Harris v. Levy

6 Citing cases

  1. Evans Young Wyatt, Inc. v. Hoods&sHall Co.

    517 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)   Cited 3 times

    In our opinion appellant did not discharge its burden to prove probable harm. See also; Harris v. Levy, Tex.Civ.App. (El Paso) NWH, 217 S.W.2d 154; Hilker v. Agricultural Bond & Credit Corp., Tex .Civ.App. (Amarillo) Er. Dis., 96 S.W.2d 544. Moreover the evidence presented to the trial court was conflicting as to whether the misconduct actually occurred; thus the decision of the trial court on that question is final.

  2. Johnson v. Mitchell

    395 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)

    about the Tower Life Insurance Company, which was shown by the undisputed and unobjected to evidence, to have paid Mrs. Johnson's medical bills; that the foreman told the jurors that insurance had no bearing on their decision; that he promptly advised them that insurance couldn't be considered when it was mentioned. Juror Belsky testified insurance was casually mentioned and the foreman said they couldn't discuss it; that juror Hoefer, who was called by appellants, was not asked about discussion of insurance; that juror Cearley said some juror asked why would each party pay for the damage to his own car if he had insurance; that the foreman said insurance was not supposed to be mentioned, that he rebuked them each time it was mentioned; that she didn't know whether the jurors decided that Mrs. Johnson did or did not have insurance. In support of appellee's conclusion that reversible error is not shown in this connection they cite Smith v. Whitehead (Tex.Civ.App.), 363 S.W.2d 369 and Harris v. Levy (Tex.Civ.App.), 217 S.W.2d 154. The decision in Mrs. Baird's Bread Company v. Hearn, and Judge Jack Pope's article, 12 Baylor Law Review 366 and Putman v. Lazarus, 156 Tex. 154, 293 S.W.2d 493, establish that it is material to show at what time in the jury deliberation improper statements were made. These authorities are cited particularly with reference to the holdings that the time, or stage, in the jury's deliberation that misconduct occurs is important in determining whether an appellant has sustained his burden of showing probable injury. Appellees contend, and we agree, that prejudicial misconduct has not been established.

  3. Bass v. Aransas County Indep

    389 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)   Cited 26 times

    At any rate, such remark, not shown to have had any effect on the jury's verdict, is not sufficient, in view of the trial court's ruling, to show reversible error. Hauck v. Price, Tex.Civ.App., 374 S.W.2d 463, n. w. h.; St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Bearfield, Tex.Civ.App., 296 S.W.2d 956, writ ref. n. r. e.; Harris v. Levy, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W.2d 154, n. w. h.; Menefee v. Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 287, writ ref. w. m.

  4. Trice Contract Carpetss&sFurniture Co. v. Gilson

    329 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)   Cited 9 times

    Whether or not any jury misconduct occurred is a question of fact. If misconduct is established, then its effect is a question of law. Harris v. Levy, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W.2d 154; Scoggins v. Curtiss & Taylor, 1949, 148 Tex. 15, 219 S.W.2d 451. Since there is a conflict in the testimony of the witnesses as to whether there was any misconduct, and the Court made no express findins of fact or conclusions of law, this Court will presume from the order overruling the motion for new trial that the Trial Court found from a preponderance of the evidence that no jury misconduct did in fact occur.

  5. Gage v. Lone Star Gas Co.

    278 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)   Cited 1 times

    The misconduct being established it then becomes a question of law whether probable injury resulted. Rule 327, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Barrington v. Duncan, supra; City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259. However the finding of the trial court 'that it does not reasonably appear that injury probably resulted to plaintiff' is not binding on the appellate court. Barrington v. Duncan, supra; Harris v. Levy, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W.2d 154. Appellant sustained serious injuries, he remained in the hospital about one year and seven months and incurred medical and hospital bills in substantial amounts.

  6. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Hudson Engineering Corp.

    245 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)   Cited 1 times

    Because of the answers to the contributory negligence issues, plaintiffs below could not recover and it has been held that under such circumstances the failure of a jury to find damages is not reversible error. Southern Pine Lumber Company v. Andrade, 132 Tex. 372, 124 S.W.2d 334; Harris v. Levy, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W.2d 154; Guerrero v. Wright, Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W.2d 609. Appellant's fourth point is overruled. The evidence in the case strongly indicated that Domingo Estringel was an employee of Gus Canales, Inc. The appellee in an alternative pleading asserted that if it be found that Domingo Estringel was an employee of Hudson Engineering Corporation, plaintiffs could not recover of appellee, because it carried workmen's compensation insurance and was not liable in a common law negligence action.