First, the courts of this state have held repeatedly and unequivocally that a witness may not express his or her opinion as to whether a child has been molested. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991); Sims v. State, 260 Ga. 782, 784 ( 399 S.E.2d 924) (1991); Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 853 (5), (6) ( 353 S.E.2d 805) (1987); Hilliard v. State, 226 Ga. App. 478, 479-481 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 81) (1997); Remine v. State, 203 Ga. App. 30, 31 (2) ( 416 S.E.2d 326) (1992). The general rule is well expressed in Allison, supra: "[A]n expert may not testify as to his opinion as to the existence vel non of a fact (in this case, whether the child had been abused sexually) unless the inference to be drawn from facts in evidence is beyond the ken of the jurors — that is, unless the jurors, for want of specialized knowledge, skill, or experience, are incapable of drawing — from facts in evidence — such an inference for themselves. [Cit.

' [Cit.]" Harris v. State, 198 Ga. App. 503 (1) ( 402 S.E.2d 62) (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991). Indeed, defense counsel may have located the witnesses and the restraining orders to which Morgan refers and determined that they were unhelpful. Baker v. State, supra at 379(2).

Moreover, Rutledge's brother admitted that he had been at the MARTA station before and, therefore, to the extent that the point was exculpatory, it was presented to the jury. Harris v. State, 198 Ga. App. 503, 506 (8) ( 402 S.E.2d 62) (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991); Ellis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 757, 759-760 (3) ( 309 S.E.2d 924) (1983). Accordingly, we conclude that error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, the objections raised below are deemed abandoned on appeal and the grounds raised for the first time on appeal need not be considered. Harris v. State, 198 Ga. App. 503, 505 (7) ( 402 S.E.2d 62) (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991); King v. State, supra at 762 (1). Moreover, even assuming that Crawford properly preserved the grounds raised on appeal, there was no error, since it was undisputed that a homicide occurred.

The trial court denied the motion and cautioned the jury that child abuse was not an issue in the case and that it was to disregard any reference to child abuse. At trial, appellant relied on Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991), and Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851 ( 353 S.E.2d 805) (1987), and on appeal relies on McCartney v. State, 262 Ga. 156 ( 414 S.E.2d 227) (1992), for the proposition that the witness' testimony was so prejudicial as to require a mistrial. While we recognize that reversible error may have occurred had the trial court admitted the testimony over appellant's objection, that is not what happened here: instead of admitting the testimony, the trial court took measures to exclude it by directing the jury not to consider it.

Id. at 853 (6). Cf. also Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991) (physician testified, based on physical examination, that child had been sexually molested). In the present case, Dr. Burton's testimony that the childhood maltreatment syndrome or abused child syndrome was the "manner" in which the fatal injuries occurred, and that the fatal injuries occurred "in the process" of the childhood maltreatment syndrome, constituted his opinion that the fatal injuries in fact resulted from child abuse.

See Allison, supra at 853 (6).Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 SE2d 482) (1991) (reversible error where physician gave opinion that child had been sexually molested); Allison, supra at 853 (7); Hilliard v. State, 226 Ga. App. 478, 479 (1) ( 487 SE2d 81) (1997); Coxwell v. State, 195 Ga. App. 751, 753 (3) ( 395 SE2d 38) (1990). See Mann v. State, 252 Ga. App. 70, 72 (1) ( 555 SE2d 527) (2001).

Garrett v. State, 196 Ga. App. 872, 873 (1) ( 397 S.E.2d 205) (1990). See also Harris v. State, 198 Ga. App. 503 ( 402 S.E.2d 62) [rev'd on other grounds 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482)] (1991); McCarthy v. State, 196 Ga. App. 839, 841 (4) ( 397 S.E.2d 178) (1990); Allsop v. State, 196 Ga. App. 379, 381-382 ( 396 S.E.2d 47) (1990); Balduf v. State, 190 Ga. App. 233 ( 378 S.E.2d 409) (1989). Although arguendo [Turner's] representation may have been less than perfect, there is no indication in the record that the conduct of his counsel met the Strickland v. Washington, [supra] criteria denoting ineffective assistance.

Because the expert inAllison had no direct physical evidence of abuse, only evidence gained through discussions with the victim and observations of her behavior, the expert was prevented from giving an opinion as to the ultimate issue of fact, i. e., that molestation actually occurred. Our Supreme Court took this rule one step further in Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991). In that case, a physician was directly asked, based on his physical examination of the victim, whether he believed that the victim had been sexually molested.

Reid v. State, 204 Ga. App. 358, 360-361 (2) ( 419 S.E.2d 321) (1992). Richard Miller accepted the jurors knowing of their relationships to Wal-Mart, and so expressly and presumptively waived his right to challenge any alleged disqualification of the jurors on appeal. See McFarren v. State, 210 Ga. App. 889, 892 (3) ( 437 S.E.2d 869) (1993); Harris v. State, 198 Ga. App. 503, 504 (2) ( 402 S.E.2d 62) (1991), reversed on other grounds, 261 Ga. 386 ( 405 S.E.2d 482) (1991). Furthermore, Richard Miller expressly acquiesced in the trial court's determination that he had no standing to object.