Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-3502 (JBS).
December 27, 2001
OMAR HARRIS, CENTRAL RECEPTION ASSIGNMENT FACILITY, West Trenton, New Jersey, Pro Se Plaintiff.
John J. Farmer, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, By: Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendants Faunce, Marcucci and Elbertson.
OPINION
Omar Harris ("Harris") is a state prisoner currently incarcerated in the Central Reception Assignment Facility in West Trenton, New Jersey. On July 14, 2000, Harris filed this harassment and retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Administrator Scott Faunce, Corrections Officer Louis Marcucci, Corrections Officer William Elbertson, and Corrections Officer McConnell at Bayside State Prison violated his civil rights by bringing false disciplinary charges against him, searching his cell without cause repeatedly, and interfering with his legal and personal mail. In his complaint, plaintiff demands a declaratory judgment that defendants violated his rights, compensatory and punitive damages, and $500.00 per day for each day spent in administrative segregation. Previously, this Court dismissed Harris's claims alleging disciplinary due process claims as frivolous, allowing his harassment claim to proceed.
The complaint against defendant Kathy Ireland was dismissed in its entirety. See Opinion of Sept. 18, 2000, at 13 n. 3. Defendants assert that Officer McConnell is not a proper defendant because, although plaintiff named Officer McConnell as a defendant in his complaint, Officers Faunce, Marcucci, and Elbertson were the only defendants served with the complaint.See Def.'s Br. at 1, note.
Presently before the Court is the motion of defendants Scott Faunce, Louis Marcucci, and William Elbertson for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Harris's harassment claim should be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The Court incorporates herein the facts as previously discussed in its opinion filed September 18, 2000, granting plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismissing Harris's disciplinary due process claim as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to Administrator Scott Faunce on or about February 12, 2000, asserting that Officer McConnell at Bayside State Prison ("Bayside") harassed plaintiff by threatening him with bodily harm. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff states that he never received a response back. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that he sent an Inmate Request slip to see the Facility Ombudsman. (Pl.'s Br. at 20.) Plaintiff then sent a request slip to Internal Affairs and met with Officer Ralph Lonergan about the alleged threats. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that on February 20, 2000, Officer McConnell and a lieutenant called plaintiff to his cell and asked him why his clothes were placed outside his cell earlier that day. (Id.) The lieutenant allegedly asked plaintiff if he had a problem, and plaintiff responded that he had a problem with Officer McConnell. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that his cell was then searched. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that officers charged him with possession of a weapon and threatening an officer with bodily harm, and that he was subsequently found guilty on both charges after appearing before Disciplinary Hearing Officer Kathy Ireland on February 23, 2000. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Ireland "makes arbitrary decisions and always suggest[s] she believes the officers statement." (Id.) Harris states that he was sanctioned with 480 days administrative segregation, 480 days loss of commutation credit, and 30 days detention. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to the Governor's office on March 25, 2000, regarding this sanction. (Id.) Administrator Faunce states that he never received any direct correspondence from plaintiff, but on August 18, 2000, he received a letter from Harris to Governor Whitman written in March 2000 alleging harassment at Bayside. Faunce states that although the letter was originally referred to Department of Corrections Assistant Commissioner Jeffrey Burns, Burns then responded to Harris by indicating that Faunce would be handling the investigation. (Faunce Aff.) Faunce then referred plaintiff's complaint to the Internal Affairs Unit for investigation. (Id.)Plaintiff states that Officers Marcucci and Elbertson searched his cell on March 2, 2000, while he was in Unit B serving detention, and that officers took from his cell his mattress, parole plans, and legal and personal mail. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff states that he was then forced to sleep on the metal bed frame with only a blanket and a sheet, causing pains to his lower back. (Id.) Plaintiff did not allege that he sought or received medical treatment for any physical injury resulting from the incident. (Pl.'s Br. at 23.) Plaintiff states his rights to access the court system and his family and friends were interfered with because his mail was taken. (Id.)
Defendants assert that plaintiff had written threatening language directed at Officer McConnell on his mattress and when asked about it, plaintiff stated, "[W]hen I get out of here, I'm going to kill McConnell." (Marcucci Aff. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff does not refute that he made the statement or that he had written threatening language on his mattress. (Pl.'s Br. at 23.) Plaintiff alleges that Officers Marcucci and Elbertson charged him with threatening an officer with bodily harm and with destroying, altering or damaging government property. (Compl. ¶ 4; Pedalino Aff. Ex. A.) Harris states that Hearing Officer Kathy Ireland found him guilty of the charge. (Id.) Harris states he asked to see a sergeant, but was denied his rights to remedy the situation. (Comp. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary decision, which was subsequently upheld by Charles Leone, the Assistant Superintendent at Bayside State Prison. (Pedalino Aff. Ex. A.)
Plaintiff alleges that Officers Marcucci and Oja searched his cell and left a piece of tissue in the shape of a cross that was burned and put out with water. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he asked to see Internal Affairs but was again denied his rights to remedy the situation. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he was further harassed on March 20, 2000, when Officer Marcucci and another officer threatened him by telling him that his incoming and outgoing mail would be destroyed. (Id.) Plaintiff states he sent letters to Governor Christine Whitman, Congressman Donald Payne, the Attorney General, and New Jersey Department of Corrections Commissioner Jack Terhune, and believed that "[a]ll responses from these officials were prevented from getting to the plaintiff because of the threats from the said officers and the [harassment]." (Pl.'s Br. at 11.) Plaintiff did receive one response from Congressman Payne. (Id.) Plaintiff states he spoke to Internal Affairs Officer Lonergan regarding plaintiff's charges of harassment. (Id.) Plaintiff also states that in March 2000, he received mail from his mother and two other friends. (Id.) Harris asserts that stamps were taken by Officer Tomlin on March 20, 2000. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the infirmary on March 20, 2000, questioned by a nurse, placed in a cell and ordered to take off his clothes, and waited approximately five hours to see psychologist Dr. Schuffer. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he was placed in a new cell that "did not have a bed, blanket, toiletries, sheets or his mail, stamps or legal mail." (Id.) Plaintiff states he wrote to Sergeant Davis about his mail but was not sure he received it due to the alleged harassment directed at him. (Id.) The New Jersey Department of Corrections allegedly received four of Harris's inmate request forms, dated February 25, 2000; March 4, 2000; March 14, 2000; and April 25, 2000. (Gentilini Aff. Ex. B.) Harris states that Officer Tomlin then charged him with disruptive conduct and being untidy and unsanitary after noticing feces under the door of his cell. (Compl. ¶ 4; Pl.'s Br. at 13.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered pain in the head and back area due to sleeping on a mattress on the floor and continued harassment by Officers Marcucci and Elbertson, who he asserts had kicked and beat the walls and heating units in the cells surrounding his cell to disrupt his sleep. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he sent request slips to see Administrator Faunce, but believes that Faunce may not have received these requests because "officers have to see mail before it can be sent out." (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that his drinking water was cut off when he returned from the infirmary on March 20, 2000, and that he knocked on his cell door to get the officers' attention but was told he would receive a disciplinary charge if the knocking continued. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that "he had no choice but to survive and he drank his own urine which he poured in a cup." (Id.)
On July 14, 2000, plaintiff filed this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment that defendants violated his civil rights, compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for each day plaintiff spent in segregation, $500.00 per day for each day spent in administrative segregation, and punitive damages in the amount of $60,000.00. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff's allegations can be grouped under the following § 1983 claims: (1) retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights; (2) denial of access to the court system in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A court may grant summary judgment when the record "shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986); Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 1983). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law.Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id.
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party.See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (3d Cir. 1996); Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1091 (1984). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (citingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 248) ("[T]he nonmoving party creates a genuine issue of material fact if it provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial.").
The moving party always bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, regardless of which party ultimately would have the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990). However,
the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders other facts immaterial.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. In such situations, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325;Brewer, 72 F.3d at 329-30 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23) ("When the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial.").
The non-moving party, here the plaintiff, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of" its pleading in order to show the existence of a genuine issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). They must do more than rely only "upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions." Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985) (citation omitted); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Thus, if the non-movant's evidence is merely "colorable" or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
1. Standard for Retaliation Claims Under Section 1983
Plaintiff asserts that defendants harassed and retaliated against him because he filed grievance charges by (1) verbally threatening to destroy his incoming and outgoing mail; (2) placing a piece of burned tissue in the shape of a cross in his cell; and (3) bringing false disciplinary charges again him.
To prevail on a claim for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) he suffered some adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his protected activity was the cause of the retaliation. Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997). The adverse action must be "sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights." Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff's denial of parole, transfer to distant prison far from his family, and imposition of financial penalty were adverse actions); see also ACLU of Md. v. Wicomico County, Md., 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993) (requiring plaintiff to show adversity to bring retaliation claim); Jones v. Franzen, 697 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring plaintiff to show that adverse action impeded his exercise of right of access to the courts to establish prima facie case of retaliation). Once the first two initial criteria are met, "the plaintiff [bears] the initial burden of proving that the constitutionally protected conduct was `a substantial or motivating factor' in the decision to discipline him." Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (quoting Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
However, because of the need to afford deference to decisions made by prison officials due to the difficulty of prison administration, the Third Circuit has recognized that a prison regulation that otherwise might impinge on constitutional rights in free society is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334 (quoting Turner v. Safly, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). "Such a standard is necessary if `prison administrators . . ., and not the courts are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.'" Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quotingJones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)). The Third Circuit has joined the various circuits that have held that, once a plaintiff establishes his initial burden of demonstrating that his constitutionally protected action was "a substantial or motivating factor" in the adverse action taken in retaliation against him, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same disciplinary action even in absence of the protected activity. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (adopting the Mount Healthy burden-shifting framework into the prison context); see, e.g., Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (using burden-shifting analysis);Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1996) (same);Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). Thus, the prison officials "may still prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest." Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.
a. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff asserts that defendants Officers Marcucci, Elbertson, and Oja, and other officers threatened him verbally in retaliation for his filing administrative grievances by stating that his incoming and outgoing mail would be destroyed. In addition, plaintiff states that a burned piece of tissue in the shape of a cross was placed in his cell, and that defendants filed false disciplinary charges against him in retaliation for plaintiff's administrative grievance charges.
Plaintiff's allegation that prison officials interfered with his access to the court system is discussed below. See infra Part A.2.
It is well established that mere verbal harassment does not give rise to a constitutional violation enforceable under § 1983.Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the use of vulgur language does not give rise to constitutional violation under § 1983); Prisoners' Legal Ass'n v. Roberson, 822 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that verbal abuse did not give rise to constitutional violation). Allegations that prison officials used threatening language and gestures toward a prisoner are likewise not cognizable claims under § 1983. Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 826 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that defendant's laughing at prisoner and threatening to hang him did not rise to constitutional violation).
In the instant matter, plaintiff filed an administrative grievance with Administrator Scott Faunce in February 2000, sent an inmate request form to Facility Ombudsman Maggie Aguero, and met with Internal Affairs Investigator Ralph Lonergan regarding his problems with Officer McConnell. The filing of grievances against prison officials is protected First Amendment activity.See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[P]rison officials cannot punish plaintiff for exercising his first amendment rights. . . ."); see also Hill v. Blum, 916 F. Supp. 470, 473-74 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[P]rison officials cannot punish or retaliate against a prisoner who exercises his First Amendment rights by filing an administrative grievance or civil action."). Thus, because plaintiff filed an administrative grievance, plaintiff has established that he participated in a constitutionally protected activity, and the first prong of plaintiff's burden has been met.
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here the plaintiff, the defendants verbally threatened plaintiff that they would destroy his incoming and outgoing legal and personal mail. Plaintiff asserts that he wrote to Governor Whitman, Congressman Donald Payne, the New Jersey Attorney General, Ombudsman Maggie Aguero, and New Jersey Department of Corrections Commissioner Jack Terhune. (Pl.'s Br. at 11.) Plaintiff stated he "believes all responses from these officials were prevented from getting to him because he was being threatened by defendants and [harassed]," even though plaintiff concedes that he indeed received a response from Congressman Donald Payne. (Id.) In addition, plaintiff states that he received letters from his mother and a friend in March 2000. (Compl. ¶ 4.) There is nothing in the record that indicates that defendants intercepted or destroyed any of plaintiff's mail. Defendants' verbal threats, without more, however, do not rise to the level of a viable constitutional claim of interference with mail enforceable under § 1983. In addition, plaintiff's filing of this action demonstrates that this is not an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. Plaintiff therefore fails to meet his burden under § 1983. Accordingly, this Court cannot afford plaintiff relief on this claim.
The Court notes that plaintiff's submissions fail to conform to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), which requires that affidavits opposing a summary judgment motion "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." In addition, plaintiff's submission was over three months late. Despite plaintiff's tardiness and noncompliance with applicable court rules, the Court chooses to proceed with its analysis, for purposes of completeness.
In addition, plaintiff claims that defendants placed a burned piece of tissue put out with water in the shape of a cross in his cell after conducting a cell search on March 2, 2000. Plaintiff states that this action "degrade[d] and place[d] fear into plaintiff thus leaving him feeling emotionally traumatized and psychologically depressed." (Pl.'s Br. at 24.) Whether a person of ordinary firmness would be deterred from exercising his or her constitutional rights due to such a display is highly doubtful. Indeed, in this case, in addition to filing this civil action, plaintiff wrote to Governor Whitman and filed at least four inmate requests, dated February 25, 2000; March 4, 2000; March 14, 2000; and April 25, 2000, according to Judy Gentilini, Administrative Assistant at Bayside State Prison. (Gentilini Aff. ¶ 4 Ex. B.) Defendants' alleged actions, while reprehensible if true, would therefore not constitute an adverse action sufficient to undermine one's efforts to exercise his constitutional rights. Because plaintiff is unable to satisfy his burden, this Court cannot afford plaintiff relief on this claim.
If plaintiff's claim that defendants "place[d] fear into [him] . . . leaving him feeling emotionally traumatized and psychologically depressed" were alternatively analyzed under the rubric of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff would be similarly unable to state a claim for relief. "[A] violation of the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments can be made out for the purposes of a § 1983 claim without actual force having been used against the plaintiff." Douglas v. Marino, 684 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.N.J. 1988). It is well established that intentionally placing a prison inmate in fear of his life inflicts suffering so as to amount to unconstitutional punishment, if the threat of physical harm is made to discourage a prisoner from seeking judicial relief. Douglas, 684 F. Supp. at 397, 398 (holding that brandishing butcher knife and threatening to kill prisoner may be constitutional deprivation); see also Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that putting gun to prisoner's head and threatening his life may be a constitutional violation); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100-01 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that pointing gun and threatening to shoot prisoner may be constitutional violation). Cf. McFadden v. Louis, 713 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 998 (1983) (holding that twenty-two officers forcing and threatening prisoner, without any physical force, to shave beard was not a constitutional violation).
To the extent that plaintiff seeks damages for emotional injury and mental suffering, see Pl.'s Br. at 24, he cannot recover for such damages absent a showing of physical injury.See, e.g., Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff with bruised and sore ear resulting from prison official's use of force does not have requisite physical injury to support claim for emotional or mental suffering) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) states that "[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (Supp. 2001). Indeed, plaintiff concedes that he "was not physically injured." Pl.'s Br. at 26.
However, absent allegations of actual force, plaintiff's claims that defendants placed a burnt piece of tissue in the shape of a cross in his cell does not sufficiently interfere with plaintiff's pursuit of judicial relief. Indeed, plaintiff's filing of the instant action negates that interference with plaintiff's pursuit of judicial relief was achieved. Without allegations that defendants used physical force in striking fear in plaintiff, or alternatively, that his pursuit of judicial relief had been impeded, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim under § 1983. Accordingly, this Court cannot grant plaintiff relief on this ground.
Plaintiff also asserts that defendants harassed him in retaliation by charging him with false disciplinary charges after he filed his administrative grievances in February 2000. (Pl.'s Br. at 1, 2.) Plaintiff asserts that officers falsely filed disciplinary charges of possession of a weapon and threatening an officer with bodily harm against him. In addition, plaintiff states he was falsely charged with disruptive conduct and being untidy and unsanitary. (Pl.'s Br. at 13.) Again, under the second prong, plaintiff is unable to show that these filings of disciplinary charges rise to the level of adverse actions affecting or impeding his constitutional rights. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (plaintiff must demonstrate that action "was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights"). Plaintiff was not impeded in exercising his constitutional rights, as evidenced by his filing of further administrative grievances, writing letters to prison and government officials, and filing of this civil lawsuit in federal court. Accordingly, by his own actions, plaintiff fails to establish that an adverse action was taken against him.
Even if plaintiff had sufficiently demonstrated that his constitutional rights were impeded and that his report to prison officials was "a substantial or motivating factor" for the filing of disciplinary charges against him, defendants provide evidence that plaintiff would have been charged absent the protected conduct. Officer Marcucci stated that he observed the following words written on plaintiff's mattress: "1 officer dead because he raped a Homo, the Homo killed him fair or murder. Unit-E CO McConnell planted a knife because my wife is white and I love her, Justice or Discrimination. A KKK killed in 2000." (Marcucci Aff. ¶ 4.)
Although plaintiff asserts that he was falsely charged with possession of a weapon, the allegations as pled are insufficient to satisfy plaintiff's burden under § 1983.
Officer Marcucci stated he then issued the disciplinary charge for threatening another person with bodily harm. When asked what was written on his mattress, plaintiff stated, "When I get out of here I'm gonna kill McConnell." (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5; Pedalino Aff. Ex. A.) Plaintiff does not refute that he made this statement. (Pl.'s Br. at 23.) Disciplinary Hearing Officer Kathy Ireland found Harris guilty of the charge, rendering a sanction of 15 days detention, 300 days of administrative segregation, and 300 days of lost commutation time. (Pedalino Aff. Ex. A.) This finding of guilty was upheld by Charles Leon, Assistant Superintendent of Bayside State Prison. (Pedalino Aff. Ex. A.) In addition, Officer Tomlin, in his disciplinary charge, stated, "While this officer was taking count this officer noticed a strong odor coming from [plaintiff's cell]. . . . This officer noticed what appeared to be urine and feces on the floor . . . coming out from under [inmate] Harris cell door." (Pl.'s Br. at 13.) Plaintiff was sanctioned with 10 days detention, 60 days loss of commutation time, 90 days administrative segregation, and 60 days suspension. (Id.) Under the Third Circuit's burden-shifting analysis above in Rauser, the defendants have sufficiently satisfied their burden by providing a purpose reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, that is, of preserving orderliness and cleanliness in prison administration and ensuring the safety of others. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (noting that preserving order and discipline in prison has been deemed a legitimate penological interest). Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted on this claim.
2. Plaintiff's First Amendment Claim of Interference With Right of Access to the Court System
In addition, plaintiff claims that defendants took his legal and personal mail during a cell search and, consequently, he was unable to access the court system or his friends and family. An individual's right of access to court is protected by the First Amendment's clause of granting the right to petition the government for grievances. Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff's filing of EEOC complaint and an employment discrimination civil suit constituted protected activity under the First Amendment) (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)). "The right of a prisoner to send and receive legal mail is uncontroverted and implicates both the First and Sixth Amendment concerns, through the right to petition the government and the right of access to the courts." Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1992). For a prisoner to sufficiently plead a First Amendment right of access claim under § 1983, he must allege both an interference with his access to the courts and an actual injury resulting therefrom. Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment for defendants because plaintiff was not prejudiced by defendants' alleged interference with his mail).
Plaintiff claims that his legal and personal mail was taken from him during a cell search conducted on March 2, 2000, and that defendants therefore interfered with his access to the court system. Plaintiff filed at least four inmate request slips, however, as well as this civil action. While plaintiff alleges that defendants interfered with his access to the court system, he fails to allege an actual injury that resulted therefrom. Plaintiff's own actions demonstrate that, contrary to incurring an injury, he was able to adequately access the courts in filing this claim. Absent evidence tending to show that plaintiff was actually injured by defendants' alleged interference, or that defendants actually impeded his access to the court system, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim alleging a First Amendment violation under § 1983. Accordingly, defendants' summary judgment motion will be granted on this ground.
While plaintiff complains of the prison administration's nonresponsiveness to his grievances, his First Amendment right of access to the courts is not compromised by such failure to address his grievances. See, e.g., Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he prisoner's right to petition the government for redress is the right of access to the courts, which is not compromised by the prison's refusal to entertain his grievance.").
3. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Claims
a. Searches of Plaintiff's Cell
Plaintiff asserts that defendants searched his cell without cause in retaliation for filing administrative grievances. Claims of unwarranted searches of a prisoner's cell, in certain circumstances, may give rise to a violation under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments "`incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' or `involving the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1992) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)). It is generally established that searches of a prisoner's person, cell, or personal belongings are permissible.See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that because prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy, even unreasonable searches of their persons, cells, and personal belongings do not violate the Fourth Amendment). However, such searches may give "rise to an Eighth Amendment violation if they are conducted for `calculated harassment,'" Prisoners' Legal Ass'n v. Roberson, 822 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D.N.J. 1993) (quotingProudfoot v. Williams, 803 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530)); see Scher v. Engelke, 943 F.2d 921, 924-25 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 952 (1992) (holding that retaliatory searches of inmate's cell ten times in nineteen days and leaving cell in disarray after three of those searches could amount to cruel and unusual punishment); cf. Roberson, 822 F. Supp. at 189 (concluding that three searches of inmate's possessions did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that "the conditions of imprisonment do not reach the threshold of constitutional concern until a showing is made of `genuine privations of hardship over an extended period of time.'"Roberson, 822 F. Supp. at 189 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979)).
Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant officers searched his cell three times over a timespan of ten days during his detention at Bayside State Prison. Defendants have provided evidence demonstrating that one of the searches was conducted pursuant to legitimate penological reasons. Officer Marcucci stated that on March 2, 2000, after observing plaintiff sitting on the heater in front of the window of his cell with a piece of bed sheet in his hand and in order to "ensure that he was not going to harm himself with his sheet," he and Officer Elbertson searched his cell. (Marcucci Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4; Pedalino Aff. Ex. A.) The Court affords deference to the decision of prison officials to search plaintiff's cell after observing plaintiff's questionable activity, and finds that the concern stated is reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of enforcing order and discipline in prison administration. UnlikeScher, the searches of plaintiff's cell do not "evidence a pattern of calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs."Scher, 943 F.2d at 924. Like Roberson, this Court concludes that plaintiff's allegations of these three searches of his cell do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation as found by the Eighth Circuit inScher, and that the evidence is insufficient for a jury to find that plaintiff was deprived of the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, this Court will grant summary judgment to defendants on this ground.
The Court notes that the allegations as pled are insufficient to support a finding that the remaining two cell searches were conducted for "calculated harassment."
b. Plaintiff's Claim of Substandard Housing Conditions
Plaintiff asserts that he suffered back pain after the mattress he was using was removed from his cell, and that he was deprived of running water for one day and had to resort to drinking his own urine. The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to "provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take `reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmate.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). The conditions of imprisonment do not reach the threshold of constitutional concern, however, until a showing is made of "genuine privations of hardship over an extended period of time." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979). Indeed, "extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). "Because routine discomfort is `part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offense against society,'Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), only those deprivations denying the `minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quotingWilson v. Seiter, 511 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The Supreme Court has determined that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two conditions are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is "sufficiently serious," and (2) the prison official acted with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety.Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Plaintiff seeks damages for not having water for one day and for the physical injury he allegedly incurred due to sleeping without a mattress. To the extent that plaintiff may have been deprived of running water for one day, this short-term deprivation hardly amounts to a serious hardship over an extended period of time that necessarily implicates the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff's claim, therefore, does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment deemed prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.See, e.g., Wilson v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 943, 946-47 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998) (cold, mice-infested cell not an Eighth Amendment violation); Gutridge v. Chesney, No. 97-3441, 1998 WL 248913, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1998) (failure to provide prisoner with blanket between April and June not a constitutional violation); Tinsley v. Vaughn, No. 90-0113, 1991 WL 95323, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1991) (confining prisoner to cell and suspending shower privileges for twelve days not a constitutional deprivation). Plaintiff's claim of back pain due to sleeping without a mattress for one night also does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. The absence of a mattress for a very short duration does not deny plaintiff of the minimal standard of "life's necessities" afforded to him. Because plaintiff's claims of substandard housing conditions are not "sufficiently serious" so as to subject plaintiff to the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, this Court cannot provide relief to plaintiff on this ground.
In this case, plaintiff does not claim that he ever sought or received medical treatment for his alleged back injury. To the extent that plaintiff seeks damages for emotional injury and mental suffering, see Pl.'s Br. at 14, he cannot recover for such damages absent a showing of physical injury. See infra note 4.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this Court grants defendants' summary judgment motion, and the claims brought by plaintiff Omar Harris are hereby dismissed. The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court on motion of defendants Administrator Scott Faunce, Officer Louis Marcucci, and Officer William Elbertson for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) to be entered against all claims brought by plaintiff Omar Harris; and the Court having considered the parties' submissions; and for good cause shown; and for the reasons discussed in the Opinion of today's date;IT IS on this ____ day of December, 2001, hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment against all claims brought by plaintiff Omar Harris is GRANTED ; and the claims of plaintiff Omar Harris are hereby DISMISSED.