Opinion
September 11, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Yoswein, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
CPLR 3101 (a) provides that there shall be full disclosure of all evidence "material and necessary" in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof. The words "material and necessary" are to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist in the preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason (see, Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403; see also, DiMichel v South Buffalo Ry. Co., 80 N.Y.2d 184, 193; Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v Lancer Ins. Co., 203 A.D.2d 515, 517).
A party's right to discovery is not unlimited, however, and may be curtailed when it becomes an unreasonable annoyance and tends to harass and overburden the other party (see, Conrad v Park, 204 A.D.2d 1011, 1012). That is exactly what happened here. Many of the plaintiffs' demands were overly broad and vexatious and tended to confuse, rather than sharpen, the central issue of negligence. Accordingly, we remit this matter to the Supreme Court and direct it to limit the plaintiffs' demands only to evidence that is material and necessary (see, CPLR 3101 [a]). Bracken, J.P., Rosenblatt, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.