Opinion
No. 205166.
January 21, 2000 at 9:05 a.m.
Appeal from WCAC, Michigan, LC No. 96-0090.
Before: White, P.J., and Hood and Gage, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted the opinion and order of the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirming the magistrate's determination to deny plaintiff's petition for benefits on the basis that plaintiff was not an employee of defendant because there was no contract of hire. We reverse.
I
Plaintiff and his cousin, Cherzell Shelby, contacted defendant Wise, a labor broker, seeking employment. Both had worked for Wise previously. No work was available when they called. However, later the same day, Wise called Shelby and offered him employment at West Michigan Steel. Shelby accepted the job, but later decided that he did not want it. Plaintiff, who had earlier worked at West Michigan Steel as a direct employee, but had been terminated for absenteeism, reported for work in Shelby's place and pretended to be Shelby. He worked at West Michigan Steel, pretending to be Shelby, until he was injured.
The focus of the dispute before the magistrate was whether plaintiff qualified as an employee of defendant under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq. The magistrate found that in order for plaintiff to qualify as an employee, a contract of hire was required pursuant to Section 161(1)(l). The magistrate rejected plaintiff's argument that he was an "employee" under Section 161(1)(n), which on its face provides a definition of "employee" that does not require a contract of hire, stating that "the intent of the section is to define and eliminate independent contractors from coverage as an employee." The magistrate concluded that plaintiff was not an employee under Section 161(1)(l) because there was no contract of hire.
The WCAC affirmed the magistrate's decision and adopted his opinion, agreeing that "the intent of section 161(1)(1) is to define and eliminate contractors from coverage as an employee," and concluding that a contract of hire is an essential component for the pursuit of a remedy under the WCAC.
This Court granted plaintiff leave to appeal.
II
The WDCA, MCL 418.401 et seq.; MSA 17.237 et seq., was intended as a remedial measure and must be liberally construed to grant rather than deny benefits. Goff v Bil-Mar Foods (After Remand), 454 Mich. 507, 511; 563 N.W.2d 214 (1997). Factual determinations of the WCAC, if acting within the scope of its powers, shall be conclusive, absent any fraud. Id. at 512. A decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal if the WCAC operated within the wrong legal framework or its decision was based on erroneous legal reasoning. O'Connor v Binney Auto Parts, 203 Mich. App. 522, 527; 513 N.W.2d 818 (1994). Although this Court ordinarily will accord considerable deference to the construction placed upon statutory provisions by an agency charged with enforcing them — at least where the agency interpretation is not clearly wrong, Taylor v Second Injury Fund, 234 Mich. App. 1, 13; 592 N.W.2d 103 (1999), citing Jones-Jennings v Hutzel Hospital (On Remand), 223 Mich. App. 94, 105; 565 N.W.2d 680 (1997), the overriding question here is one of legislative intent.
The starting point in determining legislative intent is the specific language of the statute. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich. 547, 567; 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is unnecessary and, therefore, not permitted. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich. 370, 376; 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992), criticized on other grounds in Gross v General Motors Corp, 448 Mich. 147, 164; 528 N.W.2d 707 (1995).
The issue is whether the WCAC erred in concluding that MCL 418.161(1)(n), which purports to set forth a definition of "employee," does not in fact do so, but merely distinguishes employees from independent contractors. We conclude that the WCAC erred.
Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the finding of a lack of a contract of hire. We observe, however, that while plaintiff engaged in deceptive conduct in misrepresenting his identity, whether Cherzell Shelby is regarded as an agent for an undisclosed principal, plaintiff, or whether plaintiff is simply regarded as an impostor who represented himself to be Cherzell Shelby, no harm results in finding plaintiff a party to a contract of employment. Both defendant and West Michigan Steel got what they bargained for — a worker to perform desired tasks for a fixed remuneration, and plaintiff apparently satisfactorily performed those tasks until his injury. West Michigan's prior dissatisfaction with plaintiff concerned his walking off the job. This particular concern regarding the identity of the worker sent by Wise is irrelevant under the circumstances. Plaintiff apparently had satisfactory attendance and adequately performed his assigned tasks until his injury. Nothing about the transaction suggests that defendant or West Michigan Steel considered significant the identity of the laborer. See 3 Corbin on Contracts §§ 602-603 (1960 ed.)
Under the WDCA, the term "employee" is defined in various subsections of MCL 418.161(1); MSA 17.237(161)(1), two of which are pertinent here:
As used in this act, `employee' means:
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(l) Every person in the service of another, under any contract of hire, express or implied . . . [MCL 418.161(1)(l); MSA 17.237(161)(1)(l).]
At the time plaintiff was injured on July 29, 1994, this provision was numbered as section (b) rather than section (l). Both versions of this provision contained the "under any contract of hire" provision.
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(n) Every person performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer at the time of the injury, if the person in relation to this service does not maintain a separate business, does not hold himself or herself out to and render service to the public, and is not an employer subject to this act. [MCL 418.161(1)(n); MSA 17.237(161)(1)(n).]
The provision now constituting subsection (n) was added to the Act in 1985, as subsection (d). PA 1985 No. 103. A companion 1985 amendment added subsection (3) to MCL 418.171; MSA 17.237(171), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) If any employer subject to the provisions of this act, in this section referred to as the principal, contracts with any other person, in this section referred to as the contractor, who is not subject to this act or who has not complied with the provisions of section 611, and who does not become subject to this act or comply with the provisions of section 611 prior to the date of the injury or death for which claim is made for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay any person employed in the execution of the work any compensation under this act which he or she would have been liable to pay if that person had been immediately employed by the principal. If compensation is claimed from or proceedings are taken against the principal, then, in the application of this act, reference to the principal shall be substituted for reference to the employer, except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the earnings of the person under the employer by whom he or she is immediately employed. A contractor shall be deemed to include subcontractors in all cases where the principal gives permission that the work or any part thereof be performed under subcontract.
(2) If the principal is liable to pay compensation under this section, he or she shall be entitled to be indemnified by the contractor or subcontractor. . . .
(3) This section shall apply to a principal and contractor only if the contractor engages persons to work other than persons who would not be considered employees under section 161(1)(d).
Subsection three has not been amended subsequently.
Thus, Section 171 was amended to provide that a principal's liability under that section does not extend to persons who would not be considered employees under newly added section 161(1)(d), now section 161(1)(n). To this extent, section 161(1)(d) did, indeed, set forth a test for distinguishing between "employees" and "independent contractors" for purposes of applying section 171. However, that does not answer the question whether section 161(1)(d), now (n), was intended to set forth another definition of "employee" or to be simply a vehicle for narrowing section 171. If the latter, the Legislature could have included the language of section 161(1)(d) in section 171(3), rather than setting it forth as an independent definition of "employee."
The WCAC has placed a gloss on the statute that is not consistent with its literal terms. Because a contrary legislative intent is not manifest, we must construe the statute according to its plain language. Lorencz, supra at 376. By its plain language the statute purports to provide several definitions of "employee," and section (n) sets forth a definition of "employee" independent of section (l). If the Legislature intended otherwise, it should modify the statute to comport with its intent.
We conclude that given the plain language of Section 161, the WCAC erred as a matter of law in concluding that because no express or implied contract of hire existed, a requirement not stated in the definition of "employee" set forth in section 161(1)(n), plaintiff was not an "employee" under the Act.
We note that on its face, section (n) does not abandon the requirement that the service be in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer. An "employer" is one who has any person in service "under any contract of hire express or implied." Thus, there is no requirement that there be a contract of hire with a particular claimant if another definition of employee is satisfied, as long as the employer satisfies, the definition of "employer" under the act by having any person in service under a contract of hire.
Further, section (n) also requires that the person be performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of an employer at the time of injury. Thus, the task performed must be done in the course of the business of the employer, even if the particular employee is not under a contract of hire.
The remaining argument plaintiff raises, that he did not commit conduct that would disqualify him from receiving benefits under the Act, was not addressed by the magistrate and WCAC, and we thus do not address it.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.