Harris v. U.S.

5 Citing cases

  1. Harris v. U.S.

    19 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1994)   Cited 43 times

    EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff W.L. Harris brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA") had unlawfully placed wetland easements on his land and that the property declared by the FmHA to encompass wetlands actually did not. The district court denied relief, 820 F. Supp. 1018. Harris now appeals, and we affirm. I

  2. Estrada v. Harris

    Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-00939-XR (W.D. Tex. Jun. 30, 2015)

    However, "[n]either the Declaratory Judgment Act, § 2201, nor the 'Further Relief' statute, § 2202, confer jurisdiction on [a federal court] but, rather, provide additional remedies where jurisdiction independently already exists." Harris v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 n.2. (N.D. Miss. 1992) aff'd, 19 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Smith v. Lehman, 533 F.Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D.N.Y.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173 (1983)) (holding that plaintiff must rely on other claims to confer jurisdiction because assertion of claims under §§ 2201 and 2202 failed to provide subject matter jurisdiction). Therefore, §§ 2201-2202 do not confer jurisdiction on the Court.

  3. Larson v. U.S.

    995 F. Supp. 969 (D. Minn. 1997)   Cited 5 times
    Recognizing that the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, Title 28 U.S.C. § 2201, requires the presence of an "actual controversy within the [Court's] jurisdiction."

    In addition to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Plaintiff also relies upon the "Further Relief" provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 2202, which do not counsel a different result from that reached in the analysis we detail, in the text of this Report, as to Section 2201. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 n. 2 (N.D.Miss. 1992) ("Neither the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, nor the `Further Relief' statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2202, confer jurisdiction on this court but, rather, provide additional remedies where jurisdiction independently already exists."), aff'd, 19 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1994); B. Braun Medical Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories 892 F. Supp. 115, 117 (E.D.Pa. 1995), modified on other grounds, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 599 n. 3 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Smith v. Lehman, 533 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 689 F.2d 342 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173, 103 S.Ct. 820, 74 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1983).

  4. KLLM, Inc. Employee Health Protection Plan v. Ontario Community Hospital

    947 F. Supp. 262 (S.D. Miss. 1996)   Cited 8 times
    Finding no subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to ERISA's § 1132(e) because § 1132 "does not give a fiduciary the authority to file suit seeking a clarification of its rights under the plan"

    The Hermann court, however, did not determine whether the plaintiff's preempted state law claims would be recharacterized as "arising under federal" law so as to present a federal question which conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the court. As 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Declaratory Judgment Act, does not provide an independent basis of jurisdiction but rather, "provide[s] additional remedies where jurisdiction independently already exists," Harris v. United States of America, 820 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 n. 2 (N.D.Miss. 1992), aff'd, 19 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1994), the court rejects the Plan's argument that the Act, in and of itself, confers subject matter jurisdiction. The court further notes that in each of the three cases — Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Doe, 76 F.3d 206 (8th Cir. 1996), Transamerica, 811 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1987), and Reynolds v. Stahr, 758 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D.Wis. 1991) — cited by the Plan for the proposition that the Act grants subject matter jurisdiction, the declaratory judgment defendant was either a participant or beneficiary of an ERISA plan and thus "ERISA would have permitted [each] to sue on [his] claim in federal court."

  5. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

    935 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ala. 1996)   Cited 28 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding an alternative that “would have more than doubled the cost of the construction project and which would have posed substantial logistical problems for construction” was not reasonable

    Indeed, under the APA, the burden of proving that an agency decision was arbitrary or capricious generally rests with the party seeking to overturn the agency decision.See Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (party challenging Forestry Service's decision under APA bears burden of proof); see also Holmes v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 58 F.3d 628, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Gulf Power Co. v. F.E.R.C., 983 F.2d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1993); McKinley v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.M. 1993); Harris v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D.Miss. 1992). Accordingly, the plaintiffs in this action bear the burden of demonstrating to the Court that the Corps' decision to grant the permit to the City was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.