"[T]he last clear chance doctrine has no application unless the defendant knew of the plaintiff's perilous situation and had opportunity to take evasive action to avoid injuring him." Simpson v. Reed, 186 Ga. App. 297, 298 ( 367 S.E.2d 563) (1988); Harrison v. Feather, 178 Ga. App. 35, 36 ( 342 S.E.2d 1) (1986). In the present case the evidence indicates that from the time Dewitt knew the decedent's car was not going to stop until the accident occurred no more than two or three seconds elapsed.
'" Contrary to defendant's contentions, this evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury's determination "that even though the [plaintiff's] actions may have placed [himself] in a position of peril, [defendant's agent knew of this and] had the last opportunity to avoid the [calamity] and was negligent in failing to do so. See Harrison v. Feather, 178 Ga. App. 35, 36 ( 342 S.E.2d 1) (1986). Accordingly, we find no error in the giving of the charge [on last clear chance].
In 1983, appellant Vernice Harrison was a plaintiff in an action against appellees James Feather and his employer, Buffalo Rock Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Newnan, for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of an automobile collision that occurred in 1982. For further background, see Harrison v. Feather, 178 Ga. App. 35 ( 342 S.E.2d 1) (1986) (" Harrison I"). The appeal in Harrison I followed a jury trial which resulted in a verdict for the defendants. This court reversed that judgment, finding as error the failure to direct a verdict for plaintiff Harrison "as to liability for this collision in this case." Id. at 36.
Contrary to appellant's assertions, evidence was adduced to show that even though the deceased's actions may have placed her in a position of peril, appellant had the last opportunity to avoid the collision and was negligent in failing to do so. See Harrison v. Feather, 178 Ga. App. 35, 36 ( 342 S.E.2d 1) (1986). Accordingly, we find no error in the giving of this charge.
The last clear chance doctrine also requires among other things that there be negligence on the part of the plaintiff before it comes into play. Harrison v. Feather, 178 Ga. App. 35, 36 ( 342 S.E.2d 1) (1986); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Coxwell, 93 Ga. App. 159, 164 (2) ( 91 S.E.2d 135) (1955). The comparative negligence statute, OCGA § 51-11-7, does not, under the facts before us, bar a plaintiff's recovery, but merely serves to diminish the recovery if applicable.