Therefore, the trial court incorrectly conditioned the grant of Travelers's intervention request upon an apportionment of plaintiff's prerecovery expenses. Plaintiff's reliance upon Harrison v Ford Motor Co, 370 Mich. 683; 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963), is misplaced. Unlike the situation here, Harrison involved an insurance carrier which represented both sides to the controversy.
The practice of a party appearing on both sides of a case cannot be approved and any decree where a party recovers against himself, though he appears in different capacities, is void. Hagood v. Goff, 208 Ala. 642, 95 So. 21; Martin v. Atkinson, 108 Ala. 314, 18 So. 888; Swoope v. Swoope, 173 Ala. 157, 55 So. 418; Chandler v. Shehan, 7 Ala. 251; Harrison v. Ford Motor Company, 370 Mich. 683, 122 N.W.2d 680. It is prejudicial to the Plaintiff's third party action for it to be brought to the Jury's attention that the Plaintiff has been compensated by workmen's compensation for his injuries.
Had plaintiffs or defendant objected below on the ground that Townsend and Citizens did not comply with the court rules for intervention, any error could have been easily corrected, and it is clear that Townsend and Citizens would have been allowed to intervene. See Harrison v Ford Motor Co, 370 Mich. 683, 686; 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963); Mason v Scarpuzza, 147 Mich. App. 180, 184-185; 383 N.W.2d 158 (1985); MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1). Compare American States Ins Co v Albin, 118 Mich. App. 201, 209-210; 324 N.W.2d 574 (1982); Kolar v Hudson, 55 Mich. App. 114, 118-120; 222 N.W.2d 53 (1974).
We note that the pleadings in the lower court file show the father, Gary Haddrill, as both a plaintiff and a defendant in this case. Perhaps Gary Haddrill's insurance company was the real defendant. While Gary Haddrill has never been included as a plaintiff on appeal, one cannot be a plaintiff and a defendant in the same suit. Harrison v Ford Motor Co, 370 Mich. 683, 687-689; 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963). Nor does plaintiffs' reliance on Grodin v Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396; 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980), lv den 412 Mich. 867 (1981), alter our result.
Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich. 590, 612; 274 N.W.2d 392 (1979); Gardner-White Co v State Bd of Tax Administration, 296 Mich. 225; 295 N.W. 624 (1941); Zawacki v Detroit Harvester Co, 310 Mich. 415; 17 N.W.2d 234 (1945); General Motors Corp v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 321 Mich. 604; 33 N.W.2d 90 (1948). Application of the foregoing rules of construction leads us to conclude that the period of limitation set forth for suits under § (1) does not carry over and apply to carrier suits brought under § (3) to enforce rights conferred in § (5). Dilts was injured June 14, 1977, and thus, under § (1), the carrier could not start suit to determine S H's liability to Dilts until June 14, 1978. Within one month from the date plaintiff could have started suit, Dilts filed his own action against S H. Once Dilts initiated suit, plaintiff no longer had a right to commence its own action as subrogee of Dilts. Harrison v Ford Motor Co, 370 Mich. 683; 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963).Harrison involved a carrier's suit under MCL 413.15; MSA 17.189, the predecessor of MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827).
Equally indicative of the correctness of this view is the fact that an employer or carrier is generally able to join as a named plaintiff in an employee's suit. See Harrison v Ford Motor Co, 370 Mich. 683; 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963). Under the General Court Rules of 1963, the equity rule of compulsory joinder of parties is the appropriate means of preventing the undesirable results caused by splitting a cause.
If an employee sues first, whether within the one-year period mentioned in the statute or after it, the carrier can proceed only by joining in that action. Harrison v Ford Motor Co, 370 Mich. 683; 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963). Such an employee suit is subject, however, to the provisions of the statute that protect the rights of the other interested parties.
CCC contends that Great American's "dogged" efforts to recover on its lien indicate a preference of its interest over Levy's — something which is impermissible under Michigan law. See Harrison v. Ford Motor Company, 370 Mich. 683, 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963) (holder of worker's compensation lien may not seek to recover on lien from a party whom the lienholder insures). Great American suggests that there was no violation akin to that in Harrison in this case, as it sought to recover on its worker's compensation lien from Ford, not Levy. If Great America was ware of the strong possibility that Ford would seek to recover from Levy, or as aware of the possibility that Denlar could receive a verdict in excess of Great American's policy limits, a jury could reasonably infer from Great American's effort to recover on its lien that it was acting in bad faith toward Levy and/or CCC. to this extent, the actual effect of Great American's refusal to settle, while relevant as to whether Great American acted in good faith, does not decide the issue.
This would be a useless formality which the Michigan Supreme Court will not allow. In Harrison v. Ford Motor Co., 370 Mich. 683, 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963), the Michigan Court held that the employer's workmen's compensation insurer could not intervene as a party plaintiff against itself as workmen's compensation insurer for the negligent third party, in spite of the fact that it was undisputably a real party in interest. The court said that the insurer could be adequately protected by a lien against any recovery by the employee for compensation paid and a credit for future payments to be made.
In later cases the situation clarified. In Harrison v. Ford Motor Company, 370 Mich. 683, 122 N.W.2d 680, the court phrased one issue in the case as follows: ‘ Should insurer have been permitted to intervene as party plaintiff in the plaintiff employee's suit?