Opinion
Case No. 8:17-cv-02679-HMH-JDA
11-30-2018
Julius L. Harrison, Plaintiff, v. United States of America, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant. [Doc. 80.] Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). [Doc. 1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action on September 26, 2017. [Doc. 1.] On June 4, 2018, the Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's medical treatment and mold-related claims, but denied the motion with respect to Plaintiff's slip-and-fall claim. [Doc. 68.] On August 20, 2018, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's slip-and-fall claim. [Doc. 80.] The following day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 81.] Plaintiff's response in opposition was entered on the docket on September 27, 2018. [Doc. 90.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on September 26, 2017. [Doc. 1-4 at 2 (envelope stamped as processed by prison mailroom on September 26, 2017).]
BACKGROUND
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Complaint. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff is a federal prisoner, and he alleges he was injured on December 18, 2016, while incarcerated at FCI Williamsburg in Salters, South Carolina. [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-8.] He alleges he slipped and fell in his cell because of water on the floor that had leaked from the ceiling because of rain the previous night. [Id. ¶ 8-9.] He asserts that he possibly re-injured a pre-existing back injury when he fell. [Id. ¶ 8.] Medical staff and others picked Plaintiff up and moved him by wheelchair to the medical area. [Id. ¶ 11.]
Plaintiff arrived at FCI Williamsburg on December 16, 2016, and was not warned that the buildings had a substantial leaking problem whenever it rained. [Id. ¶ 12.] Plaintiff alleges the buildings continue to leak, and many cells have mold and other microbial buildup, which has caused Plaintiff and other inmates to develop an uncontrollable cough. [Id. ¶¶ 13-14.] Plaintiff further contends that the leakage problem has existed for years and staff have been aware of the leakage and mold problems, but they have done nothing to address the problems or warn of the potential hazard. [Id. ¶¶ 15-17, 24-25.] Plaintiff further alleges that he has been denied effective treatment and MRIs for the injuries related to his slip and fall. [Id. ¶ 38.]
Plaintiff asserts that as a result of FCI Williamsburg's employees' negligence, he "has suffered exa[]cerbated physical injuries as well as the mental distress, discomfort, and oppression/depression associated with not rec[ei]ving effective medical treatment" and "will continue to experience pain for said injuries into the future." [Id. ¶ 52.] He seeks $5,000,000 in compensatory damages. [Id. ¶ 54.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
DISCUSSION
In its motion, Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for negligence based on the slip and fall. [Doc. 80 at 10-19.] The Court agrees.
Under the FTCA, federal courts must determine liability in accordance with the substantive tort law of the state "where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Accordingly, because Plaintiff alleges negligence that occurred while he was housed in a Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") facility located in South Carolina, the substantive law of South Carolina controls.
To prove negligence in South Carolina, a plaintiff must show (1) that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) such duty was breached; and (3) damage resulted from the breach of duty. Bloom v. Ravoira, 529 S.E.2d 710, 712 (S.C. 2000). A plaintiff may show defendant owed him a duty of care arising from a statute if "the essential purpose of the statute is to protect from the kind of harm the plaintiff has suffered" and the plaintiff "is a member of the class of persons the statute is intended to protect." Rayfield v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 374 S.E.2d 910, 914 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). A breach of duty exists where it is "foreseeable that one's conduct may likely injure the person to whom the duty is owed." Horne v. Beason, 331 S.E.2d 342, 344 (S.C. 1985). However, even when a breach occurs, the "damages allegedly sustained must be shown to have been proximately caused, i.e. causally connected, to the breach of duty in order to warrant a recovery." Id. The proximate causation analysis requires proof of both causation in fact and legal causation. See Oliver v. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 422 S.E.2d 128, 130 (S.C. 1992). "Causation in fact is proved by establishing the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligence." Parks v. Characters Night Club, 548 S.E.2d 605, 609 (S.C. App. 2001). Legal causation "turns on the issue of foreseeability. An injury is foreseeable if it is the natural and probable consequence of a breach of duty." Id. (internal citation omitted).
A plaintiff seeking recovery for injuries resulting from a foreign substance on a floor "must demonstrate either that the substance was placed there by the defendant or its agents, or that the defendant had actual or constructive notice the substance was on the floor at the time of the slip and fall." Wintersteen v. Food Lion, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 728, 729-30 (S.C. 2001); see also Hackworth v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (D.S.C. 2005) (citing the Wintersteen requirements when analyzing a plaintiff's FTCA claim). "The mere fact the substance was on the floor is insufficient standing alone to charge the [defendant] with negligence." Calvert v. House Beautiful Paint & Decorating Ctr., Inc., 443 S.E.2d 398, 399 (S.C. 1994).
Defendant concedes it owed Plaintiff a duty to provide reasonable care. [Doc. 80 at 14.] However, Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to establish either prong of a slip-and-fall action and that he cannot prove causation. [Id. at 14-19.] In response, Plaintiff admits that "[a]t [n]o time [in] this [a]ction did Plaintiff allege the defendant or [i]ts [a]ge[n]ts placed (w[a]ter) [f]oreig[n] substa[n]ce o[n] the [f]loor [a]t the time of the slip/f[a]ll." [Doc. 90 at 10.] Instead, Plaintiff contends that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of water on the floor, asserting that BOP officials knew that rainwater leaked into the cells at FCI Williamsburg "primarily because it was allowed to exist for such a sufficient length of time." [Id.] In support of this argument, Plaintiff has provided declarations from other prisoners at FCI Williamsburg who aver that the housing units leak when it rains. [Docs. 17-1; 59; 83.] However, Plaintiff has provided nothing beyond speculation that BOP officials knew rain water leaked into the cells, and speculation is not enough to survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Rushton v. United States, No.: 1:15-cv-01378-JMC, 2017 WL 5668404, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 27, 2017) (finding that a lack of evidence above a speculative level that a post office was on notice of any defect in a mat was insufficient to defeat summary judgment); Lucas v. Sysco Columbia LLC, No. 3:13-cv-02883-JFA, 2014 WL 4976509, at *3-5 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2014) (concluding that the plaintiff had not proven the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that water was on the floor where she slipped where the plaintiff could not show the defendant knew water was on the floor or how long the water had been there, even where an employee stated "the floor was wet 'anytime it rained'"); Norris v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 1:12-02592-JMC, 2014 WL 496010, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2014) (finding that summary judgment was proper where the plaintiff failed to show how long a foreign substance had been on the floor before she fell); Massey v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 4:09-cv-01694-RBH, 2010 WL 3786056, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 22, 2010) ("[T]he length of time that the foreign substance has been on the floor is not a determination that can be left to speculation."); Gosnell v. USPS, No. 6:05-1315-HFF, 2007 WL 1034997, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (holding that a general awareness that rain will be tracked in by customers on a rainy day was insufficient to establish "constructive notice that there was rainwater on the floor the day Plaintiff fell"). Moreover, the declarations fail to establish that rainwater was on the floor at the time Plaintiff fell or that BOP officials knew rainwater was on the floor that day. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant had constructive notice of rainwater on the floor when he fell, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Throughout his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that this case is not ripe for summary judgment under Rule 56(d), that he has made a request for evidence under the Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act, and that he could defeat summary judgment if he were allowed more time to conduct discovery. [E.g., Doc. 90 at 1-3, 12.] Plaintiff advanced a similar argument in his response in opposition to Defendant's previous motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. [Doc. 30 at 42-45.] Indeed, it was based on this argument that the undersigned recommended that Defendant's motion be treated as one to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and that matters outside the pleadings be excluded from consideration at that procedural posture. [Doc. 64 at 8 n.4.] However, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate why he has not had sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery when the case has been pending for over one year and over five months have elapsed since the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the slip-and-fall claim. According to Defendant, "Plaintiff has not propounded any discovery upon [Defendant]" in this case. [Doc. 80 at 2.] Nor does Plaintiff allege that he has served any discovery requests on Defendant as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; instead, Plaintiff asserts he has made a request under the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act. [Doc. 90-1 at 1-3.] Because Plaintiff has not shown that he lacked sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery, the Court rejects his prematurity argument. See Clayton v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d 514, 521-22 (D.S.C. 2017).
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish either that Defendant placed the water on the floor in his cell or that Defendant had actual or constructive notice that the water was on the floor at the time Plaintiff fell, the Court declines to address Defendant's other arguments. --------
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge November 30, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina