Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc.

19 Citing cases

  1. Porter v. Erickson Transport Corp.

    851 S.W.2d 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 24 times
    In Porter, the driver could drive another truck for another carrier; the carrier had no right to select the route driven by the driver; the carrier was not obligated to pay the hotel bill of the driver, and the driver did not have to call the carrier each day.

    To hold otherwise would force upon an accident victim the absurd task of filing a workers' compensation claim naming the alleged tort-feasor as the victim's employer, then attempting to convince an administrative law judge that the tort-feasor was not the victim's employer. Another case where an injured worker brought a negligence suit and the defendant asserted the sole remedy was workers' compensation is Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1968). The opinion states:

  2. McLeod v. Marion Laboratories, Inc.

    600 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 14 times

    It was suggested in Roberts that the appropriate procedure was to raise the defense by answer and determine the issue in a separate trial. See Wooten v. Youthcraft Mfg. Co., 312 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1958), and Harryman v. L. N. Buick-Pontiac Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1968). Roberts, Wooten, and Harryman, supra, were all decided at a time when the rules and code of procedure made no provision for summary judgment or the taking of evidence in support of a motion asserting an affirmative defense.

  3. Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.

    824 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1992)   Cited 38 times
    In Goodrum, this Court held: "[W]e find that [section] 287.120... is an exercise of legislative authority rationally justified by the end sought, and hence valid against the contention made here."

    Here plaintiffs plead an intentional tort by an employer is not an "accident" and is thus beyond the purview of the worker's compensation laws. See Killian, id. at 160; Speck v. Union Electric Co., 741 S.W.2d 280, 281-83 (Mo.App. 1987); Risse v. APV Anderson Brothers, 714 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Mo.App. 1986); McCoy v. Liberty Foundry Co., 635 S.W.2d 60 (Mo.App. 1982); Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193, 196-97 (Mo. banc 1968). But see Hood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Mo.App. 1983); Loughridge v. Overnite Transportation Co., 649 F. Supp. 52 (E.D.Mo. 1986); Allen v. Dorothy's Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 523 S.W.2d 874, 878-79 (Mo.App. 1975) (applying statutory provision that workers' compensation applies to unprovoked violence or assault against employee by any person).

  4. State ex Rel. McDonnell Douglas v. Ryan

    745 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1988)   Cited 37 times
    Discussing subject matter jurisdiction

    The only issue is whether his death was an accident within workers' compensation. The Colonnas principally rely on Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1968), to support their assertion that the trial court has jurisdiction over the underlying cause of action herein. In Harryman, plaintiff, a mechanic, was not awarded a workers' compensation claim because his injury, resulting from the removal of an engine block, was not an abnormal or unusual strain or unusual occurrence.

  5. Shepard v. Robinson

    451 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1970)   Cited 7 times

    It did not determine any question of res adjudicata, but we further note that the supposed employer (Ford) was a party defendant and would have been the only interested party opposing the plaintiff in a Workmen's Compensation proceeding. In Hines v. Continental Banking Co., Mo.App., 334 S.W.2d 140, 84 A.L.R.2d 1027, and Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., Mo., 431 S.W.2d 193, the rulings held to be res adjudicata were final determinations made by the Industrial Commission in matters within its jurisdiction (the reverse of our situation), and in each case the employer-defendant was a party in both the common law action and the compensation proceeding. It is obvious that the claimant in our case, pursuing here only the Second Injury Fund which was not a party to the prior common law action, is, so far as the theory of res adjudicata is concerned, relegated to his contention that the prior findings and judgment were in rem.

  6. Kansas City Univ. of Med. & Biosciences v. Pletz

    351 S.W.3d 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 8 times

    Beatty v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 731 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Mo.App. E.D.1987) (citation omitted); see also, e.g.,Consol. Freightways Corp. v. State, 503 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo.1972) (“The term ‘such users' can refer only to those [users] referred to in the first two paragraphs....”); Harryman v. L & N Buick–Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo. banc 1968) (“The phrase ‘ such accidental injury’ can only have reference to the last employment of the words ‘injury’ and ‘accident’ and that is in sub-section (1) containing the phrase ‘ injury or death of the employee by accident ’ ”) (abrogated on other grounds). Pletz responds that the language of the second condition should not be used to interpret the first condition because, “[b]y consecutively numbering and separating the clauses by a semicolon ... [KCUMB] signified [its] intent that the two clauses be given equal force and dignity.”

  7. Lastra v. Intercontinental Investments

    745 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times

    " The statute is therefore no bar to appellants' action because the statute, if in derogation of the common law, must be construed strictly, Watkins v. Wattle, 558 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Mo.App. 1977); Huff v. Union Elec. Co., 598 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Mo.App. 1980), involved the question of whether Union Electric was an owner of premises upon which improvements were erected by independent contractors which would cause it to be excepted as a statutory employee under worker's compensation laws. The court said, "The issue is the common law liability of respondent, and the law must be strictly construed when existing common law rights are affected. Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1968). * * * If there is a close question, as there is here, the decision should be weighted in favor of retention of the common law right of action.

  8. Speck v. Union Elec. Co.

    741 S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 9 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming dismissal as to portion of wrongful death action that claimed employee's initial illness was due to exposure from asbestos, holding that it was barred by workers’ compensation statute

    There are similarities between the case at bar and McCoy. Under the McCoy standard, plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action. On appeal plaintiffs do not make a serious attempt to distinguish McCoy; rather, they attack the reasoning and soundness of that decision, contending that it conflicts with Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1968), and cases from other jurisdictions. When we initially transferred this case, we anticipated that the supreme court would examine their complaints, especially the contention of a conflict between McCoy and Harryman; however, it declined to do so.

  9. Osburg v. Gammon

    704 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    Sweet v. Herman, supra at 32. The cases cited by appellant, Harryman v. L N Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1968) at 195-196; Peer v. MFA Milling Company, 578 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. banc 1979) at 293-295; Miller v. Municipal Theatre Assn. of St. Louis, 540 S.W.2d 899 (Mo.App. 1976) at 903-904, are all distinguishable because in none of the three cases did the Division of Worker's Compensation take jurisdiction and no benefits were paid. Appellant also cites two federal cases which are not apposite here because a different law is involved and because the payments made were voluntary. Further, this court is not bound by federal decisions in this field.

  10. Boswell v. May Centers, Inc.

    669 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 14 times
    In Boswell, the subsidiary corporation did not fit within the statutory definition of an "employer", § 287.030.1(1), RSMo 1986, and therefore did not have standing to assert the exclusive remedy defense.

    This conclusion also furthers the Missouri policy that "[c]ommon law rights and remedies should not be taken from an employee unless they are abolished by clear and unambiguous terms." Harryman v. L. N. Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo. banc 1968). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.