Opinion
NO. 2017-CA-000032-MR
06-21-2019
CATHY HARRIS AND PATRICIA SCHMIDT APPELLANTS v. CLIFFORD HARRIS APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: Stephen L. Bates, II Dry Ridge, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Dean A. Pisacano Covington, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-00046 OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
* ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MAZE, TAYLOR, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES. TAYLOR, JUDGE: Cathy Harris and Patricia Schmidt appeal an order entered by the Owen Circuit Court on May 16, 2016, upon conducting a bench trial, adjudicating that Patricia Schmidt had conveyed certain real property to Clifford Harris and Patricia Harris by a valid deed executed on February 15, 2009. For the reasons stated, we vacate and remand with directions.
The appeal was actually filed after the trial court rendered an Order on December 13, 2016, upon the appellants' Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 59 motion to alter, amend and vacate.
BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2007, Clifford and his then-wife, Cathy Harris, executed a deed transferring ownership of the Harrises' residence at 240 Jansen Trace in Owenton to Cathy's daughter, Patricia Schmidt, for nominal consideration. For reasons not apparent from the face of the record, the deed was not recorded until June 18, 2008. The property in question was the parties' residence, which was unencumbered and had a stated fair market value at the time of the conveyance of $207,000.
On October 19, 2008, Clifford and Cathy filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky (Case No. 08-30688-jms). No reference was made to the real estate in the bankruptcy nor was the transfer of the real estate noted in the Harrises' bankruptcy schedules. On January 30, 2009, the Harrises received a discharge of their debts from the bankruptcy court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. The Harrises' petition and schedules listed assets of $5,850 and debts totaling $93,685.
We take judicial notice of the bankruptcy petition and schedules and all pleadings filed in Case No. 08-30688-jms in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. See Doe v. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 264-65 (Ky. App. 2005).
Cathy Harris testified at trial that many of the debts discharged were medical debts incurred for her, some of which had been placed on credit cards.
On February 15, 2009, about two weeks after the Harrises' discharge in bankruptcy, Patricia, as grantor, and Clifford, purportedly as grantee, signed a deed to transfer the residence back to Clifford and Cathy, again for nominal consideration. However, Cathy, as grantee, refused to sign the 2009 deed and the Owen County Clerk refused to record the deed without her signature.
Meanwhile, in the years following the bankruptcy, Clifford and Cathy's marriage deteriorated, culminating in Clifford filing a pro se petition for dissolution of marriage in the Owen Circuit Court on March 15, 2013. In October 2013, Clifford filed a motion in the divorce action to compel Cathy to sign the 2009 deed as co-grantee transferring the property from Patricia back to himself and Cathy. The domestic relations commissioner declined to order Cathy to sign the deed for jurisdiction reasons. Clifford then initiated this action in Owen Circuit Court on March 31, 2014, naming Cathy and Patricia as defendants, to quiet title to ownership of the residence.
This action then proceeded to a bench trial on February 23, 2016. During the trial, Clifford testified numerous times under oath that he, Cathy and Patricia had devised a scheme in 2007 to keep the residence out of the Harrises' bankruptcy proceeding. Specifically, Clifford testified on direct examination as follows:
All italics in Clifford Harris's testimony herein have been added by this Court for emphasis.
Q. [By Clifford's Counsel] Can you explain to us why, uh, well, first of all, why was, uh, why would Patricia be signing, why would you be signing the property over to Patricia? Was there a--let me ask you a question, were you guys in the middle of any legal issues?Trial record, 1:18:03.
A. Yes, a bankruptcy.
Q. Ok. And you signed it over to Patricia for that bankruptcy?
A. Right.
Q. Ok. And Patricia signed that back to you a couple years later, is that correct?
A. Right, the agreement.
On cross-examination by Cathy and Patricia's counsel, Clifford repeated his testimony about the agreement:
Q. Now I'm going to refer you - you, you spoke previously about that you transferred the property and the reason you transferred the property was there was an agreement because you were in the middle of a bankruptcy. Is that what you testified to previously? Is that--did I hear you correctly?
A. That is true.
Q. Ok.Trial record, 1:26:09 - 1:29:00.
A. Very true.
Q. Ok. So when you transferred the property on June 7, 2007 your testimony before the court today is, is that you were in the middle of a bankruptcy? You were in the middle of a bankruptcy, is that right?
A. I think we's [sic] getting ready to file it.
Q. Getting ready to file it or were you in the middle of it, which one was it?
A. We's [sic] getting ready to file it before we transferred the property.
***
Q. So you weren't in the middle of a bankruptcy, fair to say, when you transferred the property June of 2007, is that correct?
A. What I remember is, Cathy and I talked about filing bankruptcy, and she asked Trish [i.e., Patricia] to come over and she told Trish we're going to file bankruptcy, put it in your name, after the bankruptcy's over then you put it back in our name.
Q. So.
A. We all three agreed.
On redirect, Clifford offered additional testimony regarding the plan to transfer the property to Patricia solely to exclude it from the pending bankruptcy proceedings. Specifically, the following remarkable exchanges occurred between Clifford and his attorney:
Q. Mr. Harris, if you would, regarding that, that [property] disclosure [form in the divorce], and, and you tried to file this thing by yourself, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, and can you explain why you wouldn't have included that property? [indistinguishable mumbling]
A. Is this the one you want?
Q. Right. You forgot to list the real estate, is that correct?
A. Yes, I didn't put it on there either place.
Q. Is that because you forgot, or you tried to hide it or not disclose it?
A. Probably because I had to, I had to seal it, your honor, we were filing bankruptcy. We put it in somebody else's name so the bankruptcy court couldn't get it. That's the truth. That's why I put it there.
Q. And, and, thank you, you clarified that and it was, and now I think you've clarified that.
A. Right.
Q. You didn't include that because you knew that it was not in your name at that time?
A. Right.
Q. And why was it not in your name at that time?
A. Because we put it in Trish's name so the bankruptcy [court] wouldn't [possibly "couldn't"] come back and say you own this property.Trial record, 1:54:45 - 1:56:12.
Patricia and Cathy related a different version of events, each denying that the transfer to Patricia was bankruptcy-related. Instead, they both testified that the land was transferred to Patricia with the intent for her to hold the property in trust for the benefit of her brother, Nick, who allegedly had health issues. Patricia testified that she would "never" have intentionally or knowingly transferred the land back to Clifford and Cathy after the bankruptcy. However, although she testified she did not recall signing the 2009 deed which purported to do just that, Patricia could not refute under oath that the 2009 deed contained her notarized signature thereon.
Cathy testified that her intent for the transfer was to create a trust for her son, Nick Harris. Cathy similarly and adamantly denied having agreed to transfer the property to Patricia to avoid it being part of the bankruptcy proceedings. She further testified that if avoiding bankruptcy was Clifford's motive for that transfer, he had "tricked" her into signing the 2007 deed. Trial record, 3:03:09.
In May 2016, the trial court issued an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law, ruling in Clifford's favor, despite his repeated admission that he had knowingly and intentionally transferred the property to Patricia to avoid it being part of his bankruptcy estate, effectively defrauding his creditors. The trial court did not find the testimony of Cathy and Patricia to be credible, concluding "the assertion of the Defendants is not credible - if the parties intended that Nick Harris [Cathy's son] benefit from the property, ie [sic] 'so he would always have a home', [sic] the parties could have simply conveyed the property to Nick." May 16, 2016, Order at 2. The court concluded as a matter of law that the 2009 deed purporting to reconvey the residence from Patricia back to Clifford and Cathy after the bankruptcy was a valid and enforceable deed, thus restoring joint title to Clifford and Cathy for purposes of division in their divorce.
The Decree of Dissolution in the parties' marriage was entered by the Owen Circuit Court on March 7, 2017.
On May 25, 2016, Cathy and Patricia timely filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59 motion to alter, amend or vacate, the court's ruling. By supplemental order entered December 13, 2016, the trial court clarified some of its previous findings of fact, but otherwise effectively denied the motion. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As noted, the trial court conducted a bench trial in this action. Accordingly, our review is based upon the clearly erroneous standard set forth in CR 52.01. CR 52.01 states that "[f]indings of fact, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." A reversible error arises when there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of the trial court. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. App. 1998). However, the trial court's conclusions of law are subject to independent de novo appellate review and determination. Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898-99 (Ky. App. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Sawyers v. Beller, 384 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Ky. 2012).
ANALYSIS
We must begin our analysis by addressing legal issues not addressed by the trial court but certainly raised by the evidence presented at trial and supported by the trial court's findings of fact thereon. The trial court did not believe the testimony of Cathy and Patricia as concerns the reason for transferring the residence to Patricia in 2007. The trial court specifically found that their testimony was "not credible" regarding the creation of the trust for Nick Harris's benefit. This finding is supported by the record below as there is no evidence in the record to support the alleged intent to create a trust for Nick Harris.
When the facts reveal a fundamental basis for a decision not presented by the parties, appellate courts are duty bound to address the issue to avoid a misleading application of the law. Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991). And, as long as the appellate court confines its review to the record on appeal, no rule of court or constitutional provision prevents the court from deciding an issue not presented on appeal by the parties. Priestley v. Priestley, 949 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Ky. 1997).
Attorney Henry Curry drafted both deeds. The 2007 deed was executed in Curry's office with all parties present. Interestingly, Curry listed Patricia Schmidt as the scrivener on the deeds which she willingly signed thereon as having prepared the documents. No trust documents were prepared by Curry for the parties. Additionally, some sixteen months after the 2007 deed was executed in Curry's office, on October 19, 2008, Curry filed Clifford and Cathy's bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and represented both parties throughout that proceeding. Incredibly, Henry Curry was not called as a witness at trial in this litigation nor was he deposed during the pendency of the case before the Owen Circuit Court.
Accordingly, by implication at minimum, the trial court believed Clifford's explanation and motive for the transfer of the property in 2007, that being to conceal the property from the bankruptcy court so the "court couldn't get it." The plan worked. The Harrises filed bankruptcy on October 19, 2008, and received a discharge for their debts on January 30, 2009. The property at 240 Jansen Trace was not listed in the Harrises' petition and schedules, nor was the transfer of the property to Patricia in June of 2007 disclosed. Paragraph 10 of the Harrises' Statement of Financial Affairs required the listing of all property transferred within two years of the commencement of the bankruptcy. The Harrises checked "none" thus affirming under penalty of perjury that they had not transferred any property within two years of filing bankruptcy, other than in the ordinary course of business. This was a false statement as the residence was transferred to Patricia approximately sixteen months prior to the bankruptcy. The transfer of the unencumbered residence to Patricia in 2007 for nominal consideration ($1.00) was not in the ordinary course of business. And, it was clearly established at trial that the purpose of the 2007 deed was to keep the property from being subject to the claims of the Harrises' creditors, which would have been asserted by the Chapter 7 Trustee assigned to the case in the bankruptcy. Thus, the attempt to conceal the property from creditors as testified to by Clifford was successful.
The Harrises' bankruptcy petition filed in 2008 listed their address as 240 Jansen Trace in Owenton, Kentucky. The trial court specifically found that the Harrises continued to reside at the property from the time of conveyance to Patricia in 2007 until Clifford moved out in 2013 and filed for divorce. More importantly, the trial court found that Patricia had not exhibited "any behaviors consistent with the ownership of the property" from 2007 - 2013.
However, the trial court's conclusion of law upholding the validity of the 2009 deed transferring the property back to Clifford and Cathy from Patricia is flawed and must be set aside. Under KRS 378.010 - 378.100, Kentucky's fraudulent conveyance statutes in effect in 2007, the transfer of the real property by Clifford and Cathy to Patricia in 2007 to defraud their creditors was void as a matter of law. KRS 378.010 reads as follows:
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 378.010 - 378.100 were repealed and replaced with the Uniform Voidable Transfer Act, KRS 378A, effective January 1, 2016. As noted, the conduct and transactions at issue in this case occurred prior to that date. The newly adopted Uniform Voidable Transfers Act did not repeal the then-existing statutes for violations committed while those statutes were still in effect. See KRS 446.110.
Every gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate, real or personal, or right or thing in action, or any rent or profit thereof, made with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or
other persons, and every bond or other evidence of debt given, action commenced or judgment suffered, with like intent, shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers and other persons. This section shall not affect the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.And, KRS 378.020 provides that transfers made without valuable consideration shall be void as to all existing creditors. Thus, the 2007 deed was void upon execution as discussed below.
The dissent in this case would give life to the void deed because neither party raised the issue before the trial court. However, the evidence presented clearly places the fraud issue regarding the 2007 deed before the Court, which was admitted by Clifford at trial. The courts cannot turn a deaf ear to such overwhelming evidence, regarding the fraudulent nature of the 2007 transaction which is supported by both the trial record and the Harrises' bankruptcy petition and schedules. To ignore this issue as argued by the dissent would require this Court, as well as the Owen Circuit Court to be "tools for the perpetration" of a fraud that is expressly prohibited by Justice v. Justice, 219 S.W.2d 964, 966 (Ky. 1949).
In this case, based upon the evidence and the trial court's findings thereon, the intent for the transfer of the property to Patricia in 2007 was to avoid creditors' claims and the deed clearly reflects on its face that the transfer was without valuable consideration. Under Kentucky law, that transfer was void, which thus places the parties in the same ownership position prior to the transfer in 2007. By coincidence only, this is the same position that the parties were placed based upon the trial court's orders regarding the 2009 deed, now on appeal, which is being vacated by this Opinion. Our reasoning for vacating the trial court's orders follows.
The initiation of this action by Clifford in 2014 effectively sought the assistance of a Kentucky court to effectuate and finalize a fraudulent scheme to place a valuable, unencumbered, piece of real estate outside the reach of the Harrises' legitimate creditors. This Court cannot condone nor will we ordain such a misuse of Kentucky courts and judicial proceedings.
In Justice v. Justice, 219 S.W.2d 964, 966 (Ky. 1949), Kentucky's highest Court addressed a similar fraudulent transaction involving real property and declared the following:
To permit the courts to thus be made tools for the perpetration of such frauds would bring into disrepute the whole administration of justice. They are not constructed for the purpose of aiding unconscionable persons to consummate the frauds which they may concoct; on the contrary it is the rule that courts will not permit themselves to be made the instruments by which such fraudulent schemes are carried out.Likewise, this Court will not be a part of nor approve what effectively was a fraudulent scheme to defraud creditors.
Once the fraudulent 2007 deed was finalized, the parties' scheme moved to the bankruptcy court. Had the Harrises filled out their bankruptcy petition and schedules truthfully in 2008, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee would have been placed on notice of the no consideration transfer of the debtors' residence to Cathy's daughter in 2007 and could have taken appropriate actions on behalf of the Harrises' unsecured creditors. For example, the trustee could have invoked Kentucky's fraudulent conveyance statutes, KRS 378.010 - 378.100 to set aside the Harrises' fraudulent conveyance as provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) which reads:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.As noted, the Harrises listed various creditors' claims totaling over $93,000 in their bankruptcy of which $78,430 was listed as unsecured. Given that the Harrises valued their residence at $207,000 in 2007, there is considerable doubt as to whether they were insolvent or otherwise eligible for a bankruptcy discharge in 2008, but for the scheme. And we further note, that had the trustee been placed on notice of this transfer as required, an action to set aside the conveyance was not barred for at least five years from the date of the conveyance in 2007 under KRS 413.120. See also, In Re Draper, 355 B.R. 607 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2006).
This Court will not address whether there exist remedies for creditors against the Harrises based on their 2008 bankruptcy. Additionally, this Opinion does not address any issues arising under 18 U.S.C. § 152 and § 3571 upon the Harrises' execution of their petition and schedules in this case. We also note that the dissent's bankruptcy law analysis is flawed. Assuming equitable tolling is applicable, which is a matter within the sole province of the bankruptcy court, the state statute of limitations for fraudulent transfers is applicable and may be utilized by a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 544 as discussed in In Re Draper, 355 B.R. 607 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2006).
Additionally, the record on appeal reflects that neither Cathy nor Patricia came into court with "clean hands" in regards to this transaction. While both testified they were not aware of the pending bankruptcy scheme as testified to by Clifford, the trial court found that their testimony was not credible. This is further supported by their actions in the case, which supported the trial court's finding of lack of credibility. Patricia signed both deeds in the presence of a notary, and became the "owner" of the residence in 2007, yet did not reside at the property, pay taxes thereon, or provide any upkeep during the period of 2007-2013. Cathy also signed the 2007 deed at the attorney's office in the presence of a notary, said deed making no reference whatsoever to the purported trust in favor of her son Nick Harris. Cathy also testified that due to various medical issues, she had accumulated substantial medical debt during this period of time. And in 2008, she knowingly and willfully signed a bankruptcy petition and schedules which failed to disclose the transfer of the residence some sixteen months earlier; yet, she continued to reside in the residence during her bankruptcy proceeding.
In Kentucky, under the "unclean hands doctrine," a party may not obtain judicial relief if that party was engaged in fraudulent or illegal conduct in regards to the subject matter of the litigation. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2010); see also Sparks v. Baker, 114 S.W.2d 1145 (Ky. 1938). It is also well recognized in Kentucky that courts will not grant relief to the parties in an illegal contract, the parties being in pari delicto, and there being no right of action for either. J.H. Fields & Son v. E.G. Holland & Son, 165 S.W. 699 (Ky. 1914); see also Barrowman Coal Corp. v. Kentland Coal & Coke, Co., 196 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1946) (holding that where both parties have engaged in inequitable conduct in a transaction, neither is entitled to relief).
We are also mindful that when Kentucky courts examine possible fraudulent transfers as in this case, the court must look to see whether certain "badges of fraud" are present. Bank of Josephine v. Hopson, 516 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1974). The findings by the trial court and the record below clearly reflect at least three of these factors are present as concerns the 2007 deed: 1) no consideration for the 2007 transfer, 2) the transfer occurred between close family members, and 3) the Harrises retained exclusive possession of the residence after the transfer until Clifford vacated the property sometime in 2013. See id. at 341.
Finally, we note that both KRS 378.010 and 378.020 embodies the doctrine of "constructive fraud" as concerns both Cathy and Patricia. This doctrine looks to a breach of a legal equitable duty, where the parties' conduct tends to deceive others, as in this case. Combs v. Poulos, 44 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Ky. 1931). Importantly, neither the actual dishonesty of the transaction's purpose or the intent to deceive is an essential element to establish constructive fraud. Id. The findings of the trial court clearly established the culpability of both Cathy and Patricia in their participation in the overall scheme involving the real property.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we vacate the court's order approving the 2009 deed and the transfer of the Harrises' residence back to Clifford and Cathy. As we have held as a matter of law that the 2007 deed and conveyance were void, the 2009 deed was a nullity and of no force or effect. Under the facts of this case, none of the parties are entitled to any relief from Kentucky courts as concerns the fraudulent scheme to transfer real property to avoid creditors' claims, in contravention of applicable Kentucky law.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the May 16, 2016, and December 13, 2016, orders of the Owen Circuit Court are vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court to set aside the 2007 deed as a fraudulent transfer under KRS Chapter 378 and to afford no other relief to either party based on the complaint or counterclaim asserted in this action.
K. THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MAZE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
MAZE, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: I concur with the portion of the majority opinion holding that the 2009 deed was fraudulent and void under the Kentucky Fraudulent Conveyances Act, KRS 378.010. Although I am generally hesitant to address an issue not raised by the parties, this Court always retains the authority to reverse a trial court's judgment on an unpreserved issue if it finds palpable error therein. Wright v. House of Imports, Inc., 381 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Ky. 2012) (citing CR 61.02). And as the majority correctly notes, in certain cases this Court may have a duty to address an issue to avoid a misleading application of the law, Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991), or to avoid perpetuating a fraud. Justice v. Justice, 219 S.W.2d 964, 966 (Ky. 1949).
In this case, the validity of the 2009 deed was actually litigated before the trial court. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that the deed was part of scheme to defraud the Harrises' bankruptcy creditors. But since none of the parties challenged the validity of the deed under KRS 378.010, the trial court did not have the opportunity to consider the application of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act. I agree with the majority that the 2009 deed presents the type of transaction that that the Act was designed to prevent.
However, our Supreme Court has cautioned this Court against reversing a trial court on an issue that was never raised or litigated by the parties. Am. Gen. Home Equity, Inc. v. Kestel, 253 S.W.3d 543, 548 (Ky. 2008). None of the parties in this case ever challenged the validity of the 2007 deed. Furthermore, setting aside the 2007 deed places Clifford in the position that he wants. The residential property is returned to the marital estate and subject to division in the dissolution action. This would effectively complete the fraudulent scheme found by the trial court. Although it may be possible to re-open the bankruptcy action to attach that property or to vacate the discharge, it is not clear that these remedies are possible or even likely given the lapse in time.
Most bankruptcy issues are outside of the scope of this Court's expertise. But my research indicates that 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) authorizes a bankruptcy court to reopen a bankruptcy case in order "to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause." However, the trustee's standing to request a re-opening is limited to limited to one year after discharge is granted or the case is closed. 11 U.S.C. § 727(e). Furthermore, the trustee's authority to bring an action to challenge a fraudulent transfer is limited to two years after the case is closed. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(2). These time limits may be subject to equitable tolling in the event of fraud. See White v. Boston, 104 B.R. 954, 955-57 (S.D. Ind. 1989). That would ultimately be a question for the bankruptcy court to address upon proper motion. In the absence of any briefing on expert testimony on the matter, this Court has no basis to consider the potential outcome of such a proceeding.
On the other hand, leaving the property titled with Patricia leaves the fraudulent scheme uncompleted and deprives Clifford and Cathy of the benefit of their misconduct. While I agree that Patricia's hands are not particularly clean either, her misconduct is tangential to that of Clifford and Cathy. I would also point out that Patricia's participation in the scheme would prevent her from asserting a good-faith defense to attachment of the property should a creditor or the trustee seek to re-open the bankruptcy discharge. And lastly, I must again emphasize that the only issue before the trial court concerned the validity of the 2009 deed transferring the property back to Clifford and Cathy.
Under these circumstances, I cannot join with the majority opinion directing the trial court to set aside the 2007 deed as a fraudulent transfer. I believe that doing so exceeds our authority as an appellate court and fashions a remedy which does not further the administration of justice. Therefore, I dissent from this portion of the majority opinion. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: Stephen L. Bates, II
Dry Ridge, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Dean A. Pisacano
Covington, Kentucky