Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:03-cv-0106-GET.
July 7, 2006
ORDER
The above — styled matter is presently before the court on plaintiffs' objections [docket no. 79] to the Special Master's Report and Recommendation ("R R") [docket no. 75] recommending that defendant be found not liable on any of plaintiffs' claims and that judgment be entered in favor of defendant on all counts of plaintiffs' complaint.
On December 18, 2002, plaintiffs filed the instant action in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, alleging that defendant discriminated against plaintiffs and retaliated against plaintiff Fitzgerald based on plaintiffs' race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On January 13, 2003, defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1331. On January 13, 2004, Magistrate Judge Hagy issued an R R denying defendant's motion for summary judgment. On April 8, 2004, this court issued an order adopting the R R. From February 7, 2005 through February 15, 2005, Magistrate Judge Hagy, sitting as Special Master, held a bench trial. On August 26, 2005, the Special Master issued an R R. On September 15, 2005, plaintiffs filed objections to the R R.
Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(2), "[a] judge may designate a magistrate judge to serve as a special master pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district court." After the special master has issued an R R, parties have twenty (20) days in which to file any objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 (g) (2). The court must decide de nova all objections to findings of fact and conclusions of law made or recommended by the master. Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 (g) (3)-(4).
Discussion
The parties stipulated to certain facts before the Magistrate Judge. Further, plaintiffs state that they have no objection to conclusions of law Nos. 3-11, and 14-19. Plaintiffs filed objections to all of the additional findings of fact and specific conclusions of law. Plaintiffs also reiterate their right to a jury trial and raise the issue of the treatment of the R R at such trial.
The court will deal first with plaintiffs' right to a jury trial. Plaintiffs assert claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The analysis to determine whether plaintiffs were intentionally discriminated and retaliated against under Title VII and Section 1981 are the same. Howard v. B.P. Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1994). For claims brought under Section 1981, and seeking compensatory and punitive relief, any party may demand a trial by jury. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial in the instant matter.
The court has reviewed the R R and the objections. Plaintiffs stipulated to the following facts: Defendant is a long-time Mercedes — Benz dealership located at 3775 Royal South Parkway, Atlanta, Georgia 30349. This dealership is now known as Mercedes-Benz of South Atlanta, Inc. Mercedes-Benz is a higher end automotive line. Defendant is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and has employed fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks every year from at least 2000 through and including 2004.
Plaintiff Fitzgerald was hired by defendant as a sales representative on or about January 2, 2000 and was fired by defendant on September 9, 2002. From January 2, 2000 until September 9, 2002, defendant was plaintiff Fitzgerald's "employer" and plaintiff Fitzgerald was defendant's "employee" as those terms are defined by Title VII. Plaintiff Harris was hired by defendant as a sales representative on or about September 10, 2001 and continues to work there in his sales capacity. Since September 10, 2001 through and including the present, defendant has been plaintiff Harris's "employer" and plaintiff Harris has been "employee" as those terms are defined by Title VII. Plaintiffs Fitzgerald and Harris are African-American males.
On September 10, 2002, plaintiff Fitzgerald filed E.E.O.C. Charge No. 110A 204332 contending that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and that he was discharged in retaliation for opposing employment practices which he alleges were unlawful. The same day, plaintiff Harris filed E.E.O.C. Charge No. 110A 204331 contending that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and was treated differently from his white co-workers. Plaintiffs received a Right-to-Sue Notice from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and filed this action within ninety (90) days of such receipt.
During the time plaintiffs worked for defendant, defendant received Internet leads on prospective buyers from various Internet sources. Different internet lead services were tried including Autotrader.com, MBUSA, Carpoint, ebay and Autobytel. In August 2001, plaintiff Fitzgerald complained that internet leads were distributed in a racially discriminatory manner. That same month, plaintiff Fitzgerald and another Africa-American sales representative, Earl King, had a discussion with Ron Peavy, defendant's Used Car Manager, regarding their concern about defendant's system for distributing internedt leads among the sales representatives. After plaintiff Fitzgerald complained, defendant permitted him to access sales leads generated from interned sources. Plaintiff Fitzgerald wrote a letter dated February 7, 2002 to Jack McCue and "management" of defendant, complaining that African-American sales representatives were not being provided equal opportunities with respect to receiving Internet sales leads. On February 13, 2002, Mr. McCue wrote plaintiff Fitzgerald, indicating that efforts were being made which would hopefully promote an even more systematized approach to distributing leads.
The completion of a vehicle sale transaction depends on many interrelated factors including, but not limited to: pricing, purchaser motivation, subjective impressions, vehicle availability, financing and timing.
In September 2002, a customer named "Mr. G" visited defendant's showroom. An incident involving Mr. G and plaintiff Fitzgerald occurred on the showroom floor near the Enterprise Rental counter. Mr. G accused plaintiff Fitzgerald of threatening him. Mr. John Garde, a member of the management team, witnessed the September 6 incident.
In addition to the stipulated findings of fact, laid out above, plaintiffs state that they have no objection to conclusions of law nos. 3-11 and 14-19. The conclusions of law are laid out in the following three paragraphs.
When a party seeks to use 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a remedy for employment discrimination, the elements required to establish a claim under Section 1981 are the same as those required for a Title VII claim. Howard, 32 F.3d at 524 n. 2; Brown v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 949 (11th Cir. 1991). Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1). The ultimate burden of persuading the friar of fact that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs remains at all times with plaintiffs. Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
To prevail on a Title VII or Section 1981 claim, plaintiffs must prove that defendant acted with discriminatory intent.Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 980-81 (11th Cir. 1989). Such discriminatory intent may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that meets the four-pronged test set out for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1997). Direct evidence is evidence "which, if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption." Schoenfeld v. Babbit, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999). "[D]irect evidence relates to actions or statements of an employer reflecting a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee." Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998). Blatant remarks whose intent could only be to discriminate constitute direct evidence.Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1266. Direct evidence may also include statements indicating bias on the part of a decisionmaker in an employment setting, and other actions or remarks of the employer reflecting a discriminatory attitude. Williams v. Mead Coated Bd., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1552, 1570-71 (M.D. Ala. 1993),aff'd, 41 F.3d 668 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also Haynes v. W.C. Cave Co., 52 F.3d 928, 931 (11th Cir. 1995). Circumstantial evidence is evidence that merely "suggests discrimination, leaving the Crier of fact to infer discrimination based on the evidence." Earley v. Champi on Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (11th Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs can establish a prima face case of unlawful discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981 by showing that: (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they were subjected to an adverse job action; (3) Carriage House Imports treated other similarly situated employees outside their classification more favorably; and (4) they were qualified to do the job. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;see also Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562.
To prove a claim of race discrimination, plaintiffs carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case through either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1561-1562. Demonstrating a prima face case requires only that plaintiffs establish facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination. Id. at 1562 (internal citations omitted);Burdine, 450 U.S, at 253-54. If plaintiffs establish an inference of discrimination, defendant must then establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If it does so, plaintiffs must show that defendant's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-255. The Eleventh Circuit has held that this framework is a valuable tool for analyzing evidence, but the framework is only a tool. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comm., 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984). The ultimate question is not whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case or demonstrated pretext, but whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Id.
After reviewing the R R and plaintiffs' objections, the court concludes that those portions of the R R [docket no. 75] to which plaintiff has agreed, the stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law nos. 3-11 and 14-19 set forth within this order, are ADOPTED. Any remaining issues, including the use of the Special Master's R R at trial, will be resolved in connection with the pretrial process. The parties are DIRECTED to file their consolidated pretrial order in accordance with the Local Rules, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.
Summary
The portions of the R R [docket no. 75] setting forth the stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law nos. 3-11 and 14-19 are ADOPTED. The matter will be set for trial by jury in due course. Any remaining issues, including the use of the Special Master's R R at trial, will be resolved in connection with the pretrial process. The parties are DIRECTED to file their consolidated pretrial order in accordance with the Local Rules.
SO ORDERED.