Opinion
No. 05-15-00133-CR
03-07-2016
HENRY DOUGLAS HARRELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2014-1-1145
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Richter
Opinion by Justice Lang
The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, Assigned --------
Following a plea of not guilty, appellant Henry Douglas Harrell was found guilty by a jury of driving while intoxicated ("DWI"). Punishment was assessed by the trial court at 150 days' confinement.
In two issues on appeal, appellant contends (1) "[t]he trial court committed reversible error and Appellant's constitutional rights under the constitutions of the United States and the State of Texas were violated when the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict despite the evidence being insufficient to establish the corpus delicti" and (2) "[t]he evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient—absent Appellant's uncorroborated extra-judicial statements—to prove that Appellant committed the offense of [DWI] because the State failed to prove that Appellant operated a motor vehicle."
We decide appellant's two issues against him. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Deputy Dusty Wainscott testified at trial that he is a patrol deputy with the Grayson County Sheriff's Office. At approximately 9:50 p.m. on December 24, 2013, he was dispatched to a location on Highway 377 in Collinsville. According to Wainscott, when he arrived at that location, he observed a Chevy Blazer that was "stuck in a ditch." There were no occupants inside the vehicle. Appellant and a woman were present at the scene. Wainscott testified he asked appellant "what was going on." Wainscott stated (1) appellant "acknowledge[d]" to him that he "had been operating a motor vehicle in that public roadway" and (2) he observed "indicators" that appellant "had been drinking that night," including slurred speech, "glassy bloodshot eyes," and the odor of an alcoholic beverage on appellant's breath. Further, according to Wainscott, appellant told him (1) "he had been in an argument" with a female passenger and (2) the argument took place while he was operating the vehicle and resulted in him and the woman "struggling over" a cigarette lighter "while they were driving."
Wainscott testified appellant told him he had consumed two alcoholic drinks approximately four to five hours earlier. Wainscott administered three standardized field sobriety tests to appellant: (1) the "horizontal gaze nystagmus" ("HGN"), (2) the "walk-and-turn," and (3) the "one-leg stand." Wainscott stated he observed "six out of six possible clues" on the HGN test, "six out of eight" possible clues on the walk-and-turn test, and "three out of the four" possible clues on the one-leg stand test. Based on those results, Wainscott believed appellant "did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties" due to "the introduction of alcohol or drugs or the combination thereof." He placed appellant under arrest for DWI. Additionally, Wainscott testified (1) appellant consented to have his blood drawn for alcohol testing and (2) he transported appellant to a nearby hospital for that blood draw.
The jury was shown a video recording of Wainscott performing the standardized field sobriety tests at the scene described above. During the showing of the video, the recording was paused at one point by counsel for the State and Wainscott testified in part as follows:
Q. This vehicle here in the ditch, is that the defendant's vehicle?
A. Yes.
. . . .
Q. Did the defendant indicate at some point that he was attempting to turn around?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he tell you the reason why he was turning around?
A. To go back to the store.
Q. Did he tell you why he was going back to the store?
A. Cigarettes or a lighter, I believe.
. . . .
Q. Is there anything odd to you about where his vehicle is if he's just going to be making a U-turn?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you explain.
A. Normally when somebody makes a U-turn they use maybe both shoulders and use the roadway to turn around rather than that far off into the ditch.
Andrew Macey testified he is the drug section supervisor at the Texas Department of Public Safety Garland Crime Laboratory. According to Macey, (1) appellant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the blood draw on the night in question was "0.049 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood" and (2) he could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's blood alcohol content was "at the legal limit of .08 or above" at "the time of driving."
After the State rested its case, appellant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that "the State has failed to prove that the defendant was operating the motor vehicle." Specifically, counsel for appellant argued in part as follows:
[T]he corpus delicti of [DWI] is that someone drove or operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. . . . [P]roof of the corpus delicti of an offense may not be made by an extrajudicial confession alone, it has to be made using corroborating evidence, but that doesn't have to be that corroborating evidence alone. However, it cannot be solely the extrajudicial confession. It has to be the extrajudicial confession plus something else. Here we don't have that. We have solely the statement that [appellant] made that he was driving. The officer didn't find him in the driver's seat. There was no evidence that the vehicle was operated by him. There was evidence that other people were there that could have been driving. And so we don't have anything to corroborate his statement.
The trial court denied appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Following appellant's presentation of testimony, the trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict of guilty and assessed punishment as described above. This appeal timely followed.
II. APPELLANT'S ISSUES
A. Standard of Review
A complaint about the denial of a motion for directed verdict is treated the same as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., Sneed v. State, No. 05-12-01061-CR, 2014 WL 5477386, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 30, 2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Evidence is legally sufficient when, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard accounts for the fact-finder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007))
B. Applicable Law
The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidentiary sufficiency applicable to an extrajudicial confession by the defendant. Miller v. State, 457 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); accord Hermes v. State, No. 05-14-01066-CR, 2015 WL 3416212, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 28, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Under the rule, "[w]hen the burden of proof is 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' a defendant's extrajudicial confession does not constitute legally sufficient evidence of guilt absent independent evidence of the corpus delicti." Miller, 457 S.W.3d at 924 (quoting Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). The purpose of the rule is to ensure "that a person would not be convicted based solely on his own false confession to a crime that never occurred." Id.
To satisfy the corpus delicti rule, there must be "evidence independent of a defendant's extrajudicial confession show[ing] that the 'essential nature' of the charged crime was committed by someone." Hermes, 2015 WL 3416212, at *3 (quoting Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 866). "This other evidence need not be sufficient by itself to prove the offense: 'all that is required is that there be some evidence which renders the commission of the offense more probable than it would be without the evidence.'" Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "[I]t satisfies the corpus delicti rule if some evidence exists outside of the extra-judicial confession which, considered alone or in connection with the confession, shows that the crime actually occurred." Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
"The corpus delicti of [DWI] is that someone drove or operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated." Layland v. State, 144 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.); accord Jacobs v. State, No. 06-03-00204-CR, 2004 WL 1116232, at *4 n.1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 20, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); cf. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2015) ("[a] person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place").
C. Application of Law to Facts
We address appellant's two issues together. Appellant contends in his first issue that the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights when it denied his motion for directed verdict despite the evidence being insufficient to establish the corpus delicti. Specifically, according to appellant, "[b]ecause the State wholly failed to offer any corroborating evidence that proved, tended to prove, or offered support for the extra-judicial confession, said confession cannot constitutionally be used against Appellant." In his second issue, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to "prove to a rational trier of fact that [he] committed the offense of [DWI]" because, other than his "uncorroborated extra-judicial statements," the State failed to offer any evidence that he "was driving the car at the time it became disabled."
The State responds in part (1) "[t]he evidence in this case contains circumstantial evidence and a confession from the appellant that the appellant was the driver of the motor vehicle in the ditch and that the appellant was intoxicated when driving that motor vehicle" and (2) "[t]his evidence corroborates the appellant's confession and supports the guilty verdict."
In support of his argument, appellant relies in part on Coleman v. State, 704 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd), which he argues involved "virtually identical facts." In Coleman, when officers arrived on the scene of a traffic accident, they "observed three or four people standing near two stationary automobiles." Id. at 511. Coleman told an officer that he had been driving the rear vehicle at the time of the accident and had run into the vehicle in front of him. Id. During questioning, it was determined that Coleman had another person in the car with him. Id. Coleman was placed under arrest for DWI. Id. At trial, neither Coleman nor the passenger testified. Id. Following his conviction, Coleman argued in the appellate court that there was no evidence, other than his own extrajudicial confession, to show he was driving the vehicle. Id. at 512. The court of appeals agreed. Id. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and a judgment of acquittal was rendered. Id.
Despite the alleged similarities between the facts of Coleman and this case, we cannot agree with appellant that Coleman is persuasive. More than twenty years after Coleman, this Court considered—and rejected—its applicability as authority in a case in which a DWI defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See Feinberg v. State, No. 05-06-01367-CR, 2007 WL 4111939, at *3 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 20, 2007, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Specifically, this Court stated,
In support of his position, appellant cites cases in which defendants were charged with [DWI] although there was no direct evidence the defendants were driving the vehicles at the time they were intoxicated. See Ballard v. State, 757 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd); Reddie v. State, 736 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, pet. ref'd); Coleman v. State, 704 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd). While these cases deal with similar fact situations, the standard of review applied to those cases was the "reasonable hypothesis" analysis, where all other reasonable hypotheses in circumstantial evidence cases had to be ruled out to sustain a conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overruled this standard in Geesa v. State and held that the same type of legal sufficiency analysis applied to cases proved by circumstantial evidence as those proved by direct evidence. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Because we are no longer required to rule out reasonable hypotheses, these cases are not applicable to this case.Id.; see also Boulch v. State, No. 03-06-00469-CR, 2007 WL 1295826, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 2, 2007, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that Coleman "must be read in light of the abandonment of the 'alternative hypothesis' construct"); Jacobs v. State, No. 06-03-00204-CR, 2004 WL 1116232, at *4 n.1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 20, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that Coleman "may have limited precedential value in light of Geesa").
Further, the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth recently concluded testimony by an officer respecting his observations at the scene was sufficient to corroborate an extrajudicial confession. See Arocha v. State, No. 02-14-00042-CR, 2014 WL 6997405, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Arocha, a police officer arrived at the scene of a two-car accident. Id. at *1. He saw "a car blocking a lane, another car parked on the side of the road, tire marks going across a median, and a bunch of debris in the roadway." Id. He concluded that the car blocking the road had been rear-ended. Id. The driver of that car was "in and out of consciousness." Id. While the officer was investigating the accident, Arocha and another man approached him. Id. Arocha described the events causing the accident and admitted that he had been driving one of the crashed cars. Id. Specifically, he said that the other car had "pulled out in front of him[,] and he didn't have time to stop." Id. Arocha pointed to the truck that he said he had driven. Id. After conducting standard field sobriety tests, the officer arrested Arocha for DWI. Id.
Following his conviction, Arocha appealed. Id. He argued the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict because, "other than his extrajudicial statements, the State did not present any evidence tending to establish that he operated a motor vehicle." Id. at *2. The court of appeals disagreed with Arocha and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id. at *4. Specifically, the court of appeals stated in part (1) "appellant gave details about how the crash occurred that [the officer's] independent observations confirmed" and (2) "[t]he driver of an automobile involved in a wreck would tend to be able to relay accurate information about the wreck, so the link of [the officer's] independent conclusions about how the wreck occurred to appellant's statements about the wreck produce a greater likelihood that appellant drove the truck that was still at the scene." Id. at *3-4. Additionally, the court stated, "We decline to hold that the evidence is insufficient in this case only because it lacks particular corroborating facts present in other cases." Id. at *4.
In the case before us, Wainscott testified that when he arrived at the scene in question, he observed a Chevy Blazer that was "stuck in a ditch." According to Wainscott, appellant told him (1) "he had been in an argument" with a female passenger; (2) the argument took place while he was operating the vehicle and resulted in him and the woman "struggling over" a cigarette lighter "while they were driving"; and (3) he was attempting to turn around "[t]o go back to the store" for cigarettes or a lighter. Additionally, Wainscott identified the vehicle in question and its location in a ditch on the video recording played for the jury and testified that "normally" a U-turn can be made on the roadway. On this record, we conclude the evidence "at least add[s] some probability that [appellant] was driving." Id. at *3; see Rocha, 16 S.W.3d at 4 ("all that is required is that there be some evidence which renders the commission of the offense more probable than it would be without the evidence"). Accordingly, we conclude the corpus delicti rule was satisfied and the trial court therefore did not err by denying appellant's motion for directed verdict. Additionally, based on that conclusion and the nature of appellant's complaint in his second issue, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's DWI conviction.
We decide appellant's two issues against him.
III. CONCLUSION
We decide against appellant on his two issues. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
/Douglas S. Lang/
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
150133F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2014-1-1145.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices Brown and Richter participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 7th day of March, 2016.