Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-0681 (JR).
March 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, the motions will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a Vietnam veteran, allegedly experienced a "flashback and psychotic episode" during his arraignment proceeding before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on January 7, 1999. Compl., ¶ 31. The presiding Magistrate Judge ordered plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation in order for the court to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Id., ¶ 32. Plaintiff was transported to the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City. Id., ¶ 33. While in New York, plaintiff was transferred to Lutheran Hospital, where he allegedly was administered anti-psychotic medications without his knowledge or consent. Id., ¶¶ 35-38.
Subsequently, in May 1999, plaintiff was transferred to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina ("FMC Butner"). Compl., ¶ 42. After examining plaintiff, a forensic psychiatrist determined that plaintiff was competent to stand trial. Id., ¶¶ 18, 42. Plaintiff was transferred back to Texas.
In Texas, plaintiff was examined by another psychologist in September 1999. Compl., ¶ 43. Based on his report, the Magistrate Judge determined that plaintiff was not competent to stand trial. Id. Thereafter, in January 2000, plaintiff was transferred back to FMC Butner for further evaluation. Id. The forensic psychiatrist there allegedly ordered medical staff to restrain plaintiff and to administer forcibly the anti-psychotropic drug Haldol. Id., ¶¶ 48, 50-51. When it appeared that plaintiff was not responding to Haldol, the psychiatrist prescribed other medications. Id., ¶¶ 52-53.
Plaintiff appeared before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas again in May 2001. Compl., ¶ 53. After it was determined that plaintiff was not competent to stand trial, plaintiff was transferred to the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota. Id., ¶ 54. In January 2002, plaintiff was transferred back to Texas. Id., ¶ 56. Presumably after the court found plaintiff competent, in June 2002 he was tried and convicted of unspecified offenses, and in January 2003 he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Id., ¶ 57. He was transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution in Petersburg, Virginia ("FCI Petersburg"), where he currently is serving his sentence. Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiff's complains of severe headaches, high blood pressure, involuntary muscle spasms, and other symptoms that he attributes to the forcible administration of anti-psychotropic medication. Compl., ¶¶ 59, 61, 64. He also complains of injury to his left foot and heel due to defendants' failure to provide footwear with proper arch support and cushioning. Id., ¶¶ 66-69. Plaintiff claims to be "suffering from some kind of foreign germ (bacteria, fungus, etc.) in his sinus area, throat, and lungs," and from back pain experienced since he was in the military. Id., ¶ 77; Amd. Compl., ¶ 9. He contends that medical staff at FCI Petersburg fail to provide adequate medical treatment for all of his conditions.
Since the filing of his original complaint, plaintiff has filed an "Amendment and Supplement to Civil Action Pursuant to Rules 15(a) (d) of F.R.C.P," [Dkt. #15], a "Motion to Amend Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a)," [Dkt. #16], a "Further Amendment and Supplement to Complaint, Rules 15(a) (d) of F.R.C.P," [Dkt. #24], and a "Motion to Further Amend and Supplement Complaint to Add the `United States' as a Defendant Under Rules 15(a) (d) of F.R.C.P., and the F.T.C.A.," [Dkt. #29]. The Court construes them as supplements to the original complaint and, in certain respects, as oppositions to the federal defendants' first motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff's first supplement to the complaint, see Dkt. #15, fleshes out the allegations of the initial complaint, and describes events occurring during his incarceration at FCI Petersburg. These events relate particularly to medical treatment or lack thereof, disciplinary matters, and inmate grievances. His subsequent pleadings, see Dkt. # 16, 24, 29, also relate particularly to events occurring at FCI Petersburg.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the federal mandamus statute, and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.
The nature and content of plaintiff's FOIA requests are not entirely clear. Nor does counsel for the federal defendants address this claim in its dispositive motions.
The Court engages in a two-part inquiry in order to determine whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. First, the Court must determine whether jurisdiction may be exercised under the District's long-arm statute. GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Bell South Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Second, the Court must determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process requirements. Id. (citing United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
Turning now to the District's long-arm statute, a District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who either (1) transacts any business in the District, (2) causes tortious injury in the District by an act or omission in the District, or (3) causes tortious injury in the District "by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia." D.C. Code § 13-423(a) (2001). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute exists "by demonstrating a factual basis for the exercise of such jurisdiction over the defendant." Novak-Canzeri v. Saud, 864 F.Supp. 203, 205 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff does not meet his burden.
The District's long-arm statute sets forth alternative bases for long-arm jurisdiction. See D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(2001). None of these alternatives is relevant in this case.
Plaintiff does not allege that any of these defendants transact any personal business in the District of Columbia. Although persistent conduct undertaken in a person's individual capacity may constitute the transaction of business for purposes of the long-arm statute, see Pollack v. Meese, 737 F.Supp. 663, 666 (D.D.C. 1990), the complaint sets forth no allegations that these defendants have any personal connection with the District of Columbia. The mere fact that these defendants are employees of the BOP, the headquarters office of which is in the District, does not render them subject to suit in their individual capacities in the District of Columbia. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 543-45 (1980) (absent minimum contacts other than those arising from federal employment, court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over federal official in his individual capacity).
Finally, the complaint alleges no facts to establish that plaintiff suffered any injury in the District of Columbia. The actual injuries of which plaintiff complains occurred in New York, North Carolina, and Virginia. Regardless of whether these defendants acted in or outside of the District of Columbia, plaintiff suffered no injury here. Accordingly, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants Gottlieb, Brooks, Laybourne, Fajardo, Panaguiton, Negron, DeWaldt, Johnson, Herbel, Zula, Moses, "Unknown Black Lieutenant," "Unknown Corrections Officers," "Unknown Nurses," Wyrick, Wheeler, Harding, and Speights pursuant to the District's long-arm statute.
For these same reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Lutheran Hospital, the Director of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Director of Lutheran Hospital, the Chief Executive Officer of the "Unknown Security Company," the "Unknown Security Company," "Ten Unknown Security Guards," "Unknown Dr. (Psychiatrist)," and "Unknown Nurse" employed by or at Lutheran Hospital in New York.
B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendants Lappin and Watts.
Plaintiff brings Bivens claims against individual defendants Lappin and Watts in individual capacities. These are the only two individual defendants who appear to be found in this judicial district. Keeping in mind that pro se pleadings are construed liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the complaint fails to state a claim against defendants Lappin and Watts.As Director of the BOP, Lappin has supervisory and oversight responsibility for the agency's activities. Plaintiff does not allege that Lappin approved of a policy or otherwise acted in his capacity as BOP's Director in a way that caused plaintiff injury. Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff's theory of the case is to hold Lappin liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of his subordinates, such a theory cannot stand. Lappin's status as the agency's head does not render him liable for the alleged wrongful acts of the agency's employees. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) ( respondeat superior liability cannot form the basis of liability for a § 1983 claim); see also Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (complaint naming Attorney General and BOP Director as defendants based on theory of respondeat superior, without allegations specifying their involvement in the case, do not state Bivens claim).
Similarly, although plaintiff names Harrell Watts, BOP's Administrative Remedy Coordinator, as a defendant to this action, nothing in the complaint or supplemental pleadings states a claim against him. The mere fact that he supervises other BOP staff who may have addressed plaintiff's inmate grievances is not a sufficient basis to hold Watts liable for their alleged unconstitutional action.
C. Venue in this district is not proper.
"Courts in this jurisdiction must examine challenges to personal jurisdiction and venue carefully to guard against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia. By naming high government officials as defendants, a plaintiff could bring a suit here that properly should be pursued elsewhere." Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Where the Court's jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in "(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Venue is not proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all defendants do not reside in the District of Columbia because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claim took place at elsewhere, and because this is not a case in which no other district is available.
Assuming without deciding that plaintiff states a cognizable FTCA claim, venue in this district is not proper for this claim either. Venue for an FTCA claim exists only where the cause of action arose or where plaintiff resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a).
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that complaint fails to state a claim against defendants Lappin and Watts, and that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants Gottlieb, Brooks, Laybourne, Fajardo, Panaguiton, Negron, DeWaldt, Johnson, Herbel, Zula, Moses, "Unknown Black Lieutenant," "Unknown Corrections Officers," "Unknown Nurses," Wyrick, Wheeler, Harding, Speights, Lutheran Hospital, Director of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Director of Lutheran Hospital, the Chief Executive Officer of the "Unknown Security Company," the "Unknown Security Company," "Ten Unknown Security Guards," "Unknown Dr. (Psychiatrist)," and "Unknown Nurse" employed by or at Lutheran Hospital in New York. Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted on these grounds, and plaintiff's FTCA claim is dismissed for improper venue. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this same date.