In In re Marriage of Tapia (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 628 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 459], we held that contributions by third persons to an ex-spouse's living expenses should be considered by the trial court in determining the ex-spouse's ability to pay spousal or child support. In Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 564] we held that Tapia should not be read to allow automatic discovery of the financial records of ex-spouses living with a third person. We held that when such discovery might be appropriate, the trial court should balance the third party's right of privacy against the ex-spouse's right to know.

The trial court's order gave Ryal the right to access documents pertaining to Alicia's personal financial information. This type of information comes within the zone of privacy protected by the California Constitution. (Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 664 (Harris), disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.) However, the privacy right "is not absolute and, upon a showing of some compelling public interest, the right of privacy must give way." (Harris, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 664.

( Rifkind v. Superior Court, supra, 123 Cal.App. 3d at p. 1052.) In Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 464], a former wife seeking to increase child support payments sought discovery of financial records of a third person who shared a house with the former husband. Although recognizing that the third person's contributions to the former husband's living expenses were relevant to the court's determination of the husband's ability to pay child support, the appellate court held that the wife was not entitled to discovery from the third person as a matter of routine.

(1) "When the right to discovery conflicts with a privileged right, the court is required to carefully balance the right of privacy with the need for discovery. [Citations.]" ( Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 564] .) Discovery may be compelled only upon a showing of a compelling public interest. ( Id. at p. 664.)

This right to privacy extends to personal financial information. Harris v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 567 (Cal.Ct.App. 1992), disapproved of on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Ct., 398 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2017) (“Personal financial information comes within the zone of privacy protected by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.”).

"A discovery proponent may demonstrate compelling need by establishing [that] the discovery sought is directly relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the underlying lawsuit." (Ibid.; Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 (Harris).) Here, the medical records of Windsor's nonparty residents are protected by California's constitutional right to privacy.

This type of information comes within the zone of privacy protected by the California Constitution. (Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 664 (Harris); Moskowitz v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 313, 315.) However, the privacy right "is not absolute and, upon a showing of some compelling public interest, the right of privacy must give way."

The person seeking discovery of material protected by the constitutional right to privacy "has the burden of making a threshold showing that the evidence sought is `directly relevant' to the claim or defense." ( Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 564].) A showing of direct relevancy may trigger a balancing by the court of the need for the discovery against the fundamental right of privacy, but "the balance will favor privacy for confidential information in third party . . . files unless the litigant can show a compelling need for the particular documents and that the information cannot reasonably be obtained through depositions or from nonconfidential sources."

Much of the California case law Local 21 relies on involved such private financial information, and is therefore inapposite. (E.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225] [statute requiring public officials to disclose private financial dealings held unconstitutional]; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656-659 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977] [privacy rights of bank customers must be accommodated in discovery proceedings]; Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 663, 664 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 564] [financial records of father's cohabitant protected from discovery in child support dispute].) The states with such legislation include Alaska (AS 39.25.080(b)(6)), Kansas (KSA § 45-221(a)(4), and Missouri (RSMo § 610.021(13)).

Thus, wife argues, cohabitation was not a change of circumstances and could not have triggered the presumption of section 4323. Wife's interpretation of the 1997 order flies in the face of the rules on appeal ( ante, pp. 3-4) and violates the "obligation of the reader," articulated by Justice Gilbert in Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665-667.) In 1997 the trial court neither expressly nor impliedly found cohabitation.