Harris v. Stovall

41 Citing cases

  1. Longmire v. McCullick

    2:17-cv-10148 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2024)

    Petitioner argues that his current attempt to raise additional claims in his original habeas petition should not be considered a successive petition within the meaning of § 2244(b)(3), because this Court denied the first petition on procedural grounds. Although Petitioner would not have been required to obtain a certificate of authorization following the dismissal of his petition if it had been dismissed without prejudice on exhaustion grounds, see Harris v. Stovall, 22 F.Supp.2d 659, 664 (E.D. Mich. 1998), this Court denied the petition with prejudice on the merits. Therefore, the current motion is a successive habeas petition.

  2. Pelichet v. Artis

    No. 23-11402 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2023)

    And it is clear that the holding of Aaron is not retroactive because the Michigan Supreme Court explicitly held that its decision would “apply to all trials in progress and those occurring after the date of [its] opinion.” Aaron, 409 Mich. at 734, 299 N.W.2d at 329; see also Bowen v. Foltz, 763 F.2d 191, 192 (6th Cir. 1985); Harris v. Stovall, 22 F.Supp.2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2000). Pelichet's trial was completed in 1977, well before Aaron was decided in 1980.

  3. Longmire v. McCullick

    2:17-CV-10148 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2022)

    Petitioner argues that his current attempt to raise additional claims in his original habeas petition should not be considered a successive petition within the meaning of § 2244(b)(3) because this Court denied the first petition on procedural grounds. Although Petitioner would not have been required to obtain a certificate of authorization following the dismissal of his petition if it had been dismissed without prejudice on exhaustion grounds, see Harris v. Stovall, 22 F.Supp.2d 659, 664 (E.D. Mich. 1998), this Court denied the petition with prejudice on the merits. Therefore, the current motion is a successive habeas petition.

  4. Franklin v. Chapman

    CIVIL 2:20-CV-12746 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2021)

    . See also People v. Carines, 460 Mich. at 759-60; Harris v. Stovall, 22 F.Supp.2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998); People v. Turner, 213 Mich.App. 558, 572-73; 540 N.W.2d 728 (1995);overruled in part on other grounds People v. Mass, 464 Mich. 615; 628 N.W.2d 540 (2001); People v. Hart, 161 Mich.App. 630, 635; 411 N.W.2d 803 (1987); Meade v. Lavigne, 265 F.Supp.2d 849, 858-59 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Cf. Redmond v. Jackson, 295 F.Supp.2d 767, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2003)(petitioner not entitled to tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations on a claim that he was actually innocent of felony-murder, finding that petitioner's act of providing a firearm to be used in an armed robbery demonstrated a wanton and willful disregard of the fact that a person could be killed or suffer great bodily harm during the course of the robbery).

  5. Crummie v. Bauman

    Civil No. 2:15-CV-12723 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 30, 2019)

    See Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2003)(intent for felony murder "can be inferred from the aider and abettor's knowledge that his cohort possesses a weapon."). See also People v. Carines, 460 Mich. at 759-60; Harris v. Stovall, 22 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998); People v. Turner, 213 Mich. App. 558, 572-73; 540 N. W. 2d 728 (1995);overruled in part on other grounds People v. Mass, 464 Mich. 615; 628 N.W. 2d 540 (2001); People v. Hart, 161 Mich. App. 630, 635; 411 N.W. 2d 803 (1987); Meade v. Lavigne, 265 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858-59 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Cf. Redmond v. Jackson, 295 F. Supp. 2d 767, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2003)(petitioner not entitled to tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations on a claim that he was actually innocent of felony-murder, finding that petitioner's act of providing a firearm to be used in an armed robbery demonstrated a wanton and wilful disregard of the fact that a person could be killed or suffer great bodily harm during the course of the robbery). The mere fact that the gun discharged after Mr. Norris reached for it in an attempt to disarm Petitioner does not negate the malice.

  6. Stewart v. Trierweiler

    Civil No. 2:15-CV-11843 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 31, 2018)

    A number of cases have held that a defendant's participation in an armed robbery, while he or a co-defendant was armed with a loaded firearm, manifested a wanton and reckless disregard that death or serious bodily injury could occur—in other words, with the requisite malice to support a conviction for first-degree felony-murder. See Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F. 3d 706, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2003); See also People v. Carines, 460 at 759-60; Harris v. Stovall, 22 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998); People v. Turner, 213 Mich. App. 558, 572-73; 540 N. W. 2d 728 (1995); overruled in part on other grounds People v. Mass, 464 Mich. 615; 628 N.W. 2d 540 (2001); People v. Hart, 161 Mich. App. 630, 635; 411 N.W. 2d 803 (1987); Meade v. Lavigne , 265 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858-59 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Finally, even if the gun went off accidentally during the struggle between Petitioner and the victim, this would not negate a finding of malice.

  7. Byrd v. Bauman

    Case No. 15-cv-13528 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 15, 2017)

    (R. 5-13, PID 1063 (emphasis added).); see also People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d. 130, 136 (Mich. 1999) (holding in relevant part that where the state charges first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory, the defendant must act with malice and know that the principal intends to commit the offense at the time the defendant renders aid). Numerous cases hold that participation in an armed robbery where the defendant knows the co-defendant to be armed with a loaded firearm supports the finding of knowledge necessary to obtain a conviction for felony-murder on an aiding-and-abetting theory. See Carines, 597 N.W.2d at 136-37; People v. Hart, 411 N.W. 2d 803, 805 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Meade v. Lavigne, 265 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858-59 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Harris v. Stovall, 22 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998). In short, trial counsel misunderstood and misstated the Michigan law of accomplice liability.

  8. Bragg v. Burton

    Civil No. 2:16-CV-10199 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 30, 2016)

    See Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F. 3d 706, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2003)(intent for felony murder "can be inferred from the aider and abettor's knowledge that his cohort possesses a weapon."); See also People v. Carines, 460 at 759-60; Harris v. Stovall, 22 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998); People v. Turner, 213 Mich. App. 558, 572-73; 540 N. W. 2d 728 (1995);overruled in part on other grounds People v. Mass, 464 Mich. 615; 628 N.W. 2d 540 (2001); People v. Hart, 161 Mich. App. 630, 635; 411 N.W. 2d 803 (1987); Meade v. Lavigne, 265 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858-59 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Petitioner argues that there was no malice because he did not intend for the victim to fall from the sixth floor balcony.

  9. Sturges v. Curtin

    CASE NO. 2:13-CV-12013 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 12, 2016)

    See Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2003)(intent for felony murder "can be inferred from the aider and abettor's knowledge that his cohort possesses a weapon."). See also People v. Carines, 460 Mich. at 759-60; Harris v. Stovall, 22 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998); People v. Turner, 213 Mich. App. 558, 572-73; 540 N. W. 2d 728 (1995);overruled in part on other grounds People v. Mass, 464 Mich. 615; 628 N.W.2d 540 (2001); People v. Hart, 161 Mich. App. 630, 635; 411 N.W.2d 803 (1987); Meade v. Lavigne , 265 F. Supp. 2d at 858-59. See also Redmond v. Jackson, 295 F. Supp. 2d 767, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2003)(petitioner not entitled to tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations on a claim that he was actually innocent of felony-murder, finding that petitioner's act of providing a firearm to be used in an armed robbery demonstrated a wanton and wilful disregard of the fact that a person could be killed or suffer great bodily harm during the course of the robbery).

  10. Faulkner v. Campbell

    Case No. 4:16-CV-10340 (E.D. Mich. May. 18, 2016)

    Petitioner previously filed a habeas petition with the federal courts. Although petitioner would not have been required to obtain a certificate of authorization following the dismissal of his petition if it had been dismissed without prejudice on exhaustion grounds, See Harris v. Stovall, 22 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (E.D. Mich. 1998), petitioner's first habeas petition was denied on the merits. Petitioner's current habeas petition is a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus and he is therefore required to obtain a certificate of authorization.