Opinion
17586.
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 1951.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 15, 1951.
Injunction, etc. Before Judge McClure. Chattooga Superior Court. June 22, 1951.
Brinson Davis, for plaintiff in error.
Walter B. Shaw, S.W. Fariss, Earl B. Self, and T. J. Espy Jr., contra.
1. A description of land as "being parts of lots of land Nos. 44 and 45 in the 6th District and 4th Section of Chattooga County, Georgia, that lie north of L. A. Harris' [lessor] present place of business, being bounded on the east by the highway, on the north by the Walker-Chattooga County line, on the west by the L. A. Harris lands, and on the south by the lands of Drummons," is too indefinite to support a decree for possession of the lands by the lessee in an equitable action against the lessor. No particular tract of land is referred to by a given name, nor is there anything to show how far west of the highway the line of separation should be with reference to other lands of the defendant, L. A. Harris. Kauffman v. Deese, 205 Ga. 841, 842 (2-a) ( 55 S.E.2d 358), and cases cited.
2. In the present action to require the lessor to give effect to a claimed right of renewal, the lessor is not estopped to assert the invalidity of the lease by reason of a void or insufficient description of the premises. As a general rule estoppel, to be relied upon, must be pleaded. DeVore v. Baxter, 155 Ga. 109 ( 116 S.E. 610); National Land Coal Co. v. Zugar, 171 Ga. 228 ( 155 S.E. 7). The pleader is not required to use the word "estoppel," where the pleaded facts are sufficient to show that estoppel is an applicable defense. Broderick v. Reid, 164 Ga. 474 ( 139 S.E. 18). The fact that the lessor has accepted some rents under an invalid lease is insufficient to constitute estoppel by conduct. "In order to constitute estoppel by conduct, there must concur, first, a false representation or concealment of facts; second, it must be within the knowledge of the party making the one or concealing the other; third, the person affected thereby must be ignorant of the truth; fourth, the person seeking to influence the conduct of the other must act intentionally for that purpose; and, fifth, persons complaining shall have been induced to act by reason of such conduct of the other." Tinsley v. Rice, 105 Ga. 285, 290 ( 31 S.E. 174). The petition contains no allegation that the insufficient description is the result of "mutual mistake," or ignorance or mistake on one side and fraud on the other side, and there is no prayer for reformation of the description. See Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672 ( 132 S.E. 442); Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699, 708 ( 51 S.E.2d 409).
3. Mere inadequacy of price may justify a court in refusing to decree a specific performance; so also any other fact showing the contract to be unfair, or unjust, or against good conscience. Code, § 37-805. Where a petition for specific performance of an alleged lease of lands, to be used by the lessee for an airfield, does not allege any sum of money to be the fair, just, and equitable rental value of the lands, and the alleged lease provides that the lessor shall be paid "a rental in the nature of income from the passenger hauls of ten per centum of the passenger traffic, and five per centum for instructions," there is nothing upon which to base a decision that the contract is fair, just, and equitable, and in good conscience should be performed. Coleman v. Woodland Hills Co., 196 Ga. 626 ( 27 S.E.2d 226); Jenkins v. Evans, 202 Ga. 423 ( 43 S.E.2d 501); Holliday v. Pope, 205 Ga. 301, 309 ( 53 S.E.2d 350). Especially is this true where no facts are alleged in the petition (and none are revealed by the evidence) from which the court might arrive at the fair rental value of the premises. Higdon v. Dixon, 203 Ga. 67, 71 ( 45 S.E.2d 423); Ogletree v. Ingram LeGrand Lumber Co., 207 Ga. 333 (3) ( 61 S.E.2d 480); Hulgan v. Gledhill, 207 Ga. 349 (4) ( 61 S.E.2d 473). Under the foregoing rules, neither the pleadings nor the evidence authorized a verdict for specific performance.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
No. 17586. ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 1951 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 15, 1951.
A. D. Abney filed an equitable petition against L. A. Harris, and in substance alleged: On May 8, 1945, the petitioner and S. M. Chapman entered into a lease contract with the defendant for a period of five years for lands of the defendant (described in headnote 3), to be used as an airfield. A copy of the lease is attached as Exhibit "A." A more particular description of the premises held and used by the lessee for the past five years is set forth. The petitioner purchased the interest of S. M. Chapman, with the knowledge of the defendant, who continued to deal with the petitioner after such purchase. After purchasing the interest of Chapman, the petitioner improved the airfield at his own expense by the digging of a well. On April 5, 1950, the petitioner received a notice from the defendant that he would not renew the lease, and on April 17, 1950, the petitioner notified the defendant of his intention to renew the lease in accordance with the option contained therein. Copies of the letters are attached, marked Exhibits "B" and "C." The defendant has gone upon the lands and constructed a white cross upon the field, the meaning of the cross under the Civil Aeronautics Rules being that the field is closed, and the action of the defendant in constructing the white cross caused the Civil Aeronautics Authority to discontinue the airfield as a commercial field. The defendant is now installing upon the airfield grounds, leased by the petitioner, certain individual speakers to be used in connection with an outdoor moving-picture screen. The construction of such speakers has rendered the field unsafe for the purpose of aircraft flights or instruction. The amount of money to be earned over a period of five years can not be calculated and the action of the defendant has resulted in damages to the petitioner that are irreparable and incapable of calculation. The defendant is continuing to trespass against the rights of the petitioner, a bona fide leaseholder.
The prayers of the petition were for a temporary restraining order; that the defendant be required to show cause why he should not be permanently enjoined; for a permanent injunction upon the final hearing of the cause; for specific performance of the lease contract; and for other relief.
The defendant filed general and special demurrers to the petition, which were overruled, and exceptions pendente lite were duly filed. The trial of the cause resulted in a verdict for the petitioner. The defendant's motion for new trial was overruled, and he excepts to that judgment, and to the judgment overruling his general and special demurrers.