Opinion
1:22-cv-266 Erie
05-16-2023
TELLY HARRIS, Petitioner v. WARDEN SUTTER, et al, Respondents
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 4], RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 7], AND PETITIONER'S MOTION TO AMEND [19]
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Pending before the Court is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner Telly Harris (“Petitioner”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Respondents' motion to dismiss the petition, and Petitioner's motion to amend. See ECF Nos. 4, 7, 19. For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that Respondents' motion to dismiss be granted, Harris' petition and motion to amend each be denied, and that no certificate of appealability should issue.
II. Report
The following factual narrative is derived from the Petition [ECF No. 4], Respondents' Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7], and the public dockets for Petitioner's underlying criminal case currently pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County.
Petitioner is a state pretrial detainee, currently incarcerated in the Erie County Prison while awaiting trial on charges of rape, indecent exposure, sexual assault, indecent assault, and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County at Case No. 2317 of 2020. Petitioner is representing himself with the assistance of standby counsel in those proceedings. A review of his state court docket indicates that he is currently awaiting trial.
Amid his state court proceedings, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 9, 2022. ECF No. 4. His only claim for relief is that he is actually and factually innocent of the state court charges based on “case facts (forensic evidence) affidavits, transcripts, case facts exhibit documentation all facts in support there of for finder of fact.” Id. at 5. Petitioner acknowledges that he has filed several unsuccessful pre-trial motions but that he has not appealed the outcome of those motions. Id. at 6. In response, Respondents contend that the Court must dismiss the petition because Petitioner has not exhausted his state-court remedies with respect to his lone claim. ECF No. 7. Rather than file a reply, Petitioner filed a motion to strike Respondents' motion to dismiss, incorrectly arguing that the motion is untimely. See ECF No. 12. This matter is ripe for adjudication.
Respondents' answer was due November 14, 2022. ECF No. 6. Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on November 11, 2022. ECF No. 7.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Analysis
“For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy.” Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1967)). As such, a prisoner may ordinarily seek federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” only after he has been convicted, sentenced, and has exhausted his remedies in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001).
While § 2254 applies to post-trial challenges, a state criminal defendant seeking relief before a state judgment has been rendered may proceed pursuant to the more general habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in very limited circumstances. In pertinent part, § 2241 provides that the writ of habeas corpus is available to a petitioner who is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States C 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). This language provides a state criminal defendant with a mechanism to challenge the legality of his pre-trial confinement in a federal habeas action by arguing that he should not be in custody because, for example: (1) his upcoming trial will violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g.. United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975); (2) he is being deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, see, e.g., Braden v. Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1973); or, (3) the trial court has unconstitutionally denied or revoked bail, see, e.g., Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1981). In all circumstances, the court's “jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent . . . ‘pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of state criminal processes.'” Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46).
Importantly, state pre-trial detainees seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust their state-court remedies. Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional la ... as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 490-91); Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 (no distinction between § 2254 and § 2241 “insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned”). The exhaustion requirement is “grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). See also Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Exhaustion addresses federalism and comity concerns by affording the state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To that end, the United States Supreme Court has held that a petitioner must “invoke one complete round of the State's established appellate review process''' to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added). It is the petitioner's burden to demonstrate that he has done so. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Coady, 251 F.3d at 488.
In the instant case, it appears that Harris has not met this burden with respect to his claim. Courts have routinely held that pre-trial detainees “should pursue the remedies available in the state court action” through pre-trial motions and, if unsuccessful, through the state appellate process. A review of the documents submitted by Respondent, as well as the current state court docket, indicates that Petitioner has filed several pre-trial motions but has not appealed the denial of those motions to the Superior Court. As such, Petitioner's claims have not been exhausted. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 10 (1979) (“the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal”); Reese v. Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2018) (emphasizing that “[c]ourts have consistently refused to exercise their habeas authority in cases where federal prisoners have sought relief before standing trial.”).
Where state-court remedies are unexhausted, “principles of federalism and comity require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Moore, 515 F.2d at 447-48. Younger abstention will apply when: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)). If the three Younger requirements are satisfied, abstention is required unless the petitioner demonstrates that the state proceedings are motivated by bad faith, the state law being challenged is patently unconstitutional, or there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised. Id. at 670 n. 4 (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)). These exceptions are to be construed “very narrowly” and invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id.-, Moore, 515 F.2d at 448. See also Brian R. Means, POSTCONVJCTION REMEDIES, § 10.3 Westlaw (database updated July 2020).
In the instant case, Petitioner is currently engaged in an ongoing state judicial proceeding as an active participant in his own defense in a state criminal prosecution. Those proceedings implicate the state's important interest in enforcing its own criminal laws. As discussed above, Petitioner can raise his constitutional claims in the context of his state criminal proceedings through pretrial motions and, if necessary, resort to the state appellate process. Granting his request for relief would plainly interfere with those proceedings. Thus, out of deference to the state judicial process, the Court must decline Petitioner's invitation to invalidate the criminal proceedings against him and abstain from entertaining his petition. See, e.g., Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (“In no area of the law is the need for a federal court to stay its hand pending completion of state proceedings more evident than in the case of pending criminal proceedings.”).
The same holds true for the arguments raised in Petitioner's motion to amend. ECF No. 19. It is unclear whether that motion presents new grounds for relief or simply offers legal argument in support of Harris' original petition. Whichever the case, those claims are plainly unexhausted.
Even if this were not the case, Petitioner's claim that he is factually innocent of the charges against him does not appear to fall within the narrow category of claims that are cognizable in a pre-trial § 2241 petition. Webb, 516 F.2d at 1034; Braden, 410 U.S. at 492-93; Atkins, 644 F.2d at 550.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Respondents' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 7] be granted and Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 4] be denied. It is further recommended that Petitioner's motion to amend [ECF No. 19] be denied. And, because jurists of reason would not find this disposition to be debatable, it is further recommended that a certificate of appealability be likewise denied. Said denial should be without prejudice to Petitioner's right to timely file another habeas petition (under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241, as the circumstances warrant) if he properly exhausts his available state-court remedies and satisfies any other applicable procedural prerequisites.
See, e.g., Reese v. Pennsylvania, 2019 WL 5746276, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019) (collecting cases for the proposition that the certificate of appealability requirement applies to Section 2241 petitions filed by state pre-trial detainees); Moore v. Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office, 2020 WL 6322817, at * 1 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2020) (same).
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).