon delivery driver (id.). The plaintiff's second cause of action is a state law claim for damages based on a right to privacy that was violated when Mr. King was able to access the plaintiff's address (id. at 16-17). The plaintiff's third cause of action against Amazon is negligence because Mr. King was able to access the plaintiff's address (id. at 17-18). The plaintiff's fourth and fifth causes of action against Amazon are negligent hiring, supervision, and retention because Mr. King was able to access the plaintiff's address (id. at 18-20).
The plaintiff's sixth cause of action is assault against Mr. King and Mr. Frazier based on the attack by Mr. King in December 2020 (id. at 20-21). The plaintiff's seventh cause of action is battery against Mr. King for the attack in December 2020 (id. at 21-22). The plaintiff's eighth cause of action is invasion of privacy - burglary against Mr. King for the assault in December 2020 (id. at 22-23). The plaintiff's ninth and tenth causes of action are criminal sexual misconduct and rape against Mr. King (id. at 23-24). The eleventh and twelfth causes of action are IIED and negligent IIED against Mr. King and Mr. Frazier (id. at 25-26). The plaintiff's thirteenth cause of action is false imprisonment against Mr. King for the attack in December 2020 (id. at 26-27). The fourteenth cause of action is harassment against Mr. King (id. at 27-28).
For relief, the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the defendants violated her rights and money damages (id. at 28-29).
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings. This court possesses the inherent authority to review the pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the pleading is not subject to the pre-screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (finding that “frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.” (citations omitted)); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that “district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee”). Accordingly, “[t]he present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous.” Trawickv. Med. Univ. of S.C., C/A No. 2:16-cv-730-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 8650132, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 8650131 (D.S.C. July 7, 2016), aff'd 671 Fed.Appx. 85 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem).
The plaintiff paid the full filing fee; thus, this case is not subject to the pre-screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Further, the plaintiff is not a prisoner; thus this case is not subject to the screening provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
There are two types of federal jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction arises when the case arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction, on the other hand, is conferred upon the Court when a suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction (and supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims) (doc. 1 at 3-4).
Because the plaintiff shares citizenship (South Carolina) with at least one defendant, diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case (see doc. 1 at 1).
As an initial matter, because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not, in and of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts, a suit brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction (i.e. federal question or diversity jurisdiction). See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). As such, the federal claim acting as a lynchpin for jurisdiction in this matter is the plaintiff's claim for violation of her right to privacy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc. 1 at 15-16). However, the plaintiff has not alleged any viable § 1983 claims in this action. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, the plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail because the defendants were not acting under color of state law. It is well-settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the state' can be sued as a state actor under § 1983.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012). However, private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is not covered under § 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999). In distinguishing between state action and private action,
The judicial obligation is not only to preserv[e] an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoi[d] the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control, but also to assure that constitutional standards are invoked when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assn, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). State action may be found to exist “if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has identified several contexts in which private action may be found to constitute state action, such as “when the state has coerced a private actor to commit an act that would be unconstitutional if done by the state”; “when the state has delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor”; “when the state has sought to evade a clear constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor”; or “when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private citizen.” Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993). The critical inquiry in each case is whether the private actor's conduct was fairly attributable to the state. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2001). “[T]he ultimate resolution of whether an actor was a state actor . . . is a question of law for the court.” Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 344 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000). Here, the plaintiff's complaint - alleging that her exhusband utilized his position as an Amazon delivery driver to obtain her address, stalk her, and attack her (doc. 1 at 7-12) - “includes no facts that establish such a ‘close nexus' between” the defendants' challenged actions and the state such that their actions “may be ‘fairly treated' as those of the state itself.” See Perry v. Chattem, Inc., C/A No. 7:08-cv-00106, 2008 WL 983428, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2008). Indeed, there is nothing in the plaintiff's complaint to suggest that Amazon (or any of the defendants) are somehow state actors (see doc. 1). Further, a § 1983 action may not be “based alone on a violation of state law or on a state tort.” Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1988) Wilson v. Ozmint, C/A No. 3:10-cv-02887-RMG, 2011 WL 1336391, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2011). As such, the plaintiff's complaint does not contain any cognizable federal claims.
Because the plaintiff's complaint does not contain any cognizable federal claims, to the extent the plaintiff seeks damages based on state law causes of action -including right to privacy; negligence; assault; battery; negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; invasion of privacy-burglary; and IIED, as gleaned from her complaint - the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over such claims. Such claims can be considered by this court through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction,” which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal claims. Wis. Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Here, as noted, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a federal claim for relief, as outlined in more detail above. Thus, based on the inherent authority of the court, the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss the § 1983 claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining stat law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”).
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending her complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).