Opinion
Civil No. 08-1016 (JAF).
November 5, 2009
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, Harry Rodríguez-Rivero ("Rodríguez"); Linette Miró-Quiñones; and their conjugal partnership, bring the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, Pedro Toledo-Dávila ("Toledo") and Rafael Ramos-Vélez ("Ramos"), each in his personal capacity, and an unnamed insurance company, alleging violations of Rodríguez' rights under the U.S. Constitution. (Docket No. 17.) Plaintiffs also allege violations of their rights under Puerto Rico law. (Id.) Defendants Toledo and Ramos (together, "Movants") move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (Docket No. 70), and Plaintiffs oppose (Docket No. 82).
Plaintiffs also sued unnamed police officers and supervisors, but said defendants were later dismissed on Toledo's motion. (See Docket Nos. 34; 37.)
I. Factual and Procedural History
We derive the following factual and procedural summary from the parties' pleadings, motions, exhibits, and statements of uncontested facts. (Docket Nos. 17; 30; 39; 69; 70; 73; 81; 82.)At the time of the alleged constitutional violations, Toledo was superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD"), and Ramos was a PRPD officer involved in Rodríguez' arrest.
On January 8, 2007, Rodríguez exited on foot a convenience store in San Juan, Puerto Rico. According to Rodríguez, he got into his car, which had been parked in front of the store, pulled away from the curb, and started down the road. (Docket No. 70-2 at 9-11.) Shortly thereafter, a group of men in plain clothes surrounded his car, wielding firearms and demanding that he exit the car. (Id. at 11-14, 18.) Believing himself and his car in danger, Rodríguez panicked and fled the gunmen; he reversed, running into the car behind him, then put his car into drive and sped away. (Id. at 11-15, 21.) Not far down the road, he heard police sirens and pulled over immediately. (Id. at 26.) Four marked police vehicles pulled up behind him, and police surrounded his vehicle with their weapons drawn. (Id. at 28-29.) The police threatened to kill him, pulled him out of the car, dropped him on the ground, hit his mouth, and grabbed his legs and dragged him face down on the pavement before they handcuffed him and lifted him to his feet. (Id. at 29-30; Docket No. 70-6 at 4-9.) At no time did Rodríguez resist the officers. (Docket No. 70-6 at 7.) The officers then placed him in an unmarked police vehicle and took him to the police station, where they processed his arrest and held him for several hours. (See id. at 9-10, 16, 23.) They tested his blood alcohol content, cited him for driving under the influence, and released him. (See id. at 26.)
Although neither Rodríguez nor the woman whose car he hit, a witness to the present action, knew it at the time, the gunmen who originally approached Rodríguez' car were plain-clothed police officers. (See, e.g., Docket Nos. 70-2 at 11; 81-3 at 5, 10.) Said officers were all members of the PRPD drug and narcotics division, deployed as if to run a drug intervention. (See Docket No. 81-6 at 2-3.) Nothing in the record explains why they initially approached Rodríguez.
Ramos participated in the foregoing events, but the extent of his participation is disputed. By his own testimony, Ramos witnessed Rodríguez' hit-and-run (Docket No. 81-6 at 2), which places him among the officers involved in the initial intervention. Despite his sworn testimony, Ramos maintains in his motion that his first involvement came after Rodríguez was handcuffed. (See, e.g., Docket No. 70 at 17.) Undisputed is that Ramos then led Rodríguez to the car, rode in the backseat with him to the station, processed his arrest paperwork, and interacted with him during the course of his detention. (See, e.g., Docket No. 70-6 at 17.)
As to Toledo's involvement, Plaintiffs allege that he was charged with ensuring that PRPD officers were trained properly regarding constitutional violations. (Docket No. 17.) But according to Toledo, Toledo's subordinate was the one responsible for organizing and executing such training. (Docket No. 81-4 at 1.) To Toledo's knowledge, that training occurred monthly and without problems. (Id. at 8.) Ramos, however, testified that he had never, in four years at the PRPD, received this required, monthly training. (Docket No. 81-2 at 10.)
On January 8, 2008, Plaintiffs filed suit in this court. (Docket No. 1.) On July 17, 2008, they filed an amended complaint. (Docket No. 17.) On November 17, 2008, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and on Defendant Toledo's motion, this court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against Toledo in his official capacity, and the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of Miró and the Miró-Rodríguez conjugal partnership. (Docket No. 26.) Movants moved for summary judgment on October 2, 2009, as to the remaining claims against them (Docket No. 70), and Plaintiffs opposed on October 29, 2009 (Docket No. 82).
II. Summary Judgment Under Rule 56(c)
We grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party and "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).The movant carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
"Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must `produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.'" Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999)). The nonmovant "may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2).
III. Analysis
Movants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) Plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause of action under § 1983 for violation of Rodríguez' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (2) Movants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Docket No. 70.) We address each argument in turn.
A. Prima-Facie Case Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for violation of a federal right by a person acting under the color of state or territorial law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, under § 1983, a supervisory official may be held liable for his subordinates' behavior, but only if (1) his subordinates' behavior resulted in a constitutional violation; and (2) the official's action or inaction was affirmatively linked to that behavior such that "it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference." Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiffs allege Ramos' direct violation both of Rodríguez' Fourth Amendment rights, in arresting Rodríguez without probable cause and in using excessive force while effecting that arrest, and of Rodríguez' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, in originally approaching Rodríguez in the manner described above in Part I. (See Docket Nos. 17; 82 at 8.) Plaintiffs also allege Toledo's supervisory liability for said violations. (Docket No. 17.) We examine each alleged violation, in turn, and then discuss Movants' involvement in same.
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. If a crime is committed in an officer's presence, the ensuing arrest is considered a reasonable seizure of the offender. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Indeed, "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." Id.
In the present case, the PRPD officers arrested Rodríguez after he, in their presence, impacted another car and sped away from the accident site. Rodríguez' behavior constitutes a misdemeanor under Puerto Rico law. See 27 L.P.R.A. §§ 5101-5102 (2006). Thus, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arresting Rodríguez.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment also prohibits the use of excessive force in effecting arrests. See Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2009). Excessive force is "force that was unreasonable under all the circumstances." Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). To determine whether the force applied was unreasonable, we look to certain criteria, including "the severity of the crime at issue[;] the extent (if any) to which the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
The evidence on the record in the present case suggests that the force used against Rodríguez during his arrest was excessive. According to Ramos' testimony, Rodríguez was arrested for a hit-and-run. There is no evidence that Rodríguez was "resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight," as no one claims that the officers who initially approached Rodríguez were attempting to arrest him. In fact, when he first heard police sirens, Rodríguez immediately pulled over and fully cooperated with the police at all times thereafter. While arguably Rodríguez' apparently reckless driving posed "an immediate threat" to public safety, a reasonable jury could find that the arrest described above in Part I was, nevertheless, excessively forceful under the circumstances.
Movants argue that "[t]he force used during the arrest was . . . reasonable, specially [sic] given the circumstances of the case in which plaintiff Rodríguez had tried to escape and also the fact that he was drunk." (Docket No. 70 at 15.) But no evidence shows that the initial approach was an attempted arrest from which Rodríguez tried to "escape"; indeed, no one offers any explanation whatsoever as to the character of that approach. Furthermore, Ramos testified that the officers did not know Rodríguez was drunk until after they interviewed him at the police station. (Docket No. 81-2 at 3; see also Docket No. 81-3 at 14.)
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Generally, we apply Fourth Amendment analysis to claims of unlawful seizures. But we find that some of the alleged behavior in this case requires analysis under Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process instead. This is because the unexplained behavior of the officers, that initial approach that startled Rodríguez into his flight, did not constitute a "seizure" in the constitutional sense. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998) (citing California v. Hodari P., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)) (discussing Court's holding that a mere attempt to seize "does not amount to a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"). Thus the behavior surrounding that approach is not governed by the Fourth Amendment, and we must turn instead to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of a person's life, liberty, or property by a state or territory without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Exam'g Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 586 (1976) (applying Due Process Clause to U.S. territories). "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government. . . ." County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 845-46 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
" Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims often turn on whether the alleged misconduct `shocks the conscience.'"Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 262, 272 (1st Cir. 2009). And "the official conduct `most likely to rise to conscience-shocking level' is `conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.'" Id. at 273 (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003)).
The record in this case reveals no justification whatsoever for the officers' initial approach. Rodríguez' hit-and-run provided the only justification for interacting with Rodríguez at all, and that event transpired only after the initial approach. Toledo and Ramos ignore this glaring omission, deeming it immaterial by maintaining that Ramos was not present at that initial approach. (See Docket No. 70 at 8 ("Ramos arrived to the scene for the first time, once [Rodríguez'] arrest had taken place.").) We find this argument untenable, as Ramos himself testified that he had witnessed the hit-and-run. (See Docket No 81-6 at 2.) Without any explanation as to the government's intent or interest, and with evidence from Plaintiffs suggesting that Rodríguez was approached for no legally-cognizable reason, we cannot but consider the government's conduct arbitrary. And, given the understandable distress said behavior caused Rodríguez, a reasonable jury could certainly find that said arbitrary conduct shocks the conscience.
3. Movants' Involvement
As to Ramos' involvement in the alleged Fourth Amendment violation, we need only note his testimony that he was "the person who effected the arrest." (Docket No. 81-2 at 8; see also id. at 11 ("Q: Could you tell us who was the person who restrained [Rodríguez]? A: Myself.").) As to his involvement in the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation, we again need only note his testimony that he was present for the hit-and-run, which was the site of the initial approach. (See Docket No. 81-6 at 2.) These facts satisfy us that a reasonable jury could find that Ramos was directly involved in both of the alleged constitutional violations.
As to Toledo's involvement, we must inquire as to whether his conduct "could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference." See Pineda, 533 F.3d at 54; see also supra (discussing standard for supervisory liability). For his behavior to amount to at least deliberate indifference, we must find that Toledo knew of the risk of constitutional violations to people in Rodríguez' position but failed to take reasonable steps to abate that risk.Cf. Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2002).
The record shows that Toledo regularly received reports regarding complaints against officers (Docket No. 81-4 at 2); this supplies the requisite showing that Toledo knew of the risk to the constitutional rights of people like Ramos. The record also shows that Toledo, through his subordinates, required constitutional-compliance training for officers like Ramos but failed to ensure that this training took place (see Docket Nos. 81-4 at 4, 6; 81-2 at 10); this supplies the requisite showing that Toledo failed to take reasonable steps to abate said risk. Thus, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the issue of Toledo's supervisory involvement in the constitutional violations at issue in this case.
B. Qualified Immunity
Movants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Ramos' actions did not violate Rodríguez' constitutional rights. (Docket No. 70 at 17-18.)
Qualified immunity protects state officials from the burden of standing trial or facing other onerous aspects of litigation.Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). To determine whether Movants are entitled to qualified immunity, we must ask "(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right at issue was `clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged violation." Maldonado v. Fontañes, 568 F.3d 263, 268-69 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009)). The second prong of the Pearson analysis entails two separate inquiries: First, whether the right at issue was sufficiently clear; and second, whether under the facts of the particular case, a reasonable defendant would have known that his conduct violated that right. Id. at 269 (citing Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
We already determined that Plaintiffs proffered sufficient evidence to establish violations of Rodríguez' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, supra Part III.A.1-2, and, accordingly, we find the first prong satisfied. We also find that both the Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force and the Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from arbitrary, injurious government action are clearly established.See supra Part III.A.1-2.
Further, for the reasons stated above, supra Part III.A.1, a reasonable officer in Ramos' position would have known that the force used in Rodríguez' arrest was excessive under the circumstances. Similarly, on this record, a reasonable officer in Ramos' position would have known that the intervention with Rodríguez was arbitrary, injurious government conduct. See supra Part III.A.2. As to Toledo, a reasonable officer in his position would have known that the failure to adequately train officers like Ramos as to constitutional compliance directly contributes to the perpetration of constitutional violations by such officers. See supra Part III.A.3. Given the above conclusions, we find that Movants are not entitled to qualified immunity, and we strongly urge the parties to settle this case.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Movants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 70). We DISMISS Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim that Rodríguez was arrested without probable cause, but we RETAIN all other claims.