Opinion
B323218
05-24-2023
THELMA MARIE HARRIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GLOBAL MEDICAL RESPONSE, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Bartlett Barrow and Brian P. Barrow for Plaintiff and Appellant. Clinton & Clinton, David A. Clinton, Adrienne M. Stover and Christian L. Woods for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 20AVCV00667 Michael C. Kelley, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Bartlett Barrow and Brian P. Barrow for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Clinton & Clinton, David A. Clinton, Adrienne M. Stover and Christian L. Woods for Defendants and Respondents.
CHAVEZ, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Thelma Marie Harris (appellant) appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants and respondents, Global Medical Response, Inc., American Medical Response, Inc., and American Medical Response of Southern California, Inc (collectively respondents). Appellant alleges that she suffered personal injuries in a motor vehicle accident caused by respondents' employee's negligence.
Summary judgment was granted because the one-year statute of limitations enacted in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 was found to bar the claim. We find error because appellant's claim did not arise from professional negligence, but from general negligence, making the two-year statute of limitations found in section 335.1 applicable. Since the record shows that appellant filed her complaint within the required two-year period, summary judgment should have been denied. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
All further statutory unattributed code references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 8, 2018, appellant was operating her 2015 Dodge Dart in Palmdale and was stopped at a red light near the intersection of Avenue S and Calle Grillo. Meanwhile, licensed emergency medical technician (EMT) Rey Leigh Huegi was driving an ambulance on Avenue S using lights and sirens while transporting a patient to Lancaster Community Hospital. Huegi was employed by American Medical Response, Inc. While attempting to drive the ambulance around appellant's stationary vehicle, Huegi collided with it, causing injuries to appellant.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant filed a complaint on September 21, 2020, alleging that she suffered personal injuries due to the negligence of Huegi and her employers, respondents herein. In her complaint, appellant pleaded a single cause of action for negligence against Huegi and respondents, alleging that Huegi breached her duty to operate and drive the ambulance in accordance with the California Vehicle Code and to obey all rules of the road.Appellant also asserted that respondents were liable for Huegi's negligence because she was their employee at the relevant times.
Appellant dismissed Huegi from the action on November 17, 2020.
Respondents raised an affirmative defense in their answer, contending that appellant's claims were barred by the statute of limitations under section 340.5. Respondents then sought summary judgment on the ground that appellant's claim was for professional negligence against a health care provider and that section 340.5 applied.
Before the hearing, appellant's attorney obtained leave to withdraw based on a breakdown in communication with appellant, who was then unable to find new counsel and did not file opposition.
The trial court found the undisputed facts showed that Huegi was a health care provider and acting in her professional capacity at the time of the accident. It then concluded that appellant's claim was for professional negligence against a health care provider and that the one-year statute of limitations in section 340.5 applied. Since appellant had not filed her complaint within one year of the collision, and because the undisputed facts showed that respondents had a complete defense, summary judgment was granted.
Judgment was entered May 25, 2022. Thereafter appellant obtained an attorney and filed a motion for new trial, arguing that her claim was not for professional negligence and she had not received a fair hearing due to her attorney's withdrawal. Her motion was denied on August 25, 2022.
Harris then filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and order denying her motion for new trial.
DISCUSSION
I. General legal principles and standard of review
We apply the de novo standard to review whether respondents had established the right to entry of judgment. Summary judgment is granted when a moving party establishes the right to entry of judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving that there is no merit to a cause of action by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1037.) Once a defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) If a plaintiff does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate. In order to obtain a summary judgment, "all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action ....[T]he defendant need not himself conclusively negate any such element." (Id. at p. 853, fn. omitted.)
On appeal from a summary judgment, an appellate court makes "an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial court's ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 218, 222.) In doing so, we "[consider] all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained." (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.)
II. The two-year statute of limitations in section 335.1 applies to appellant's claims
Respondents sought summary judgment based on the statute of limitations identified in section 340.5, which is specific to claims for professional negligence against medical providers and was enacted as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). The time to commence such an action against a health care provider under section 340.5 is "three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first."
The Legislature enacted MICRA "in response to a medical malpractice insurance 'crisis,' which it perceived threatened the quality of the state's health care." (Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 111.) "Accordingly, MICRA includes a variety of provisions all of which are calculated to reduce the cost of insurance by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases of professional negligence." (Ibid.) These provisions are enacted at Civil Code sections 3333.1, 3333.2; Code of Civil Procedure sections 340.5, 364, 667.7, 1295; and Business and Professions Code section 6146.
Appellant claims to have suffered personal injuries when EMT Huegi, the driver of the respondents' ambulance, negligently caused it to collide into her motor vehicle. Respondents argued that section 340.5 applied because the incident resulted from the professional negligence of a health care provider.
The trial court agreed, and its minute order reflects an analysis of the relevant case law. However, following our independent review we conclude that section 340.5 does not apply to the appellant's claims based on a distinction between the professional duties owed to a patient and those owed to the general public. (Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 86 (Flores).) Since at the time of the collision appellant was a member of the general public, Huegi's duty to her sounds in general negligence as no professional medical service was being rendered to appellant at the time of the collision.
The EMT operating an ambulance to transport a patient to or from a medical facility may have a duty to the patient that can be breached by "professional negligence" since the EMT is rendering services to the patient that are within the scope of services for which the EMT is licensed. (Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 404 (Canister).) However, this does not establish that the EMT has a professional duty to other drivers merely because the EMT is operating an ambulance.
Rather the EMT's obligation to other drivers on the road starts with the generally applicable duty of all California drivers to drive with due regard for the safety of all others using the highway. (Veh. Code, § 21056.) This is distinct from the EMT's obligation to the patient based on the services provided within the scope of the EMT's license.
In Flores our Supreme Court distinguished between these two obligations when it noted that hospitals owe different duties to their patients in the rendering of medical services from the duties owed to all users, including personnel and visitors, simply by virtue of operating a facility that is open to the public. (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 86.) The court rejected a rule that would make MICRA applicable to every form of ordinary negligence that occurs on hospital property. (Flores, at pp. 86-87.)
When the hospital's obligations overlap with obligations imposed on all persons subject to California's laws, "the special statute of limitations for professional negligence actions against health care providers applies only to actions alleging injury suffered as a result of negligence in rendering the professional services that hospitals and others provide by virtue of being health care professionals: that is, the provision of medical care to patients." (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 88.)
Here, appellant alleged that Huegi violated a generally applicable rule, Vehicle Code section 22107. Demonstrating that the duty allegedly violated was the obligation on all drivers when using public roadways, which is distinct from the EMT's obligation to the patient based on the services provided within the scope of the EMT's license. Therefore, the violation of a generally applicable rule does not become professional negligence merely because the driver was operating an ambulance.
Vehicle Code section 22107 states, "No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement."
Thus, when Huegi was driving the ambulance, she was not providing a health care or professional service within the meaning of MICRA because the task of driving does not require any particular medical skills. Further, Huegi's violation of a generally applicable rule of the road does not become professional negligence merely because she was operating an ambulance.
The distinction between duties arising from providing professional services and from driving on the public roadways is clearly set forth in Aldana v. Stillwagon (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1. There, Division Six of this court concluded that an on-duty paramedic supervisor was not engaged in professional services when he was driving his employer's truck to the location of an accident. (Id. at p. 8.) En route, he failed to stop at a red light and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle. The court found that driving to an accident victim is not the same as providing medical care to the victim and that a "paramedic's exercise of due care while driving is not 'necessary or otherwise integrally related to the medical treatment and diagnosis of the patient' [citation], at least when the patient is not in the vehicle." (Ibid.) This distinguishes between the duties owed by all drivers when operating a motor vehicle and the professional duties owed by an EMT to a patient.
Maintaining this distinction is consistent with other opinions that have found an EMT has a professional duty to a patient being transported in the ambulance because the EMT is rendering professional services to that patient. This applies also to passengers in an ambulance when it is foreseeable that the passenger could be injured if the EMT were negligent in providing professional services. Thus, in Canister, MICRA applied to the ambulance passenger's claim because the EMT was providing professional services to the patient in the ambulance, and it was foreseeable that a passenger could be injured if the EMT were negligent in providing the professional services. (Canister, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 407-408.)
In Lopez v. American Medical Response West (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 336, that court recently found the special statute of limitations in MICRA applied to the claims of a patient and the patient's companion in the ambulance. In both cases, MICRA applied to the passenger because it was foreseeable that a passenger in the ambulance could be injured if the EMT was negligent in providing the professional services to the patient.
In the pending case, Huegi owed a general duty of care to other drivers, such as appellant, even though Huegi was providing care to a patient at the time of the accident. Unlike the passenger's claims in Lopez, it was not foreseeable that Huegi's professional negligence in providing medical care to her patient would cause injury to appellant because the provision of medical services to the patient did not cause the collision with appellant. Rather, the collision was seemingly caused by Huegi's failure to make safe lane change. Section 340.5 is not applicable here because appellant's injuries were not caused by professional negligence. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations is the two-year period found in section 335.1.
The accident occurred on October 8, 2018, and appellant filed her complaint within two years, on September 21, 2020. Since appellant filed her complaint within the required two years, it is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Respondents' motion for summary judgment on this ground should have been denied because respondents did not meet their burden of proof under section 437c. Because we conclude that summary judgment should have been denied, the appeal of the order denying the new trial motion is moot.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings. Appellant is awarded her costs of appeal.
We concur LUI, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.