Opinion
Civil Action 23-4361
02-15-2024
KENYATTA HARRISON, Plaintiff v. TEMPLE EPISCOPAL HOSPITAL, Defendant
MEMORANDUM
PRATTER, J.
Currently before the Court is a pro se complaint filed by Kenyatta Harrison asserting claims against Temple Episcopal Hospital. See Doc. No. 2. (“Compl.”). Mr, Harrison has also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion to appoint counsel. Doc. Nos. 1, 3. For the following reasons, the Court grants Mr. Harrison leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but dismisses his complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim and grants him leave to file an amended complaint. Mr. Harrison's request for counsel is denied without prejudice as premature.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Harrison's allegations are brief. He alleges that on the evening of August 15, 2023, he was fired from his position at Temple Episcopal Hospital after attempting to protect himself from an assault by a patient. Compl. at 4. Mr. Harrison alleges that he noticed a patient “targeting” him and requested assistance before encountering the patient. Id. The patient allegedly spit on Mr. Harrison and, when the patient appeared poised to spit again, Mr. Harrison allegedly tried to block a second assault. Id. He was subsequently fired. Id., at 5. Mr. Harrison alleges that he has experienced depression and emotional stress following the incident. Id. He seeks to file a claim asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). Id.
The allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Mr. Harrison's Complaint. The Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Because Mr. Harrison is not able to pay the applicable filing fee, the Court grants him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021).
“‘At this early stage of the litigation,' ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,'!draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiffs] favor,' and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.'” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Mr. Harrison is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013). This requires the Court to remain flexible, especially considering a litigant's pro se status. Id. The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, ‘“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.'” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245).
“[T]he plausibility paradigm announced in [Bell Atl Corp, v.] Twombly[, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),] applies with equal force to analyzing the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.” Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). To state an employment discrimination claim, as with any other claim, a plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Id. at 213 (quotations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Federal law prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability. See E.E.O.C, v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. § 12112). In general, to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position in question; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and; (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). In particular, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that her membership in a protected class was “either a motivating or determinative factor” in her employer's adverse employment action against her. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Santos v. Iron Mountain Film & Sound, 593 Fed.Appx. 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (explaining that to survive a motion to dismiss a plaintiff “cannot merely state that he was discharged due to his national origin” and instead “must plead facts that plausibly connect his national origin to his discharge”). Mr. Harrison specifically states that he wishes to pursue a claim under the ADA. In order to state a plausible ADA claim, he must allege that he is a "qualified individual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA, and that he suffered an adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination. Tice v. Ctr, Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 511-12 (3d Cir. 2001).
A complaint need not establish a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss, because a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement, and hence is not a proper measure of whether a complaint fails to state a claim. Connelly, 809 F.3d 788-89 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Nonetheless, a plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213.
Mr. Harrison does not allege that he is a “qualified individual with a disability.” While he alleges his employment was terminated, he does not allege that the termination was related to any alleged disability. See, e.g., Favors v. Sec'y United Slates Dep't of Veterans Ajfs., 695 Fed.Appx. 42, 44 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of Title VII race discrimination claim where plaintiff “included no allegations whatsoever linking his termination to his race”); Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiffs general assertions of discrimination and retaliation, without any details whatsoever of events leading up to her termination, are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”); Culler v. Sec'y of U.S. Veterans Affairs, 507 F, App'x 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (explaining that “[t]he discrimination must be ‘because of the employee's protected status or activity,” citing Andreoli v Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 644 (3d Cir. 2007)); Shahin v. Del. Dep't of Transp., 405 Fed.Appx. 587, 588-89 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiff failed to provide “details on what position she applied for, how she was qualified for the position, and what protected classes she belongs to”), Mr. Harrison's undeveloped complaint does not state a plausible claim and is dismissed. Because Mr. Harrison may at some point be able to state a plausible claim under the ADA, the Court grants him leave to file an amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court grants Mr. Harrison's motion for leave to proceed In forma pauperis, dismisses his complaint without prejudice, and grants Mr. Harrison leave to file an amended complaint. Mr. Harrison's motion to appoint counsel will be denied without prejudice as premature, An appropriate Order follows.
Pursuant to § 1915(e), the Court may request an attorney to represent an indigent plaintiff in a civil action. See 28 U.S.C, § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”). Although district courts have broad discretion to request counsel for indigent pro se litigants, appointment of counsel is not a statutory or constitutional right of the litigant, but rather a privilege. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.2d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002). In determining whether to appoint pro bono counsel, the Court must first consider, as a threshold matter, whether the plaintiffs claim has “some merit in fact and law.” Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). Because the Court cannot yet determine whether Mi'. Harrison's claims have merit in fact or law, the issue of appointment of counsel is premature.