Opinion
G053243 c/w/G053665
01-18-2018
In re Marriage of MAHNAZ HARRIS-RAFIPOOR and MIKE RAFIPOOR. MAHNAZ HARRIS-RAFIPOOR, Respondent, v. MIKE RAFIPOOR, Appellant.
Law Offices of Lemkin, Barnes & Row, Cheryl Anne Row, and Wm. Curtis Barnes, Jr., for Appellant. Law Offices of John A. Bledsoe and John A. Bledsoe and Ronald G. Gomez for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 03D006006) OPINION Appeals from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Barry S. Michaelson, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. Law Offices of Lemkin, Barnes & Row, Cheryl Anne Row, and Wm. Curtis Barnes, Jr., for Appellant. Law Offices of John A. Bledsoe and John A. Bledsoe and Ronald G. Gomez for Respondent.
Mike Rafipoor (Husband) and Mahnaz Harris-Rafipoor (Wife) ended their 17-month marriage in 2003. A stipulated dissolution judgment stated Husband owed Wife $400,000. Wife has been trying since 2009 to collect this debt. After much litigation over the validity of the debt, a trial court determined the stipulated judgment was unambiguous and constituted an enforceable money judgment in 2013. We affirmed this ruling. (In re Marriage of Rafipoor (Aug. 6, 2014, G048924) [nonpub. opn.] (Rafipoor I).)
Thereafter, the trial court held a 13-day trial on the issue of whether the money judgment had been satisfied. It issued a lengthy written ruling, concluding Husband failed to prove he paid the entire judgment and Wife's 2013 request for a judgment debtor examination would take place on March 4, 2016. Additionally, the court imposed a $20,000 sanction against Husband pursuant to Family Code section 271 (all further statutory references are to the Family Code). We consolidated Husband's appeals from these two rulings. He maintains we must reverse these orders because the trial court erred in refusing to consider his defense of laches and the sanctions were unwarranted. Concluding these contentions lack merit, we affirm the orders.
FACTS
The events leading up to the 13-day trial are adequately described in Rafipoor I, and we incorporate by reference that factual summary here. The court prepared a statement of decision, defining the issues to be determined, discussing the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, weighing the evidence presented, and granting and denying alleged offsets to the $400,000 debt. Of all the claimed payments, the court permitted offsets of approximately $185,000, representing Husband's payments on Wife's automobile lease, residence, etc. It ordered a judgment debtor examination be held regarding the remaining debt.
The parties' stipulated marital settlement agreement, which the court incorporated into the 2003 dissolution judgment, contained an attorney fee provision. After the hearing, each party requested fees, claiming to be the prevailing party. Wife requested $243,572 in attorney fees, $2,500 in reporter fees, and $70,000 in sanctions. Husband requested $169,231 in attorney fees and claimed he had a success rate equivalent to 20.4 percent after proving several offsets against the debt, making him the prevailing party. The court disagreed with Husband and ordered that he pay Wife $175,000 in attorney fees. The court also granted Wife's request for sanctions under section 271. It ruled, "[Husband] was disrespectful in court, . . . he threatened witnesses in court, and failed to tell the truth. He testified openly that he had lied in the prior action involving his former spouse . . . and his actions in this case caused it to be extraordinarily long. Sanctions are granted in the sum of $20,000."
I. Defense of Laches
In the trial court's lengthy statement of decision, the trial court correctly noted the Rafipoor I decision established the $400,000 debt, and it was Husband's burden to prove "payment or offset." Husband only challenges two paragraphs of the trial court's 17-page discussion of the evidence, rejection of claims, credibility calls, and the final conclusion Husband still owed Wife money. In short, he asserts the court erred in refusing to consider the defense of laches.
In two paragraphs, the trial court determined the defense of laches did not apply in this matter. It explained, "[Section 4205 was] the predecessor to . . . [section] 291, which states that the money judgment made or entered under the Family Code is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied. [Section 291, subdivision (d)] specifically refers to the defense of laches and limits it only to any portion of the judgment that is owed to the state. [¶] The defense of laches fails in this matter. Although [Husband] continues to deny the existence of the $400,000 debt, it is well documented and there was not any equitable defense to the enforcement of its payment subject to any appropriate offsets or credits."
The court repeated the same conclusion at the end of its eight-page judgment. It stated, "[Husband] contended the principle of laches applies to [Wife's] request for enforcement of the principle and accrued interest there. The [c]ourt finds . . . [section 291, subdivision (d)] specifically limits the defense of laches to only a judgment that is owed to the state. The [c]ourt denies [Husband's] affirmative defense of laches." We find no error in the court's conclusion.
It is well settled, "In enforcing Family Code judgments and orders, the court's discretion is not limited by the rules concerning the period of enforceability and renewal of judgments in the Enforcement of Judgments Law ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 683.010 et seq.). [§ 291]" (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 18:3 (hereafter Hogoboom); see § 683.310 [statutory rules on enforcement of judgments do "not apply to a judgment or order made or entered pursuant to the Family Code"].)
Section 291, subdivision (a) provides: "A money judgment or judgment for possession or sale of property that is made or entered under this code, including a judgment for child, family, or spousal support, is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied." Thus, Family Code judgments are exempt from the general rule requiring that a judgment be renewed every 10 years. (Schelb v. Stein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1447.) "Although not essential to enforcement, parties to a Family Code judgment have the option of renewing the judgment pursuant to the . . . procedures applicable to money judgments generally. [Citations.]" (Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 18:3:5.) Although renewal has no effect on enforceability, it can benefit the judgment creditor because "[i]t provides a mechanism for updating the amount owed on the judgment to reflect installments that have come due, plus costs and accrued interest [citation]." (Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 18:3:7.) In addition, section 291's "open-ended enforcement period [citation] applies to family law judgments and orders entered into before the statute's 2006 operative date so long as the judgment or order is not one for 'possession or sale of property' within the meaning of former [section] 291. [Citations.]" (Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 18:3:8.)
"In exercising its broad discretion to determine the appropriate means of enforcing Family Code judgments, the court generally can—and should—consider the equities of the situation. [Citations.]" (Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 18:4.) However, application of the "[l]aches defense to support enforcement [is] limited to judgments owed to the state." (Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 18:5.) "The absence of a statutory limitations period on the enforcement of Family Code judgments generally does not preclude application of the equitable doctrine of laches—the defense of unreasonable delay in taking enforcement action to the prejudice of the judgment debtor. However, a laches defense may be raised or considered in an action to enforce a child, family or spousal support judgment only with respect to that portion of the judgment (if any) owed to the state (i.e., for public assistance reimbursement or as custodial parent's assignee in public assistance cases). [Citations.]" (Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 18:5, citing § 291, subd. (d), and Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177 (Boswell); see also Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 186-190 (Fellows) [decided under identically-worded predecessor to section 291].) In summary, in a private action, other equitable defenses may be available but laches is not.
Husband argues section 291's elimination of the laches defense in private actions is limited to money judgments for child, family, or spousal support. He argues section 291, subdivision (d), does not apply to "other enforcement proceedings" because the subdivision mentions only support-related judgments. We disagree.
The provision at issue provides, "In an action to enforce a judgment for child, family, or spousal support, the defendant may raise, and the court may consider, the defense of laches only with respect to any portion of the judgment that is owed to the state." (§ 291, subd. (d).) The subdivision mentions only support-related judgments because the State of California is concerned only with litigation relating to these types of cases. The state has no reason to enforce other types of family code money judgments.
Nothing in section 291 supports consideration of the laches defense in private litigation regarding Family Code judgments. The statutory provision announces only one exception regarding when the laches defense may be asserted. To accept the Husband's proposed interpretation, we would have to ignore section 291's open-ended enforcement period, which makes no distinction between the various types of family code judgments. They are all "enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied." (§ 291, subd. (a).) The $400,000 marital debt qualifies as a Family Code judgment, defined by section 291, as covering any "money judgment or judgment for possession or sale of property that is made or entered under this code, including a judgment for child, family, or spousal support." (§ 291, subd. (a).)
We found no case law, and Husband cites to none, supporting his unique interpretation of section 291. To the contrary, section 291 provides there is an unlimited time-period of enforcement for a non-support, family code judgment. Certainly, a trial court has broad discretion to consider the equities of the situation, however, the laches defense is unavailable unless the judgment is owed to the state. (Boswell, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1175-1177 [court could refuse to enforce judgment based on finding of unclean hands but not alternative theory of laches defense].) We conclude the trial court properly refused to consider Husband's laches defense but considered other equitable defenses (ultimately concluding none applied).
II. Sanctions
The court imposed $20,000 in sanctions against Husband. The ruling stated sanctions were warranted due to Husband's disrespectful conduct in court, threats to witnesses, failure to tell the truth, and causing the hearing to be "extraordinarily long." Husband maintains the record "does not adequately support [these] findings." Specifically, he challenges the evidence regarding two incidents that occurred during the hearing, and also points his finger at Wife's misconduct and lack of credibility.
Section 271 provides, "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. . . ."
"'[A] sanctions award under . . . section 271 need not "be limited to the cost to the other side resulting from the bad conduct."' [Citation.] In other words, a party requesting a . . . section 271 award is not required to show any financial need for the award or any actual injury. [Citation.] The only stricture is that the sanction may not impose an unreasonable financial burden on the party sanctioned. [Citation.] The sanction simply authorizes a penalty for obstreperous conduct. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 990-991 (Falcone).)
"'A sanctions order under . . . section 271 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Accordingly, we will overturn such an order only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.' [Citations.] '"We review any findings of fact that formed the basis for the award of sanctions under a substantial evidence standard of review."' [Citations.]" (Falcone, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 995.)
Husband fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. He asserts there was insufficient evidence that he threatened witnesses in court. Wife's motion for sanctions mentioned four separate incidents. First, Husband made a motion with his finger across his throat while Wife's brother, Moe Ghazi, was testifying. Ghazi interpreted this gesture as a threat to slit his throat. The court questioned Ghazi about the incident and admonished everyone in the courtroom to refrain from making any physical, facial, or other response during testimony. Second, Wife claimed Husband made this same gesture again to Ghazi when they were in the court's restroom. Her brother felt intimidated and, thereafter, requested a deputy be present whenever he left the courtroom. Third, Husband made the same threatening gesture to a second witness, Daniel Sadek. Fourth, Wife asserted Husband made the threatening gesture towards her and also "muttered profanity at her" while she testified. Husband asserts nobody else in the courtroom witnessed these events, and therefore, the misconduct was not "supported, evaluated, or determined to have occurred." Alternatively, he maintains the sanctions were unwarranted because such misconduct would have had no bearing on whether the case could be settled and did not change the time spent presenting evidence on matters related to the debt owed.
Husband's argument ignores the fact Ghazi and Wife supplied evidence of these incidents when they testified about the misconduct. We will not second-guess the court's credibility assessment of their testimony. After learning about the misconduct, the court gave several warnings that harassment of witnesses would not be tolerated. Certainly, intimidating witnesses is bad faith conduct that hampers "cooperation between the parties and attorneys." (§ 271.) The sanction was designed to be a penalty for such "obstreperous conduct." (Falcone, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 991.)
Moreover, Husband does not dispute any of the evidence supporting the many other reasons the court stated as justifying sanctions. Specifically, the court concluded sanctions were warranted because in addition to threatening witnesses, Husband was disrespectful in court, did not tell the truth, and admitted lying about his debts in his prior spouse's lawsuit. It cannot be said the court abused its discretion in concluding sanctions under section 271 were appropriate. The totality of Husband's reprehensible conduct frustrated the policy of promoting cooperation among litigants.
Finally, we find meritless Husband's assertion the court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions to Wife, because she was guilty of similar misconduct at the hearing. To support this assertion, Husband cites to portions of the trial court's statement of decision discussing Wife's credibility issues with respect to certain assets and documents. Husband acknowledges the court also had credibility issues with his testimony, but he notes the statement of decision lists four issues with his credibility, but seven issues with Wife's credibility. He concludes credibility flaws, unlike his demeanor issues, increased the cost of litigation because the parties were required to call additional witnesses and to carefully scrutinize the evidence. We reject this argument for several reasons.
First, no legal authority supports Husband's theory that perjury and witness intimidation are less sanctionable actions than poor credibility. Second, sanctions were imposed due to the severity of Husband's overall obstreperous conduct during the hearing, not because he lost a credibility contest. And simply counting sentences in the statement of decision is not a legally acceptable measurement regarding who was less credible overall. Third, Husband overlooks the fact it was his burden at this trial to produce proof there were payments or other offsets to the $400,000 debt he has refused to pay for many years. As the moving party, Husband's lack of compliance and egregious conduct at the hearing could reasonably be considered more significant in adding to the costs of litigation, and a greater hindrance overall, than Wife's conduct. Husband has not shown Wife's conduct compels the conclusion the sanctions award in her favor was unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
O'LEARY, P. J. WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J. THOMPSON, J.