Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-00491
10-13-2023
WILLIAM HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. ASHLEY TRAFICANTE, Mailroom Supervisor, et al., Defendants.
David S. Cercone District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMONDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's “Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order” (ECF No. 26) be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Background
Plaintiff William Harris (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner who is currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and confined at SCI-Fayette. Plaintiff initiated this pro se prisoner civil rights action on March 22, 2023, and his Complaint was filed after he was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on April 12, 2023. (ECF Nos. 1-3, 6-7.)
Currently pending before the Court is the third Motion for preliminary injunctive relief that Plaintiff has filed since he initiated this case. (ECF No. 26.) A response to the Motion was filed by the named Defendants on September 29, 2023. (ECF No. 31.) In his Motion, Plaintiff complains about the denial and/or delay in receiving medications for his testicular condition and heart issues. Despite the title of his Motion, he does not actually request that the Court order any specific injunctive relief. Instead, he requests that the Court order the Defendants to stop playing Russian Roulette with his health and to pay him $100 per day for every day that he was deprived of his medications. See ECF No. 26, p.8.
With respect to the denial of and/or delays in receiving medication for his testicular condition, Plaintiff alleges the following. He was taken to see a urologist at Allegheny General Hospital (“AGH”) on June 8, 2022. At this visit, the urologist prescribed Plaintiff pain medication for his testicular pain but did not inform Plaintiff as to what specific pain medication was prescribed. When Plaintiff returned to the prison, he asked what pain medication was prescribed to him by the urologist and was either ignored or told that no pain medication was prescribed. On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff went to the chronic care clinic at the prison and was told that the urologist at AGH had prescribed him Tylenol for the pain. He was also told by the provider at the clinic that a medical supervisor had determined that, in order to save money, Plaintiff would have to purchase the generic Tylenol from the commissary.Nevertheless, the provider at the clinic ordered Plaintiff the Tylenol and Plaintiff picked up a 30-day supply the next day. Plaintiff complains that the medical supervisor, an unidentified employee from Wellpath who is currently listed as a John Doe defendant in this case, exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's testicular pain for two months by not providing Plaintiff with the Tylenol that the urologist had prescribed to him following his appointment on June 8, 2022, and that this was done specifically to save money. He also states in his Motion that since August 10, 2022, he has received “deliberate delays” in replenishing his Tylenol prescription, specifically from March 11-29, 2023; June 27-July 6, 2023; and August 5-19, 2023.
Plaintiff does not make clear whether this was the reason he was not provided with the Tylenol after he saw the urologist on June 8, 2022.
With respect to the delays in receiving medication for his heart issues, Plaintiff alleges the following. He was seen by a cardiologist at Uniontown Hospital on June 15, 2021. The cardiologist prescribed him Cardizem, HCTZ, Lopressor and Eliquis and directed Plaintiff to take the medication every day or risk a stroke or heart attack. Despite this directive, Plaintiff states that there were several occasions where he was not provided with his medications. Specifically, he claims that he was not given his Cardizem on March 10-11, 2023. He filed a grievance regarding the incident (#1023622), and the response acknowledged that there was a delay in receiving Plaintiff's Cardizem but denied that the delay was intentional. Plaintiff also claims that he was not given his Lopressor, HCTZ or Flomax on August 7-8, 2023. He states that he was stricken with dizziness, vomiting and headache the night of August 8, 2023, and into the morning of August 9, 2023, which he claims was due to his elevated blood pressure and racing heartbeat. Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the incident (#1046596), and the response to it indicated that he was in fact given his Lopressor on August 8, 2023, and that the only medication that he did not receive was HCTZ, which did not come in until August 9, 2023. (ECF No. 31-1, pp.1-5.) The grievance response also indicated that because Plaintiff never pressed his call button to indicate that he was in medical distress the night of August 8, there was no way to tell if what he was experiencing was due to missing any medications for his heart issues. Id. Plaintiff also claims that he was not given his Lopressor, HCTZ or Flomax against from August 24-26, 2023. He filed a grievance regarding the incident (#1049145), and the response indicated that while the full supply of medications was not available for pick-up on August 24, 2023, medical gave him a 5-day supply of all three medications from the stock room in order to cover him until the refills came in, which they did on August 29, 2023. (ECF No. 311, pp.6-8.)
As previously stated, Plaintiff does not actually request any specific injunctive relief in his Motion. He simply states that the denial and/or delays in providing him with his medications places his health and life in imminent danger, and he requests that Defendants be ordered to compensate him for every day he was deprived of his medications at a rate of $100 a day.
B. Standard of Review
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant “must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the movant's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440,443 (3d Cir. 1982), see also Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 3:13-CV-2661, 2014 WL 3955105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (“An injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy' that is never awarded as of right.”). Rather, the decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982).
Generally, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Further, where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
For a party to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.'” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 3:CV-10-1899, 2014 WL 3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. Contino, 629 F.Supp.2d 449, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “The mere risk of injury is not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. And the burden of showing irreparable injury “is not an easy burden” to meet. Moore v. Mann, 3:CV-13-2771, 2014 WL 3893903, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug 7, 2014). In assessing a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must also consider the harm to the defendants and whether granting the preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 2012).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
C. Discussion
With the above considerations in mind, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a preliminary injunction is warranted in this case.
First and foremost, Plaintiff has not established a nexus between the injuries claimed in his Motion with respect to the delay in receiving medication for his heart issues and the conduct asserted in his Complaint. Specifically, the issuance of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the merits of the pending lawsuit. However, the injuries claimed in his Motion with regard to the delays in receiving his heart medication appear to bear no relation to the pending action. See Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint”); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed or further harmed in the manner in which the movant contends [he] was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint.”); Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 838 (affirming the denial of injunctive relief because the individuals whose conduct the plaintiff sought to enjoin were not named as defendants in the action and because most of the relief she was requesting was completely unrelated to the allegations in her amended complaint); Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that because plaintiff's motion was based on new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely different from the claim raised and the relief requested in the original lawsuit, they cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction); Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered.”); see also Spencer v. Stapler, No. 04-1532, 2006 WL 2052704, *9 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2006) (denying plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief because it concerns events that are unrelated to the subject of his complaint and concerns conduct of persons other than the named defendants); Westbank Yellow Pages v. BRI, Inc., No. 96-1128, 1996 WL 255912, *1 (E.D. La. May 13, 1996) (determining that a preliminary injunction is not an appropriate vehicle for trying to obtain relief that is not sought in the underlying action); Williams v. Platt, 2006 WL 149124, *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 2006) (concluding that “[a] preliminary injunction would be inappropriate to address wrongs wholly unrelated to the complaint”). Specifically, Plaintiff's allegations with respect to the delays in receiving his heart medication are new assertions of wrongdoing by individuals who are not even named as defendants in this action. Therefore, even though none was specifically requested, any issuance of injunctive relief in this regard would not be appropriate.
Nevertheless, even if there was a nexus between Plaintiff's Complaint and his allegations in his Motion with respect to the delays in receiving his heart medications, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to such a claim that may be brought as the evidence submitted in support of Defendants' response to Plaintiff's Motion indicates that Plaintiff did actually receive his medications on some of the days he claims he was deprived of them, and to the extent that he did not, the delays were not intentional or meant to cause Plaintiff harm.
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations regarding the denial and delays of receiving Tylenol for pain stemming from his testicular condition, he has not shown an immediate irreparable injury justifying the grant of any injunctive relief. Irreparable injury is established by showing that the plaintiff will suffer harm that “cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm”). In this context, the word irreparable has a specific meaning and connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, [or] atoned for . . . .” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (citations omitted). Thus, an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury . . . .” Id. at 655 (citation omitted). Plaintiff has the burden of showing an imminent threat of irreparable injury. However, he has now received his Tylenol prescription, and to the extent he complains about the delays in receiving refills, the undersigned does not find that these infrequent episodes pose an imminent threat of irreparable injury since Plaintiff admits that the generic version is readily available for purchase in the commissary. For all of these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's “Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order” (ECF No. 26) be denied.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.