Opinion
C.A. No. 03A-01-002.
July 16, 2003.
Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire.
Ms. Laverne Harris.
Dear Counsel and Ms. Harris:
This is my decision on Laverne Harris's (the "Claimant") appeal of a decision by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the "Board"). The Board dismissed Claimant's appeal for failure to prosecute. I affirm the Board's decision for the reasons stated herein.
Facts
Claimant was employed as a poultry worker by Mountaire Farms of Delaware ("Employer") from October 7, 1996, until October 23, 2002. On the later date, Claimant was discharged from employment for insubordination after cursing at her supervisor. On October 29, 2002, Claimant filed for unemployment compensation. The Claims Deputy found that Claimant was discharged for just cause and denied her benefits. Claimant appealed the Claims Deputy's decision and a hearing before the Referee was scheduled for December 12, 2002. The Referee found that Claimant's use of profanity towards her supervisor amounted to insubordination. Thus, the Claims Deputy's decision was affirmed.
Claimant disputes that she cursed at her supervisor and alleges that Employer deceptively obtained her signature on a document stating that she had used profanity in the workplace.
On December 18, 2002, Claimant appealed the Referee's decision to the Board. Claimant failed to appear at the Board hearing on January 15, 2003. Claimant neither notified the Board of her inability to attend, nor requested a continuance. Consequently, the Board dismissed Claimant's appeal for failure to prosecute. On January 30, 2003, Claimant sought an appeal of the Board's decision in this Court. The appeal concerns the factual merits of the case, not the propriety of the Board's dismissal of the claim.
Claimant contested the Referee's findings of fact and maintained that she did not curse at her supervisor.
As her grounds for appeal, Claimant contends that her termination was not for just cause and she "did not cuss the supervisor."
The Board maintains UIAB Rule 4.2 allows it to dismiss an appeal if a claimant fails to attend a scheduled hearing. Thus, the Board argues that the dismissal of Claimant's appeal for failure to prosecute was proper. Furthermore, the Board contends that Claimant's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking review in this Court leaves this Court without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Standard of Review
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 312 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960), and to review questions of law de novo, In re Beattie, 180 A.2d 741, 744 (Del.Super. 1962). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.), app. dism., 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. 19 Del. C. § 3323.
Discussion
Judicial review of a Board finding "shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted all administrative remedies." 19 Del. C. § 3322(a). A hearing before the Board is the final administrative remedy. 19 Del. C. § 3320. When an appellant fails to appear before the Board, "the Court lacks the jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because the Appellant did not exhaust all administrative remedies by not presenting his case to the Board." Griffin v. Daimler Chrysler, Del. Super., Civ. A. 00A-10-008, Carpenter, J. (April 27, 2001), at 2.
The appeal contests the Referee's determination that Claimant used profanity in the workplace and was dismissed for just cause. This concerns the merits of the case, not the propriety of the Board's dismissal. Claimant's failure to appear before the Board denied the Board the opportunity to determine the accuracy of this finding. Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the sufficiency of the factual findings. See Bell v. Northeast Treatment Ctr., Inc., Del. Super., Civ. A. 02A-09-001, Carpenter, J. (June 30, 2003); Jackson v. Murphy Marine Serv., Del. Super., Civ. A. 01A-11-11, Del Pesco, J. (April 24, 2002);Griffin v. Daimler Chrysler, Del. Super., Civ. A. 00A-10-008, Carpenter, J. (April 27, 2001). As Claimant did not attend the Board hearing and exhaust her administrative remedies prior to approaching this Court, this Court is limited to determining whether the Board's decision to dismiss Claimant's appeal for failure to prosecute was an abuse of discretion.Mintz v. Wilmington Trust Co., Del. Super., C.A. No. 92A-11-013, Gebelein, J. (Nov. 15, 1995), at 2. Failure to prosecute, as evidenced by a claimant's unexcused absence at the Board hearing, provides the Board with reasonable grounds for dismissal. See Mintz at 3. Claimant's absence at the Board hearing leads this Court to conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the appeal for failure to prosecute.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.