Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-491
07-18-2023
WILLIAM HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. ASHLEY TRAFICANTE, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMONDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's “Re-Filed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order” (ECF No. 20) be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, William Harris, a prisoner currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and confined at SCI-Fayette, initiated this case in March 2023. The Complaint was not filed until April 12, 2023, due to Plaintiff's initial failure to submit a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff alleges violations of the first, fourth, eighth and fourteenth amendments, including obstructing access to the courts, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, cruel and unusual punishment, retaliation for the exercise of free speech, and unlawful search and seizure. Pertinent to the pending Motion, his allegations include various actions to tamper with Plaintiff's mail that have impeded incoming and outgoing delivery and have affected his legal filings and access to the courts. ECF No. 7 at 5.
Shortly after the Complaint was docketed, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 16. In that Motion, he complained that outgoing mail to the Clerk of Court in Uniontown and outgoing mail to this court were being unlawfully withheld by the institution. He asked the Court to enjoin the institution from interfering with his legal mail. The Court denied that Motion as moot as the complained of mailing to this Court had been received so the matter was resolved. ECF No. 17. Plaintiff disagrees and has filed the present “re-Filed Motion....” In it he alleges that, although the complained of mail was eventually sent to the Court, it was held in the mail room for 8/9 days, which Plaintiff argues is unacceptable.
B. Standard of Review
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a movant “must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the movant's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). In contrast, a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” if certain conditions are met. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1).
Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440,443 (3d Cir. 1982), see also Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 3:13-CV-2661, 2014 WL 3955105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (“An injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy' that is never awarded as of right.”). Rather, the decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982).
Generally, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Further, where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
For a party to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.'” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 3:CV-10-1899, 2014 WL 3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. Contino, 629 F.Supp.2d 449, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “The mere risk of injury is not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. And the burden of showing irreparable injury “is not an easy burden” to meet. Moore v. Mann, 3:CV-13-2771, 2014 WL 3893903, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug 7, 2014). In assessing a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must also consider the harm to the defendants and whether granting the preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 2012).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
C. Discussion
With the above considerations in mind, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is warranted in this case. A delay in the sending or delivery of mail for 8 to 9 days does not amount to a constitutional violation. In addition, it appears from Plaintiff's own argument that the document in question was dated 6/12/2023 and was mailed on 6/16/2023, a delay of only 4 days. ECF No. 20 at 3. The Court further notes that this Re-Filed Motion is dated July 10 and was received by the Clerk on July 14, indicating no delay in mailing. If Plaintiff is able to prove that the Defendants tampered with and delayed his mail such that he was caused actual harm, he may proceed with that claim under his complaint. There is no actual harm alleged here and no risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is not entered.
In addition, Plaintiff is asking the Court to enjoin future action that has not yet occurred. “A primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered.” Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994). He is not asking to maintain the status quo but to enjoin future delays in his legal mail. The Court does not see a reasonable possibility of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. Any minimal delay, such as the one that apparently occurred here, can be easily remedied by granting Plaintiff an extension of time.
Based solely on the allegations in the original and the re-filed Motion, Plaintiff has not shown an immediate irreparable injury justifying the grant of the relief he is requesting. Irreparable injury is established by showing that the plaintiff will suffer harm that “cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm”). In this context, the word irreparable has a specific meaning and connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, [or] atoned for . . . .” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (citations omitted). Thus, an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of [the] remote future injury . . . .” Id. at 655 (citation omitted). Plaintiff, who has the burden of showing an imminent threat of irreparable injury, has failed to meet this precise burden with respect to his request for preliminary injunctive relief.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Re-Filed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order” (ECF No. 20) be denied.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.