The parties agree that the rational basis test applies in determining the constitutionality of the classification since neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved. ( Harrington v. City of Chicago (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 137, 139.) "Under that test, the court determines whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."

Since no fundamental right or suspect class is involved here, our standard of review is the rational basis test. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); McNeal v. Police and Firefighters' Retirement Relief Board, 488 A.2d 931, 935 n. 4 (D.C. 1985); Harrington v. City of Chicago, 116 Ill. App.3d 137, 139, 452 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1983). "If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.

( Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill.2d 116, 122, 412 N.E.2d 151; Hoskins v. Walker (1974), 57 Ill.2d 503, 508, 315 N.E.2d 25; Szczurek v. City of Park Ridge (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 649, 657, 422 N.E.2d 907.) Where no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the classification "need have only a rational relationship to a legitimate State purpose to be upheld." People v. Gurell (1983), 98 Ill.2d 194, 204, 456 N.E.2d 18; Harrington v. City of Chicago (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 137, 139, 452 N.E.2d 26. No fundamental right to garbage collection exists ( Goldstein v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 1974), 504 F.2d 989, 991), and mobile home park owners are not among the "suspect" classes recognized by the courts.

( New Orleans v. Dukes (1976), 427 U.S. 297, 49 L.Ed.2d 511, 96 S.Ct. 2513; Panchinsin v. Enterprise Cos. (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 441, 453 N.E.2d 797.) If a reviewing court can discern any reasonable basis for the legislative classification, the statute should be upheld. Harrington v. City of Chicago (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 137, 452 N.E.2d 26. • 6 In the case at bar, we find that the classification of those persons licensed prior to September 20, 1977, is rationally related to the State's objective of protecting the public's health, safety and welfare and ensuring that those who are licensed under the Act demonstrate minimal competence in the field.

The legislature may well have enacted the disparate interest rates in order to somewhat lessen the burden on the taxpayers who ultimately pay for judgments rendered against governmental entities." Harrington v. City of Chicago (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 137, 139, 452 N.E.2d 26.) See also Waukegan Port District v. Kyritsis (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 751, 471 N.E.2d 217; Estate of Ahmed v. County of Cook (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 719.

In imposing a lower rate of judgment interest on governmental bodies than on other entities, the legislature rationally may have intended to lessen the burden on taxpayers who ultimately pay for judgments rendered against governmental entities. Harrington v. City of Chicago (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 137, 139, 452 N.E.2d 26. In the instant case, the judgment debtor, Cook County, a unit of local government, owed interest on the judgment at 6%.

One may question whether the legislature struck a proper balance between the tax saving resulting from a lesser rate ofjudgment interest and the burden imposed on the individual judgment creditor who is obliged to collect less on his judgment simply because he was injured by a governmental entity, but such is not the court's task." Harrington v. City of Chicago (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 137, 139, 452 N.E.2d 26, 28. For the reasons stated, the determination that an interest rate in excess of the statutory rate be awarded defendants is reversed, and this cause is remanded for application of the rate specified by statute.