Opinion
No. FA06-4010039
April 11, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
BACKGROUND
The parties were divorced on February 16, 2007 after a seven-year marriage. At that time the parties signed a dissolution agreement providing, among other things, that defendant pay alimony to plaintiff in the amount of 23% of his annual bonus for a non-modifiable term of seven years, that defendant pay child support in the amount of $195 per week for their two minor children (based on his gross income, not including his bonus), and that he pay 40% of the children's unreimbursed medical insurance and day care costs. The parties further agreed that neither plaintiff's remarriage nor her cohabitation would terminate alimony.
The parties also agreed that the marital residence, which was occupied by plaintiff and the children at the time of the divorce, would be sold. After the payment of certain specified debts and obligations, plaintiff was to receive 60% and defendant 40% of the net proceeds. Their agreement also provided that they would "continue to pool their incomes and pay the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities and repairs on the marital residence until the sale of the marital residence." It was further stipulated that child support would commence the week after closing, and that the court would retain jurisdiction over the payment of expenses and the sale of the house.
MOTIONS AND ISSUES
The parties presented themselves to this court on February 8, 2011 to commence a five-day post-judgment hearing. They stipulated that the following motions and issues were before the court for consideration:
1. Plaintiff's motion for modification (#113, dated July 20, 2009) requesting that the court order an increase in alimony and child support based upon a change in circumstances in that the house had not sold and defendant was earning more money;
2. Plaintiff's motion for contempt (#114, dated July 30, 2009) alleging defendant failed to pay his share of the children's work-related day care costs, his share of the unreimbursed medical expenses of the children, and his share of the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities and repairs on the home;
3. Defendant's motion to reopen judgment and modify alimony (#117, dated October 14, 2009) alleging that plaintiff was cohabiting with another individual, that plaintiff no longer maintained her residence, and that defendant's compensation structure had changed;
4. Defendant's motion for a summer parenting schedule (#129, dated June 1, 2010) which was rendered moot by the agreement of the parties prior to this hearing;
5. Defendant's motion to modify the parenting plan (#133, dated July 14, 2010) which was rendered moot by the agreement of the parties prior to this hearing;
6. Plaintiff's motion for contempt (#139, dated August 9, 2010) alleging defendant failed to pay 23% of his 2009 bonus, in the amount of $12,650, to plaintiff;
7. Defendant's motion for counsel fees (#143, dated September 14, 2010) requesting that $250 be awarded to him for having to file a motion for continuance, which was ultimately relinquished in defendant's post-trial brief;
8. By stipulation and request of the parties, orders regarding the allocation of the fees for the GAL for the children;
9. By stipulation and request of the parties, orders regarding the transportation of the children for visitation;
10. By stipulation and request of the parties, what restrictions, if any, there should be on international travel by the children; and
11. By stipulation and request of the parties, orders regarding the division of debts that were to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence, specifically the debt to Steven Stokes and defendant's student loan.
FACTS
Once plaintiff moved out of the house she filed her first motion for modification of the alimony and child support orders (motion #113). At that time, defendant was not under a court order to pay child support as these payments were not to commence until the sale of the house. Despite the fact that the parties had stopped paying their mortgage, defendant did not make any child support payments for about seven months thereafter. The parties have stipulated that any child support order entered by this court would be retroactive to August 9, 2009, and that defendant would be given credit for his voluntary (not court ordered) payments of $250 per week that he has made since October 14, 2009.
With regard to plaintiff's motion #114, both parties continued to make some payments toward the household expenses after the divorce, but neither party had a level of communication that allowed them to recognize, calculate or even appreciate the other's contributions. Each party now has a good faith dispute as to the amounts owed to the other as well as with their mathematical computations. The time passage of several years compounded the financial picture.
Some payments were made without court order and without any agreement as to how those voluntary payments would affect their ultimate obligations. For example, over the course of many months, defendant rounded out his mortgage contributions to plaintiff. Instead of paying exactly one-half of the mortgage contribution, he rounded out the payments to $1,500, approximately $45 per month more than his exact share. He never told plaintiff that he expected her to return these monies to him and defendant has provided no basis for the court to find that plaintiff has an obligation to do so.
In addition, defendant continued to contribute to plaintiff's Roth IRA account in the amount of $100 each month. Defendant is now claiming that he should be credited with that total of $2,500 he paid into her account up to March 2009. In May 2009, however, he clearly expressed his intention that this money need not be returned to him. In an e-mail message sent to plaintiff he stated that he had made these contributions and further represented that "you are more than welcome to cash out."
With regard to defendant's motion #117, the financial circumstances of the parties have changed substantially over time. Plaintiff earned a very good income during the times she worked as a waitress at the Mayflower Inn. While she showed her salary to be only $200 gross per week, she acknowledged receiving additional tips of $480 per week. She was fired after not showing up for work. For a period of time around February 2007 she worked at Helmes Briscoe, earning $962 gross and $753 net per week. She left that job voluntarily after three to four months. She has now chosen to return to school for massage therapy and expects to graduate in the next few weeks. Plaintiff has been assured that she can start working immediately thereafter. She is currently collecting unemployment compensation in the amount of $209 gross and $182 net per week.
Plaintiff left two substantial sources of employment. She left the marital residence to live with her boyfriend and continues to share living expenses with him. These facts notwithstanding, she would have the court order that defendant continue to pay 23% of his gross bonus as alimony and pay child support on his base salary and bonus. Pursuant to the previous agreement of the parties, however, defendant's bonus was to be considered as a stream of income for alimony purposes only and excluded from the child support calculation. It was the apparent intention of the parties to deviate from the Child Support Guidelines by not including defendant's bonus in his gross income for child support purposes. They agreed to create that separate source of income, his annual bonus, as the source of his alimony obligation. The parties are presumed to have a reasonable basis for this agreement. Whereas the Child Support Guidelines (CSGL) normally include "commissions, bonuses and tips" in the gross income of the non-custodial parent, the court will find that to strictly apply said Guidelines in this particular case would be inequitable and inappropriate.
Defendant was earning $1,250 per week gross and $784.34 net at the time of the divorce. In addition, he was receiving an annual bonus of $10,000. That compensation arrangement continued through 2008. In 2009 and 2010 his base compensation increased to approximately $100,000 gross per year. In addition, he received a $55,000 bonus for 2009 and a $47,500 bonus for 2010. As he had agreed to pay alimony to plaintiff in the amount of 23% of his bonus, his annual alimony payment was scheduled to increase from $2,300 (under his initial compensation structure) to $12,650 for 2009 and $10,925 for 2010. Defendant filed his motion to modify the alimony order on October 14, 2009. He has paid the 2009 alimony payment under protest and has withheld the alimony payment on the 2010 bonus pending orders of this court.
Defendant has increased his deferred compensation funds from $6,300 to $45,000 since the time of the divorce and has likewise increased his cash on hand from $200 to $15,500 ($10,000 of which is held in reserve for court orders regarding the 2010 bonus).
Defendant alleged the change in his compensation structure and plaintiff's cohabitation as grounds for his motion for modification. Even though he had agreed that the remarriage or cohabitation of plaintiff would not terminate alimony, he is now requesting this court to order his alimony reduced to $1 per year, retroactive to his 2009 bonus. That order would effectively terminate his alimony obligation at a time when plaintiff is not employed. At the same time, he is asking that plaintiff be responsible for securing and maintaining a substantial life insurance policy pursuant to the dissolution judgment, pay her own attorney fees and pay one-half of the GAL's fees.
The parties are to be commended for reaching an agreement on most post-judgment parenting issues. Their extensive agreement was presented to the court and entered as an order at the beginning of this hearing. The unresolved parenting issues are discussed below.
The transportation of the children for visitation has been an issue that has confronted the parties for some time. Over a year ago the court (Bozzuto, J.) issued an order on this very same issue. That order directed plaintiff to drive the children to defendant's residence on Friday for his weekend visitations, and to arrive there by 6:30 p.m. That order further directed defendant to return the children to plaintiff on Sunday by 5:30 p.m. Plaintiff began disobeying that order when defendant "stopped paying her." Currently, defendant and his fiancee perform virtually all of the transportation for visitation.
The court is mindful of the plaintiff's driving responsibilities. It is apparent that she is a devoted mother who takes her role seriously. Transportation for parenting access, however, is different. Some sharing of this responsibility indicates to children that their parents support and encourage parental access. It is especially important in this case as there is a high level of conflict between the parties.
In consideration of this issue, the court deems it further relevant that plaintiff is not now working, and will be able to adjust her hours once she begins working. Her suggestion that she will share the transportation of the children if defendant shares the driving for the children's activities is not practical or possible. The current driving arrangement is in violation of court orders and is not in the best interests of the children. Defendant has limited parenting time with the children and the current transportation arrangement is patently unfair to him. A neutral meeting point, other than the homes of the parties, is required at this time as both parties had previously been arrested for a domestic incident involving the children. Finally, it is the GAL's belief that the transportation of the children for visitation should be a shared responsibility, and that a half-way meeting point at the Danbury Fair Mall would be appropriate and in the children's best interests.
The parties are also sharply divided on the issue of what restrictions, if any, should be placed on the children traveling on international trips. Plaintiff wishes the court to order that defendant and the children only be allowed to travel with a chaperone, who would be selected by her and paid for by defendant. In consideration of this issue, the court deems it relevant that defendant was always a citizen of South Africa (now also a citizen of the United States). His entire family lives in South Africa. The parties have traveled to South Africa with one of their children, who was an infant at that time. Plaintiff has twice consented to the children traveling internationally with defendant. The children have traveled outside of this country with defendant, and have been returned without incident or complaint. The children enjoy this travel. The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), after thoroughly investigating this family, believes it to be in the best interests of the children that they be allowed to travel internationally with their father. Most important, plaintiff has provided no objective reason or evidence for her contention that the children's safety would be compromised or threatened if they were allowed to travel internationally with their father.
To simply order the restrictions requested by plaintiff or to simply overlook plaintiff's concerns and grant the unrestricted right of international travel to either parent in the future would not now be prudent or in the children's best interests. There is no trip currently planned for the children. As such, it is impossible to determine what circumstances may exist when either party might wish to travel with the children. All circumstances and variable factors must be examined when plans are foreseen. The non-traveling party would have the right to know these circumstances in order to make an informed decision. If an agreement could not be reached, any judge would have to know the specific proposed arrangements in order to issue a judicious ruling.
With regard to the payment of debts from the proceeds of sale, the marital residence never sold. It languished on the declining real estate market and is now under foreclosure by the mortgage holder. The last combined mortgage payment made by both parties was in January 2009. The parties did not use their best efforts to preserve and maintain the property. Despite the fact that both parties were gainfully employed, they both defaulted on their note obligation to the mortgagee, defaulted on their agreement to each other to contribute to that expense, and violated the court order to that effect. Plaintiff was the first to stop paying her share of the mortgage. At the same time she stopped paying her share of the mortgage she spent $2,000 on a vacation trip to St. Lucia. Defendant alone paid two additional mortgage payments. Plaintiff continued to reside in the home with the children until June 2009, when she abandoned the property to begin residing with her boyfriend.
The parties have stipulated that they will not receive any proceeds from the ultimate disposition of this property as its current value is significantly lower than the mortgage balance owed. As this was not anticipated by the parties, they have now jointly requested this court to "interpret, construe or effectuate the provisions of Paragraph 7.1 of the Dissolution Judgment of the parties concerning payment of debt."
Specifically, that provision of the dissolution judgment provides that the payment of the debt to Steven Stokes (although originally stated to be $5,000, it was later found to be $4,000) and up to $13,000 of defendant's student loan would be paid from the gross proceeds of the sale of the house. The judgment, therefore, does provide for the payment of these debts, but now the specified source of payment for those debts is no longer available. The core of the original judgment was the sale of the house, which the court cannot now effectuate with any meaningful results. The original judgment did not assign personal liability to either party for defendant's student loan debt or the debt to Stokes. The gross proceeds from the sale of the house were to be the source of payment for those debts.
Plaintiff posits that, despite the retention of jurisdiction over the "payment of expenses and the sale of the house," the court does not have the power or authority to reallocate debt after the dissolution of marriage and that the court's only power to assign debt is limited to the dissolution decree. Defendant is requesting the court to order a redistribution of these specific debts as part of an overall "reformation" of the divorce judgment, specifically to assign personal liability for the aforementioned debts.
LAW
In this regard, General Statutes § 46b-81 provides in relevant part: "Assignment of property and transfer of title. (a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage for legal separation . . . the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect . . ."
"The purpose of a dissolution action is to sever the marital relationship, to fix the rights of the parties with respect to alimony and child support . . . [and] to divide the marital estate . . . The trial court is empowered to deal broadly with the equitable division of property incident to a dissolution proceeding, and, consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally, the term property should be interpreted broadly as well . . . General Statutes § 46b-81 confers broad powers upon the court in the assignment of property, and the allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court's broad authority in the assignment of property." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark v. Clark, 115 Conn.App. 500, 505, 974 A.2d 33 (2009). "Our Supreme Court has held that § 46b-81 authorizes the trial court to require one party to assume the joint liabilities of the parties . . . It follows, therefore, that the statute also authorizes the court to order that the debt of one party be paid from proceeds of a sale of the marital assets." (Citations omitted.) Schott v. Schott, 18 Conn.App. 333, 335-36, 557 A.2d 936, 937 (1989).
General Statutes § 46b-86 provides in relevant part: "Modification of alimony or support orders and judgments. (a) Unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support . . . may, at any time thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by the court . . . This section shall not apply to assignments under section 46b-81 . . ."
"[Section 46b-86], therefore, deprives the Superior Court of continuing jurisdiction over that portion of a dissolution judgment providing for the assignment of property of one party to the other party under General Statutes § 46b-81 . . ."
"Although the court has jurisdiction to assign property in connection with § 46b-81, that assignment is not modifiable . . . Moreover, property distributions . . . cannot be modified to alleviate hardships that may result from enforcement of the original dissolution decree in the face of changes in the situation of either party . . . [I]t is [however] within the equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment . . .
"A modification is [a] change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact . . . If a party's motion can fairly be construed as seeking an effectuation of the judgment rather than a modification of the terms of the property settlement, this court must favor that interpretation . . . Similarly, when determining whether the new order is a modification, we examine the practical effect of the ruling on the original order." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Santoro v. Santoro, 70 Conn.App. 212, 216-17, 797 A.2d 592 (2002).
"[W]hen a party has been denied marital property to which the party is entitled as part of the allocation of property pursuant to a judgment of dissolution of marriage, and the aggrieved party seeks relief from the court, the court is under an affirmative obligation to issue financial orders effectuating the existing allocation of marital property to protect the integrity of the original judgment, subject to equitable defenses. To hold otherwise would allow a court to modify a property distribution simply by its own silence or inaction." Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, 118 Conn.App. 325, 334, 983 A.2d 293 (2009)
The following cases are helpful in distinguishing modifications from effectuations. In Roberts v. Roberts, 32 Conn.App. 465, 472, 629 A.2d 1160 (1993), and Clement v. Clement, 34 Conn.App. 641, 646, 643 A.2d 874 (1994), the Appellate Court upheld trial court orders as effectuations of previous dissolution judgments, whereas in Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, supra, 118 Conn.App. 333-34, the Appellate Court held that a trial court's refusal to enforce a property division was an improper modification.
In Roberts v. Roberts, supra, 32 Conn.App. 466, the parties entered into an agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, that provided for the disposition of the martial residence by sale. The parties were to split the proceeds evenly after paying certain debts. Id. The defendant, who remained in the marital residence, refused to lower the listing price of the residence. Id., 467. His refusal to lower the price prevented the sale of the residence. Id. In response to the plaintiff's motion for contempt, the court ordered the sale of the residence by auction. Id. The defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's motion because it requested an impermissible modification of the property settlement. Id., 468.
On appeal, the Appellate Court held "the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its subsequent order for sale of the real estate by auction, since that order did not operate to modify or to alter the terms of the stipulated judgment." Id., 472. It explained: "Here, the court's order for sale of the marital property by auction does not interfere with the terms of the stipulated judgment in any way. Both parties continue to be entitled to 50 percent of the proceeds of the sale remaining after the enumerated debts are satisfied." Id.
In Clement v. Clement, supra, 34 Conn.App. 643, as part of the dissolution decree, the trial court awarded the defendant the entire interest in the marital residence and ordered the plaintiff to hold the defendant harmless on two of three outstanding mortgages. Id. The plaintiff did not pay the mortgages and one of the banks foreclosed and took title to the residence. Id. The defendant filed a motion seeking, among other things, to hold the plaintiff in contempt. Id. The trial court found the plaintiff in contempt and ordered him to pay the defendant the difference between the value of the residence and the mortgage balances on which he had been ordered to hold her harmless. Id. 644. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order that modified the property settlement. Id.
On appeal, the Appellate Court held that "the plaintiff's claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without merit because the trial court had the power to enforce its [original] judgment." Id., 646. It explained: "After the foreclosure, the plaintiff was no longer required to pay the mortgage because the mortgage was, in effect, extinguished . . . Thus, the plaintiff's noncompliance with a court order resulted in his obligation's being extinguished. This result undermines the integrity of the original court order. To prevent this and to preserve the original judgment's integrity, the trial court required the plaintiff to pay the defendant the value of the loss caused by the plaintiff's failure to comply with its judgment." (Citations omitted.) Id.
In Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, supra, 327-38, the trial court approved a separation agreement in which the parties agreed that two qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) would be executed assigning to the plaintiff a portion of the defendant's pension benefits under two pensions. When the defendant retired, neither pension administrator processed the QDROs against the defendant's pensions. Id., 328. As a result, the defendant's pension payments included portions that were allocated to the plaintiff in the parties' separation agreement. Id., 329. The plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment and a motion to find the defendant in contempt, in which she asked the trial court to order the defendant to pay her an amount equal to the portion of his benefits that she would have received had the QDROs properly been in place at the time the defendant retired and began receiving benefits. Id. The trial court denied the plaintiff's requests. Id., 330. She appealed, arguing that her requested order was necessary to effectuate and to preserve the integrity of the dissolution judgment. Id.
On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff that "the failure of the court to issue orders that were necessary to effectuate its original assignment of property in the parties' marital dissolution action was tantamount to an impermissible modification of the original property division." Id., 333. It concluded: "[T]he plaintiff's property interest in portions of the defendant's pension benefits was not predicated on the processing of paperwork; the plaintiff cannot be deprived of this important asset on the basis of a mere administrative error. We hold that the plaintiff was entitled to her portion of the defendant's pension benefits." Id.
Both subsequent judgments in Roberts and Clement produced the same results of the original judgments by requiring the parties to do what was required of them under the original judgments. In Roberts, the original judgment required the sale of the residence. The subsequent judgment required the sale of the residence. In Clement, the original judgment required the plaintiff to pay the mortgage so the defendant could have title to the residence. The subsequent judgment required the plaintiff to pay the defendant the value of the residence, which the plaintiff prevented the defendant from acquiring by his failure to pay the mortgage. The trial court ordered him to do no more than what he was required to do under the original judgment. In contrast, the trial court's refusal to enter orders in Cifaldi prevented the plaintiff from receiving what was owed to her under the original judgment. It impermissibly modified the original judgment by preventing the plaintiff from receiving her portion of the defendant's pension benefits as required by the original judgment.
Defendant's proposed reformation of paragraph 7.1 in the present case would constitute an improper modification of the original judgment. Instead of protecting the integrity of the original judgment, accepting defendant's proposed reformation would fundamentally change the terms of the original judgment by making plaintiff personally liable for half of the husband's student loan debt and half of the debt to Stokes. The proposed reformation would therefore impermissibly place liability on plaintiff despite her having none under the original judgment. Unlike the parties in Roberts and Clement, plaintiff, under the defendant's proposed reformation, would be required to do more than required under the original judgment. Moreover, in the present case, both parties share some of the blame by failing to pay the mortgage on the residence, unlike Roberts and Clement, in which only one party was responsible for preventing the effectuation of the original judgment. Accepting defendant's proposed reformation would have the practical effect of modifying the original judgment from a sale of real estate to the assignment of debt. Accordingly, defendant's request to reform or modify paragraph 7.1 of the dissolution judgment is hereby denied.
ORDERS
This Court has specifically considered the relevant statutory provisions and case law affecting the issues in this case as well as the extensive testimony and evidence presented by the parties.
The Court enters the following orders:
1. Plaintiff's motion #113 requesting an increase in alimony is denied.
Plaintiff's requested modification to the order of child support is granted as there were substantial changes in the financial circumstances of the parties.
Defendant's child support arrearage shall be computed on the following basis:
a) From August 9, 2009 to the date when plaintiff most recently started receiving unemployment compensation, child support is to be calculated at $299 per week.
b) From the time plaintiff most recently started receiving unemployment compensation to the date of this judgment, child support is to be calculated at $333 per week.
c) For the purposes of this arrearage calculation and future calculations of child support, so long as child support payments are current, each of the parties shall be entitled to claim one of the children for tax dependency purposes. When just one of the children qualifies as a dependent the parties shall alternate claiming that child, starting with plaintiff.
d) Defendant shall be given a credit against the total arrearage for the payments of $250 per week he has made since October 14, 2009.
e) Child support shall be paid prospectively by defendant at the rate of $333 per week, together with 61% of unreimbursed medical expenses and qualified child care costs, with plaintiff paying 39% of said costs. This obligation shall continue unless further modified by the court.
2. Plaintiff's motion #114 requesting that this court hold defendant in contempt for his failure to pay certain expenses is denied. It is found, however, that defendant owes the following to plaintiff:
1/2 cable, CLP and ATT $3,082.30
work-related day care 5,724.00
1/2 of Joseph Boisvert bill 590.00
1/2 propane gas bills paid by plaintiff 1,323.33
Total $10,719.63
As offsets or credits to defendant, he shall be entitled to the following: medical/dental $37.00
CT Page 9160
1/2 of two mortgage payments 2,853.00
1/2 Hocon Gas payment 9/29/07 1,146.97
plaintiff's automobile taxes 409.00
1/2 Hocon Gas payment 3/16/09 392.83
Total $4,838.80
Defendant is ordered to pay the net amount of $5,880.83 to plaintiff within two weeks of this judgment.
3. Defendant's motion #117 requesting a modification of his alimony obligation is granted in part. The court finds there has been a substantial change in circumstances. Defendant's obligation to pay 23% of his 2009 bonus shall remain unchanged. The only interest to be paid to plaintiff on this order is that which is represented by plaintiff's exhibit 9, which states that "If Jodi (plaintiff) prevails, these funds will be given to her with interest earned in the account where they are deposited."
Defendant shall immediately pay 15% of his 2010 bonus, or $7,125 to plaintiff. No interest shall be paid to plaintiff on this order. He shall continue to pay alimony in the amount of 15% of his future bonuses to plaintiff until his alimony obligations under the judgment of divorce have expired, unless modified further by the court.
4. Plaintiff's motion #139 seeking to hold defendant in contempt is denied.
5. Each of the parties is ordered to pay one-half of the fees of the GAL. Payment in full shall be made no later than 60 days from the date of this judgment. The court retains jurisdiction for the GAL to return to court, if necessary, for further orders.
6. With regard to transportation for weekend visitations, plaintiff shall bring the children to the Danbury Fair Mall at 6:00 p.m. on Friday for pick-up by defendant, and defendant shall return the children to said Mall at 5:00 p.m. on Sunday for pick-up by plaintiff. Either party may designate another responsible person to transport the children if necessary. The parties shall use the same location for the transportation of the children for any midweek visitations, holidays or vacations.
7. It is the further order of this court that if either parent wishes to travel outside of the United States with the children, that parent shall give no less than 60 days written notice to the other parent. Such notice shall include a travel itinerary including the length of the trip, the destination country, flight and/or other travel arrangements, hotel and other living accommodations (including address, telephone, and other contact information), a proposed schedule for telephone or email contact with the children during the travel, a list of all people who will accompany the children on the trip and the telephone numbers and addresses of U.S. Consular or Ambassador locations in each city or country in which travel is included. If the non-traveling parent has any objection to said trip, he or she will notify the other of those objections in writing, setting forth what specific elements of the trip are objectionable, and why they are objectionable. Any such objection will be made within two weeks after the non-traveling parent received notice of the proposed trip. Consent will not be unreasonably withheld by either parent. In the event there is no agreement, either parent may petition the court for relief. The court may consider awarding fines, attorney's fees, and/or costs if either parent is found to have acted unreasonably. If there is either an agreement or court order, the parties will cooperate to make the children's passports available to the traveling parent and will provide written permission of the children to travel outside of the United States as may be required by the international air lines, other carriers, or the destination country. During any time that the children are not traveling internationally, their passports are to be held by plaintiff.
8. Miscellaneous orders:
a) It is anticipated that the plaintiff shall complete her education and become employed as soon as possible. She is to immediately notify defendant once she has obtained employment and provide him with the name of her employer and the basis for her compensation. She is to also notify defendant of any other income she may earn as a result of her self-employment.
b) In accordance with the judgment entered on February 16, 2007, plaintiff is ordered to secure a $230,000 life insurance policy naming the minor children as beneficiaries as long as child support is being paid. Defendant shall continue to maintain $500,000 of his life insurance for the benefit of the minor children as long as child support is being paid;
c) Each of the parties is to pay their own attorneys fees, each without contribution from the other;
d) The parties are to exchange copies of their federal and state income tax returns by certified mail return receipt or registered mail return receipt within 30 days after such returns have been filed but not later than May 15 of each year for so long as there is an outstanding alimony order and/or an outstanding child support order or any outstanding arrearage regarding either order;
e) All stipulations entered into, both before and during the course of this hearing, have been accepted by the court and are ordered as part of this judgment;
f) All court orders not modified by this judgment shall continue in full force and effect.