Harris v. Marlow

36 Citing cases

  1. Bonasera v. Town of Islip

    48 A.D.3d 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the jury verdict was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Harris v Marlow, 18 AD3d 608, 610; Torres v Esaian, 5 AD3d 670, 671; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134). Where, as here, conflicting expert testimony is presented, the jury is entitled to accept one expert opinion and reject the other ( see Clarke v Limone, 40 AD3d 571, 572; Vona v Wank, 302 AD2d 516).

  2. Cetoute v. Sidney

    167 A.D.3d 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    For a reviewing court to determine that a jury's verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, it must conclude that "there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences" by which the jury could have rationally reached its verdict on the basis of the evidence presented at trial ( Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145 ; seeWilson v. Philie, 107 A.D.3d 700, 701, 966 N.Y.S.2d 514 ; Guclu v. 900 Eighth Ave. Condominium, LLC, 81 A.D.3d 592, 592, 916 N.Y.S.2d 147 ). Moreover, "[a] jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the evidence so preponderate[s] in favor of the [moving party] that the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence" ( Albano v. K.R. & S. Auto Repair, Inc., 123 A.D.3d 748, 749, 998 N.Y.S.2d 431 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeAcosta v. City of New York, 84 A.D.3d 706, 708, 921 N.Y.S.2d 644 ; Harris v. Marlow, 18 A.D.3d 608, 610, 795 N.Y.S.2d 608 ; Schiskie v. Fernan, 277 A.D.2d 441, 716 N.Y.S.2d 702 ). " ‘It is within the province of the jury to determine issues of credibility, and great deference is accorded to the jury given its opportunity to see and hear the witnesses’ "

  3. Acosta v. City of N.Y.

    153 A.D.3d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 11 times

    The standard for determining whether a jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence is whether the evidence so preponderated in favor of the movant that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ; Harris v. Marlow, 18 A.D.3d 608, 610, 795 N.Y.S.2d 608 ; Torres v. Esaian, 5 A.D.3d 670, 671, 773 N.Y.S.2d 453 ; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 132–133, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184 ). Great deference is accorded to the fact-finding function of the jury regarding the credibility of witnesses, as the jury had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses (see McDonagh

  4. Konvalin v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.

    17 N.Y.S.3d 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

    The Civil Court denied defendant's motion, and a judgment was subsequently entered in plaintiff's favor in accordance with the verdict. Upon a review of the record, we find that the verdict was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence presented to the jury, and therefore was not against the weight of the evidence (see Lolik v. Big v. Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744 [1995] ; Harris v. Marlow, 18 AD3d 608, 610 [2005] ; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129 [1985] ). Moreover, we find that the jury's award to plaintiff of $450,000 for past pain and suffering for a total of 12 years was not excessive and did not materially deviate from what would be reasonable compensation, given the several surgeries that plaintiff had undergone as a result of his injuries (see CPLR 5501[c] ; Bennett v. Henry, 39 AD3d 575, 576 [2007] ; Williams v. Pelican Pest Control, Inc., 11 AD3d 454 [2004] ; Weldon v. Beal, 272 A.D.2d 321 [2000] ).

  5. Kim v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.

    87 A.D.3d 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 17 times

    CPLR 4404(a) states that a court may set aside a jury verdict and either (1) “direct that judgment be entered in favor of a party entitled to judgment as a matter of law” or (2) “order a new trial ... where the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless “the evidence so preponderate[s] in favor of the [moving party] that the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence” ( Acosta v. City of New York, 84 A.D.3d 706, 708, 921 N.Y.S.2d 644; see Harris v. Marlow, 18 A.D.3d 608, 610, 795 N.Y.S.2d 608; Schiskie v. Fernan, 277 A.D.2d 441, 716 N.Y.S.2d 702)

  6. Schaffer v. Batheja

    76 A.D.3d 970 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 4 times

    The evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury's finding that Dr. Batheja departed from accepted medical practice, and that the departure was a proximate cause of Mrs. Schaffer's injuries ( see Hartley v St. Charles Hosp. Rehabilitation Ctr., 307 AD2d 274; Biggs v Mary Immaculate Hosp., 303 AD2d 702). Moreover, the liability verdict against Dr. Batheja was not contrary to the weight of the evidence ( see Harris v Marlow, 18 AD3d 608; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129).

  7. Abreu v. Brookdale Hosp.

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 52464 (N.Y. App. Term 2008)

    Accordingly, the verdict in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability was supported by legally sufficient evidence ( see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499; Courtney v Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 45 AD3d 801). Moreover, we find that the verdict was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence presented to the jury, and therefore was not against the weight of the evidence ( see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744; Harris v Marlow, 18 AD3d 608, 610; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129). Thus, the court properly denied the branch of defendant's motion which sought to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of liability.

  8. Exarhouleas v. Green 317 Madison

    46 A.D.3d 854 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 61 times

    Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. A jury verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746; Harris v Marlow, 18 AD3d 608, 610; Torres v Esaian, 5 AD3d 670, 671). Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors ( see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 498).

  9. Kihl v. Pfeffer

    47 A.D.3d 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 50 times
    Affirming a jury award for future housekeeping services where "Kihl's vocational rehabilitation expert, Dr. Richard Shuster, testified that Kihl required a housekeeper, especially while her son was young, for approximately 20-30 hours per week, and for only 10-15 hours per week upon the son's reaching adolescence."

    Household chores were being performed, according to the evidence, by Kihl's husband, neighbors, and family, and Kihl occasionally would prepare meals. A jury's verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless the evidence preponderates so heavily in favor of the moving party that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746; Artusa v Costco Wholesale, 27 AD3d 499, 500; Salim v Gomez, 20 AD3d 410; Harris v Marlow, 18 AD3d 608, 610; Bobek v Crystal, 291 AD2d 521, 522; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 133-134). Great deference is to be accorded the fact-finding function of the jury as it had the responsibility of resolving any dispute as to the weight to be accorded to evidence, and as to the credibility of the witnesses ( see Stylianou v Calabrese, 297 AD2d 798, 799; Conforti v Gaeta, 190 AD2d 772, 773; Tarantino v Vanguard Leasing Co., 187 AD2d 422, 423; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d at 133-134).

  10. Rahman v. Smith

    40 A.D.3d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 27 times

    The plaintiffs' contention that the jury verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law is without merit ( see Dicke v Anci, 31 AD3d 696; Harris v Marlow, 18 AD3d 608, 610). Furthermore, a jury verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless "the evidence so preponderated in favor of the movant that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence" ( Harris v Marlow, supra, at 610 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134).