ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and the facts, by deleting the provisions thereof conditioning the father's future unsupervised visitation with the subject child upon his submission to the Family Court of evidence of “medical clearance” and upon his continued submission of “medical clearance” evidence to the court on an annual basis; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. “The court's paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child” (Matter of Julie v. Wills, 73 A.D.3d 777, 777, 899 N.Y.S.2d 669 ; see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260 ; Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d 883, 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808 ). Since custody determinations depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, deference is accorded to the trial court's credibility findings, and such findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d at 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808 ; Matter of Otero v. Nieves, 77 A.D.3d 756, 756–757, 908 N.Y.S.2d 603 ). Here, the Family Court's determination that the child's best interests would be served by awarding sole custody to the mother had a sound and substantial basis in the record, and will not be disturbed (see Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d 712, 713, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208 ; Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d at 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808 ; Matter of Peoples v. Bideau, 85 A.D.3d 798, 924 N.Y.S.2d 843 ).
During the pendency of this appeal, one of the children, Samia B., turned 18 years of age. As such, she is no longer subject to the order appealed from, and the appeal from so much of the order as pertains to Samia B. must be dismissed as academic ( see Matter of Bartley v. Pringle, 90 A.D.3d 653, 933 N.Y.S.2d 889;Matter of Brown v. Jimenez, 88 A.D.3d 875, 876, 931 N.Y.S.2d 522;Matter of Cahill v. Zakian, 71 A.D.3d 765, 895 N.Y.S.2d 738;Matter of Merando v. Vantassel, 66 A.D.3d 783, 886 N.Y.S.2d 356). “The court's paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child” (Matter of Julie v. Wills, 73 A.D.3d 777, 777, 899 N.Y.S.2d 669;see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260;Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d 883, 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808;Haggerty v. Haggerty, 78 A.D.3d 998, 999, 911 N.Y.S.2d 639). “Because custody determinations depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, deference is accorded to the trial court's findings, and such findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Otero v. Nieves, 77 A.D.3d 756, 756–757, 908 N.Y.S.2d 603;see Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d at 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808;Haggerty v. Haggerty, 78 A.D.3d at 999, 911 N.Y.S.2d 639). Here, the Family Court's award of sole custody to the mother has a sound and substantial basis in the record and will not be disturbed ( see Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d at 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808;Matter of Peoples v. Bideau, 85 A.D.3d 798, 924 N.Y.S.2d 843;Matter of Cavallero v. Pena, 83 A.D.3d 1062, 1063, 921 N.Y.S.2d 531).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. In resolving custody and visitation disputes, the paramount concern is the best interests of the child ( see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260;Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 432 N.E.2d 765;Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d 883, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808;Matter of Awan v. Awan, 63 A.D.3d 733, 880 N.Y.S.2d 683). The Family Court's determination of custody and visitation disputes is largely dependent upon an assessment of the credibility of the parties, and those credibility determinations are generally accorded deference on appeal. The determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of Cordero v. DeLeon, 92 A.D.3d 943, 938 N.Y.S.2d 901;Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d at 883–884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808;Matter of Awan v. Awan, 63 A.D.3d 733, 880 N.Y.S.2d 683). Contrary to the father's contention, the Family Court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in determining that the best interests of the subject child would be served by awarding sole custody of the child to the mother ( see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260;Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 17 A.D.3d 635, 636, 794 N.Y.S.2d 103), with extensive visitation to the father pursuant
"The paramount concern in any custody or [parental access] determination is the best interests of the child, under the totality of the circumstances" ( Matter of Boggio v. Boggio, 96 A.D.3d 834, 835, 945 N.Y.S.2d 764 ; seeMatter of Wilson v. McGlinchey, 2 N.Y.3d 375, 380–381, 779 N.Y.S.2d 159, 811 N.E.2d 526 ; Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260 ). Since custody determinations depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, deference is accorded to the trial court's findings, and such findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record (seeMatter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d 883, 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808 ; Haggerty v. Haggerty, 78 A.D.3d 998, 999, 911 N.Y.S.2d 639 ; Matter of Otero v. Nieves, 77 A.D.3d 756, 756–757, 908 N.Y.S.2d 603 ; Matter of Conforti v. Conforti, 46 A.D.3d 877, 877–878, 848 N.Y.S.2d 359 ). Here, the Supreme Court's determination that the children's best interests would be served by awarding temporary joint legal custody to the parties has a sound and substantial basis in the record and will not be disturbed (seeMatter of Gasby v. Chung, 88 A.D.3d 709, 709–710, 930 N.Y.S.2d 471 ; Matter of Quinones v. Gonzalez, 79 A.D.3d 893, 912 N.Y.S.2d 432 ).
To modify an existing custody arrangement, there must be a showing of a subsequent change of circumstances such that modification is required to protect the best interests of the child (seeGentile v. Gentile, 149 A.D.3d 916, 918, 52 N.Y.S.3d 420 ; Nusbaum v. Nusbaum, 106 A.D.3d 791, 793, 964 N.Y.S.2d 628 ; Matter of Fallarino v. Ayala, 41 A.D.3d 714, 838 N.Y.S.2d 176 ). The best interests of the child are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances (seeEschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260 ). Inasmuch as custody determinations depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, deference is accorded to the hearing court's findings in this regard (see Matter of McKenzie v. Williams, 165 A.D.3d 673, 674, 85 N.Y.S.3d 205 ; Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d 712, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208 ; Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d 883, 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808 ). The court's findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of McKenzie v. Williams, 165 A.D.3d at 674, 85 N.Y.S.3d 205 ; Gasby v. Chung, 88 A.D.3d 709, 930 N.Y.S.2d 471 ). Under the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court's determination, in effect, denying that branch of the father's motion which was to modify the custody provisions of the parties' judgment of annulment so as to award him sole physical and legal custody of the child has a sound and substantial basis in the record, and therefore, it will not be disturbed (see Matter of Vargas v. Gutierrez, 155 A.D.3d 751, 752–753, 64 N.Y.S.3d 76 ; see also Matter of Sullivan v. Sullivan, 40 A.D.3d 865, 866, 836 N.Y.S.2d 259 ).
Moreover, there is no basis to disturb the Family Court's order awarding sole custody of the child to the mother. “The court's paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child” (Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d 712, 712, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260 ). “Custody determinations turn in large part on assessments of the credibility, character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, and such assessments by the Family Court should not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Falabella v. Belits, 129 A.D.3d 1077, 1077, 10 N.Y.S.3d 875 ; see Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d 883, 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808 ). Contrary to the father's contention, the Family Court properly determined that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding sole custody to the mother, with liberal visitation to him (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 174, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260 ; Matter of Falabella v. Belits, 129 A.D.3d at 1077, 10 N.Y.S.3d 875 ).
Moreover, there is no basis to disturb the Family Court's order awarding sole custody of the child to the mother. "The court's paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child" (Matter of Gooler v Gooler, 107 AD3d 712, 712 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171). "Custody determinations turn in large part on assessments of the credibility, character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, and such assessments by the Family Court should not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Falabella v Belits, 129 AD3d 1077, 1077; see Matter of Harry v Harry, 92 AD3d 883, 884). Contrary to the father's contention, the Family Court properly determined that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding sole custody to the mother, with liberal visitation to him (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 174; Matter of Falabella v Belits, 129 AD3d at 1077).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. “The court's paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child” ( Matter of Julie v. Wills, 73 A.D.3d 777, 777, 899 N.Y.S.2d 669;see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260;Matter of Maraj v. Gordon, 102 A.D.3d 698, 957 N.Y.S.2d 717;Matter of Julian B. v. Williams, 97 A.D.3d 670, 948 N.Y.S.2d 399;Matter of Purse v. Crocker, 95 A.D.3d 1216, 944 N.Y.S.2d 648;Matter of Awan v. Awan, 63 A.D.3d 733, 734, 880 N.Y.S.2d 683). Since custody determinations depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, deference is accorded to the trial court's findings, and such findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of Harry v. Harry, 92 A.D.3d 883, 884, 938 N.Y.S.2d 808;Haggerty v. Haggerty, 78 A.D.3d 998, 999, 911 N.Y.S.2d 639;Matter of Otero v. Nieves, 77 A.D.3d 756, 756–757, 908 N.Y.S.2d 603;Matter of Conforti v. Conforti, 46 A.D.3d 877, 877–878, 848 N.Y.S.2d 359). Here, the Supreme Court's determination that the children's best interests would be served by awarding sole custody to the father has a sound and substantial basis in the record and will not be disturbed ( see Matter of Gasby v. Chung, 88 A.D.3d 709, 709–710, 930 N.Y.S.2d 471;Matter of Quinones v. Gonzalez, 79 A.D.3d 893, 912 N.Y.S.2d 432).