Opinion
No. 07-869.
Filed April 1, 2008.
Lenoir County No. 03CVD212.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 27 December 2006 by Judge Rose Vaughn Williams in District Court, Lenoir County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 March 2008.
Gerrans, Foster Sargeant, P.A., by Jonathon L. Sargeant, for Defendant-Appellant. Joretta Durant for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Janice W. Harrison (Defendant) appeals from an order finding her to be in willful civil contempt and awarding sanctions. We affirm.
This case was before the Court of Appeals in Harrison v. Harrison, 180 N.C. App. 452, 637 S.E.2d 284 (2006) (" Harrison I"). Our earlier opinion sets out the facts and procedural history of this case in full. See id. at 452-53, 637 S.E.2d at 285-86. Teddy Harrison (Plaintiff) sued Defendant for divorce and sought an equitable distribution. Defendant filed a counterclaim. In December 2003, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to compel Defendant to respond to his interrogatories and produce documents. The trial court ordered Defendant to respond to the discovery requests by 17 February 2004. In a written order filed on 10 March 2004, the trial court imposed a $50.00 per day fine after the 17 February 2004 deadline, and directed a show cause notice to issue if Defendant failed to comply.
Defendant delivered thirteen boxes of documents to the office of Plaintiff's attorney on 23 February 2004. The boxes were not organized and did not contain answers that were fully responsive or in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, a dead mouse was found stuck between several of the papers inside a box. Plaintiff's counsel refused to accept the boxes in response to the discovery requests. The parties were ultimately unsuccessful in resolving their discovery dispute. Plaintiff filed a motion for contempt and sought sanctions. The trial court issued an order on 25 August 2005 holding Defendant in contempt and imposing sanctions, including striking Defendant's answer and counterclaim. Defendant appealed.
In Harrison I, our Court noted with disapproval Defendant's "egregious" conduct and "dilatory tactics." Harrison I, 180 N.C. App. at 456, 637 S.E.2d at 288. However, we concluded that the trial court failed to consider lesser sanctions as required by Goss v. Battle, 111 N.C. App. 173, 432 S.E.2d 156 (1993), prior to striking Defendant's counterclaim. Accordingly, we vacated the contempt order and remanded "for consideration of sanctions in light of the principles set forth in Goss." Harrison I, 180 N.C. App. at 456, 637 S.E.2d at 287-88. On remand, in accordance with our instructions, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
14. . . . This case is now before this Court again on remand from the Court of Appeals for this Court to consider all options available for sanctions in this matter in light of [ Goss v. Battle], 111 N.C. App. 173, 432 S.E.2d 156 (1993). In its opinion in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals indicated that the failure to make discovery has now rendered it impossible for marital assets to be appropriately appraised, thus making equitable distribution impossible.
15. More than seventeen months passed between Judge Carraway's March 10, 2004 order and the date of the first hearing on the Motion for Contempt and Show Cause.
16. That more than two years passed between the filing of this action for equitable distribution and the first hearing on the Motion for Contempt and Show Cause[.]
17. This Court finds that Judge Carraway's order filed March 10, 2004 anticipated the $50.00 per day fine in addition to other sanctions in contempt if . . . Defendant did not comply with the discovery order.
18. This Court could impose the $50.00 per day fine, which would have been thousands of dollars by August 25, 2005, the day of this contempt hearing, in addition to the sanctions for contempt entered. This Court finds that the $50.00 per day fine would be insufficient punishment for contempt in this case, and that it would be unjust to impose the $50.00 per day sanction in addition to the severe sanctions imposed by this Court in striking . . . Defendant's pleadings.
19. Monetary sanctions would not help move this case forward.
20. This is an equitable distribution case filed on February 14, 2003, more than three years ago. As of the date of this hearing, . . . Plaintiff's attorney has not been able to review the requested documents, first because . . . Defendant delivered documents in a state of disarray with the presence of a dead mouse stuck in the papers. Secondly, . . . Defendant has not explained to this Court why no accommodation was made to enable Plaintiff's counsel to see the documents while they were in the possession of Defendant's counsel.
21. The Court finds that Defendant's attorney has today offered documents in response to the requested discovery.
22. This Court did not award attorney's fees to . . . Plaintiff as sanctions in the August, 2005 order and will not award attorney's fees now. Attorney's fees as a sanction are a usual and customary sanction for a party whose delay in providing discovery has caused the other party to seek help from the Court in procuring the discovery.
23. This Court finds that attorney's fees would be sufficient sanctions if discovery was provided only after an order of the Court compelling the discovery, but within the time frame set by the Court, or even if provided outside the time frame imposed by the Court, the responses had been provided appropriately.
24. In this case, as of August 25, 2005, complete discovery still was not provided appropriately.
25. This Court could hold . . . Defendant in criminal contempt and send her to jail for thirty days, but that sanction would not accomplish anything for this case, but only cause further delay. If Defendant chose, she could continue to commit contempt and remain in jail to keep her former husband from obtaining the documents requested.
26. This Court has considered all of the available options for sanctions as outlined in Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and in light of [ Goss, id.] This Court recognizes that the option of striking . . . Defendant's answer and counterclaim is a severe sanction. However, after careful review of the record in this case, and after hearing evidence presented, this Court finds that Court orders and statutory deadlines violated by . . . Defendant were necessary for the fair administration of justice and not just technicalities to be repeatedly overlooked while this case was unduly delayed.
27. That . . . Defendant has not offered any legal excuse as to why she did not comply with Judge Carraway's order filed March 10, 2004. That Defendant's failure to comply with Judge Carraway's March 10, 2004 order has caused unreasonable delays in the trial of this equitable distribution case.
28. . . . Defendant had the ability to comply with the order compelling her to respond to . . . Plaintiff's request for discovery.
29. . . . Plaintiff still has to prove his claim for equitable distribution.
30. That after considering all available options for sanctions as provided by Rule 37, and in light of [ Goss, id.,] this Court finds that striking . . . Defendant's pleadings and dismissing her claims is in the best interest in the administration of justice.
Based on its findings, the trial court ordered that Defendant's answer and counterclaim be stricken and her prayer for relief dismissed. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused it discretion by failing to order less severe sanctions than the dismissal of her counterclaim. Defendant asserts that the conduct in this case was not the most severe type of disobedience which should merit the sanction of dismissal. We disagree.
As stated above, our Court in Harrison I vacated the trial court's order with instructions that the trial court should consider whether lesser sanctions were appropriate in light of the principles set forth in Goss. Harrison I, 180 N.C. App. at 456-57, 637 S.E.2d at 287-88. In accordance with our instructions, the trial court on remand clearly considered all of the available options for sanctions as provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37, in accordance with Goss, as demonstrated by the trial court's findings of fact. The trial court again concluded that dismissal of Defendant's answer and counterclaims was warranted. Our Court has previously stated:
Sanctions under Rule 37 are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.
Hursey v. Homes by Design, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 175, 177, 464 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Goss, 111 N.C. App. at 177, 432 S.E.2d at 159 (stating that "the determination of what, if any, sanction to be imposed under Rule 37(d) lies in the sound discretion of the trial court"). We find that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were the result of a reasoned decision, and we therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order.
Affirmed.
Judges STROUD and ARROWOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).