Opinion
10-P-1530
11-09-2011
DANIEL HARRINGTON v. DOROTHY GIBSON.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Daniel Harrington, appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his complaint against Probate and Family Court Judge Dorothy Gibson and the denial of his motion to amend his complaint. Harrington sued Judge Gibson for intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment after Judge Gibson, while presiding over Harrington's divorce case, found Harrington in contempt and ordered his incarceration for ten days. Harrington also moved to amend his complaint to include additional claims against Judge Gibson and to add several other defendants. This motion was denied by a judge (motion judge) other than the one who dismissed the complaint.
Harrington filed his original complaint on October 7, 2009. On January 27, 2010, upon order of the court, Harrington filed a first amended complaint. He then filed the motion at issue here to further amend the complaint. Our reference to the complaint in this memorandum and order is to the January 27, 2010, first amended complaint.
The complaint also includes claims for injunctive relief, abuse of process, and violation of Massachusetts and Federal civil rights laws.
Harrington sought to add as defendants Judge Gibson's husband, Judge Gibson's attorney, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, the Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police, and two State troopers who, Harrington claims, came to his office to deliver a message from Judge Gibson in 'an intimidating and threatening tone.'
On appeal, Harrington claims that (1) dismissal was improper under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974); (2) Judge Gibson is unprotected by judicial immunity because she lacked jurisdiction to incarcerate Harrington or to publish confidential documents related to his case; and (3) it was error for the motion judge to deny his motion to amend because Judge Gibson and the other defendants he sought to add were not protected by judicial immunity. We affirm.
Judicial immunity. The Superior Court judge ruled that the doctrine of judicial immunity required her to grant Judge Gibson's motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 'It is a basic principle of our common law, 'too well settled to require discussion, that every judge, whether of a higher or lower court, is exempt from liability to an action for any judgment or decision rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in him by law." Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 418 Mass. 760, 766-767 (1994), quoting from Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187, 189-190 (1935). This court has already ruled that Judge Gibson was acting within her powers when she found Harrington in civil contempt for violation of a sanctions order. Harrington v. Logan, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (2011).
Judge Gibson's finding of contempt and her publication of confidential documents were actions taken in the exercise of her jurisdiction as a judge. As such, she is exempt from liability and the matter against her was properly dismissed.
Denial of motion to amend. Harrington also claims that his motion to amend the complaint to add additional claims against Judge Gibson and to include claims against six other defendants was improperly denied. We disagree.
'The decision to grant a motion to amend a complaint, while generally ' freely given when justice so requires,' Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(a), 365 Mass. 761 (1974), lies within the broad discretion of a trial judge.' Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 864 (1991). 'Good reasons for denying such a motion include 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc." Kennie v. Natural Resource Dept. of Dennis, 451 Mass. 754, 766 (2008), quoting from Castellucci v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 372 Mass. 288, 290 (1977).
Here, Harrington's proposed amendments failed to make any cognizable claims on which relief could be granted. Even if we assume, as we must, that everything Harrington alleged in his motion to amend the complaint was true, Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), a cause of action was still not made out. '[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle [ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Ibid., quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Harrington's proposed amended complaint did not specify any legally redressable misconduct by the defendants sought to be added. Consequently, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the proposed amendments to the complaint.
We note that Harrington, to his detriment, has failed to include the complete transcript of the hearing before the motion judge. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 419 Mass. 366, 371 (1995).
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For these reasons as well as for substantially those in the brief of Judge Gibson, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rapoza, C.J., Grasso & Kantrowitz, JJ.),