No. 14-07-00422-CR
Opinion filed October 23, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 178th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1070541.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, SEYMORE, and BOYCE.
WILLIAM J. BOYCE, Justice.
Appellant, Alan Julian Harper, challenges his conviction following a bench trial for causing serious bodily injury to a child with the use of a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed punishment as confinement for 65 years. Appellant contends that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that appellant caused serious bodily injury to complainant's chest and abdomen; (2) the evidence was factually insufficient to establish that appellant was guilty of injury to a child; (3) the trial court denied his constitutional right to present a defense; and (4) the trial court erred in excluding a videotaped statement of the complainant's mother. We affirm.
Background
Complainant was the two-year-old son of C'Neshia Traylor. Traylor also had two other children, a son who was five years old at the time of complainant's injury and a daughter who was one year old. Traylor and her three children lived with Traylor's mother, Cecelia Traylor Boudreaux. Traylor and her children moved out of Boudreaux's home and into appellant's Houston residence in February 2004. Appellant and Traylor had known each other for about eight years and had begun dating in August 2003. They married on March 28, 2004. While Traylor resided with him, appellant typically cared for Traylor's three children during the day while Traylor was at work. On April 3, 2004, complainant spent part of the day with Boudreaux. Boudreaux testified that complainant did not appear to have any injuries on that date. On April 4, 2004, complainant received an arm injury while he was in appellant's care at appellant's residence. Traylor bandaged complainant's arm and asked appellant about the injury. Appellant said that complainant probably injured himself somewhere around the house, but offered no further explanation. On April 5, 2004, Traylor gave complainant medicine for what she believed to be a chest cold. Complainant had no appetite and appeared to have a fever. About 11:00 p.m., Boudreaux picked up complainant and his brother to spend the night at her home. Boudreaux asked complainant about his arm injury but he would not tell her how he had been injured. Boudreaux also noticed complainant's fever. Complainant slept on Boudreaux's sofa with her. Complainant was restless and did not sleep well that night. Complainant still had a fever and refused to eat anything on the morning of April 6, 2004. Boudreaux took complainant's brother to school and returned complainant to appellant's residence. Traylor had left for work already and appellant was the only adult at the residence. Complainant began crying and screaming as Boudreaux dropped him off with appellant. It was not unusual for complainant to act this way when Boudreaux returned him to appellant. When Traylor returned home from work the afternoon of April 6, 2004, complainant and his siblings were together in their bedroom and complainant was lying on the floor in front of the television. Traylor told police she was not sure if complainant's eyes were open or closed at the time. Traylor testified at trial that complainant's eyes were closed; she thought he was sleeping and did not wish to disturb him. Shortly after Traylor got home from work, appellant left the residence for 20 or 30 minutes to get cigarettes and marijuana. Upon appellant's return to the residence, he and Traylor watched television and talked. Traylor eventually asked appellant to gather the children for dinner. Appellant testified that he went to the children's room and attempted to wake complainant, who was limp and unresponsive. Appellant yelled for Traylor to come quickly and eventually carried complainant to her. Complainant was limp in appellant's arms and cold to the touch when Traylor checked him for a pulse. Traylor told appellant to call 9-1-1, which he did, and she then began performing CPR on complainant. Traylor continued performing CPR until emergency medical personnel arrived and took over. Emergency medical personnel noted at the scene that complainant was pale, cool to the touch, not breathing, and had no pulse. Complainant had no obvious injuries and there was no blood in the area where he was found. Emergency medical personnel were told that complainant was found unconscious and unresponsive in front of the television. These personnel restarted complainant's heart, but complainant could not breathe on his own. Complainant was transported to the hospital; Traylor and appellant followed. During this time, Traylor asked appellant what had happened to complainant. Appellant replied that nothing happened and he could not explain how complainant had been injured. Traylor testified that appellant stated, "I promise nothing happened. If something happened I would tell you. . . . I love you. You know I wouldn't do anything to hurt the kids." Complainant was comatose and brain-dead upon arriving at the hospital. Emergency room personnel noticed injuries to complainant's head that were consistent with child abuse. Hospital personnel and police questioned Traylor and appellant both together and individually about child abuse. Each denied abusing complainant. Appellant testified that Traylor told him at the hospital she had "whipped" complainant during appellant's 20-30 minute absence on April 6, 2004, but had not hurt him. Appellant testified that he withheld this information from police to keep Traylor from being arrested. Traylor testified at trial that she had no contact with complainant during appellant's absence on April 6. Traylor's other children were examined at the hospital. Traylor's oldest son had no major injuries. Traylor's daughter had a lacerated liver, a skull fracture, and a broken leg. Appellant denied causing these injuries. Appellant and Traylor were prohibited from having any further contact with complainant and told to leave the hospital. Traylor gave voluntary consent to search the family's residence. The search revealed no blood splatter and no weapons or other items police believed would have caused complainant's injuries. An autopsy determined that complainant had suffered three fractured ribs on the left rear side of his body. Some fractures showed evidence of previously healed or healing fractures. There also was hemorrhaging around many of the rib fractures. The medical examiner indicated that these fractures likely resulted from complainant being grabbed and compressed or twisted. According to the medical examiner, the type of rib fractures present were not commonly seen in children and complainant had more injuries than one would expect for a normal two-year-old. These injuries included bruises and scars on complainant's head, neck, and back. Complainant also had hemorrhaging completely around the bone on one arm, which would be consistent with someone squeezing and twisting the arm. These injuries were not the cause of complainant's death. When asked if he would characterize complainant's rib fractures as serious bodily injury, the medical examiner replied, "Not in and of themselves." The autopsy also revealed that complainant's liver had been torn nearly in two, resulting in significant internal bleeding. The medical examiner testified that bleeding from the liver injury would have caused loss of appetite and impaired the functioning of complainant's intestines. He further testified that an impact forceful enough to compress the front part of complainant's abdomen all the way to his back would be required to cause such an injury. The medical examiner testified that, based on the amount of internal bleeding, this injury occurred "probably a few hours" before complainant was brought to the hospital. This injury was not the cause of complainant's death. While acknowledging that the liver was still partially functioning, the medical examiner testified that this injury met the legal definition of "serious bodily injury." The injuries to complainant's chest and abdomen likely were too severe to be caused by improper performance of CPR. The autopsy also revealed that complainant had brain injuries, many of which were not evident from external observation. The medical examiner testified that these injuries resulted from impact from a blunt object and caused complainant's death. The medical examiner opined that some of complainant's brain injuries would have caused lethargy or disorientation, but also could have knocked him unconscious. Complainant's treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Dauser, testified that complainant's most severe head injury would have rendered him unconscious immediately. Dr. Dauser agreed with the medical examiner's assessment that impact from a blunt object caused complainant's head injuries. Dr. Dauser testified that complainant's most severe head injury required an extremely forceful hit, similar to what one would see in a serious car accident. Dr. Dauser opined that a fall would necessarily be from at least a one-story building to produce such an injury, and that the injury almost certainly occurred within 12 hours of complainant's arrival at the hospital. After the autopsy, appellant was charged in an eight-paragraph indictment with causing serious bodily injury to a child with the use of a deadly weapon. Paragraphs one and two of the indictment alleged that appellant caused blunt force trauma to complainant's head by use of a deadly weapon; paragraphs three and four alleged that appellant caused blunt force trauma to complainant's neck by use of a deadly weapon; paragraphs five and six alleged that appellant caused blunt force trauma to complainant's chest by use of a deadly weapon; and paragraphs seven and eight alleged that appellant caused blunt force trauma to complainant's abdomen by use of a deadly weapon. At the close of the State's case-in-chief during trial, appellant moved for a directed verdict on each paragraph of the indictment. The trial court granted this motion with respect to the neck injuries addressed in paragraphs three and four, and denied the motion as to the remaining paragraphs. At the conclusion of the guilt-innocence stage of the trial, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charges alleged in paragraphs one, two, five, six, seven, and eight of the indictment. Analysis
Appellant challenges legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings that appellant caused serious bodily injury to complainant's chest and abdomen. Appellant does not challenge the finding that complainant suffered serious bodily injury to his head. Appellant also challenges factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that appellant was guilty of injury to a child. Additionally, appellant challenges the exclusion of videotape evidence containing a police interview of Traylor in which she made incriminating statements against appellant. We address each challenge in turn. I. Legal Sufficiency of Evidence Establishing That Appellant Caused Serious Bodily Injury to Complainant's Chest and Abdomen.
In reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court will examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational finder of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). When reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence, the court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the fact finder. See Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (en banc). The appellate court's duty is not to reweigh the evidence, but to serve as a final due process safeguard ensuring only the rationality of the fact finder. See Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). An appellate court faced with a record of facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume _ even if not obvious from the record _ that the finder of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the State, and must defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Serious bodily injury is defined as an injury that "creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Tex. Penal Code Ann. _ 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that "protracted" loss or impairment is synonymous with injury that is continuing, lingering, long-continued, ongoing, or prolonged. See Moore v. State, 739 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987). When considering whether serious bodily injury exists, the relevant question is the extent of the injury as inflicted _ not after medical treatment has been received. Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 715 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Whether the facts in a particular case support a finding that an injury is a serious bodily injury must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Rogers v. State, Nos. 01-02-01024-CR, 01-02-01025-CR, 2004 WL 253265, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 12, 2004, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). As noted above, appellant does not challenge the trial court's finding that complainant suffered serious bodily injury to his head. If there is sufficient evidence to prove one theory of the commission of the offense charged, a reviewing court need not consider sufficiency relating to other theories. Vasquez v. State, 665 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gonzales v. State, 723 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (en banc); see also Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 551 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (en banc) (where State pleads alternative theories of same offense, it need not prove guilt under all theories alleged), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (en banc); Callis v. State, No. 14-04-01091-CR, 2006 WL 771897, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 28, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (where evidence is sufficient to prove one of two ways of committing offense, appellate court need not consider sufficiency of evidence to prove alternative theory). The unchallenged head injury is sufficient to establish that complainant suffered serious bodily injury. The medical examiner testified that complainant died from brain injuries caused by impact from a blunt object. Dr. Dauser agreed with the medical examiner's assessment, and testified that complainant's head injury was caused by an impact similar to what one would see in a serious car accident. Dr. Dauser opined that complainant's head injury would have required a fall from at least a one-story building. This evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of serious bodily injury to complainant's head. Additionally, there is legally sufficient evidence to establish that complainant suffered serious bodily injury to his abdomen. Autopsy results showed that complainant's liver was nearly torn in half and had filled his abdominal cavity with enough blood to impair the functioning of other vital organs. The force required to cause such an injury pushed the front part of complainant's abdomen all the way to his back. The medical examiner's testimony explicitly characterized complainant's abdominal injury as "serious bodily injury." Based on this testimony, a rational fact finder could have found complainant's abdominal injury to be a "serious bodily injury" beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule appellant's issue regarding legal sufficiency of the evidence. II. Factual Sufficiency of Evidence Establishing That Appellant Was Guilty of Injury to a Child
Appellant next challenges factual sufficiency of the evidence establishing that appellant was the individual who injured complainant. The record shows that the parties presented competing theories regarding the origin of complainant's injuries. The State asserted that appellant caused the injuries while complainant's mother was at work. Appellant argued that complainant's mother inflicted the injuries during appellant's 20-30 minute absence from the home on April 6, 2004. Each side presented circumstantial evidence and in-court testimony to support its respective theory. When conducting a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court must determine (1) whether the evidence introduced to support the verdict is "so weak" that the fact finder's verdict seems "clearly wrong and manifestly unjust," and (2) whether, considering conflicting evidence, the fact finder's verdict is nevertheless against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In the case of rejection of a defense by the finder of fact, an appellate court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State's evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)). In order to declare that an evidentiary conflict justifies a new trial, an appellate court must rely on some objective basis in the record that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury's verdict. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 706-07 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (citing Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417). An appellate court should not substantially intrude upon the fact finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Due deference must be given to the fact finder's determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence, and reversal of those determinations is only appropriate to prevent the occurrence of a manifest injustice. Martinez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (citing Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003)). Where there are reasonably equal competing theories of causation, it is the province of the finder of fact, not the reviewing court, to accept or reject any of those theories. See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). In cases based upon circumstantial evidence, it is not required that all facts point to a defendant's guilt; it is sufficient if the combined and cumulative force of all of the incriminating circumstances warrants the conclusion of guilt. See Courson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (citing Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (en banc)). Appellant highlights the following evidence in support of his contention that Traylor caused serious bodily injury to complainant: (1) inconsistencies between Traylor's testimony and other evidence, including her prior statements; (2) appellant's testimony that Traylor admitted "whipping" complainant while appellant was absent on April 6, 2004; (3) appellant's testimony that he attempted to awaken complainant and thought complainant was asleep when he found complainant unconscious and unresponsive; (4) appellant's testimony that he did not injure complainant and did not know how complainant got injured; (5) the absence of blood splatter or instruments that could have caused complainant's injuries in appellant's residence; (6) the inability of the State's medical experts to identify precisely what instrument(s) caused complainant's injuries or exactly when he was injured; (7) the testimony of defense witnesses tending to inculpate Traylor and exculpate appellant; and (8) Dr. Dauser's testimony that complainant's head injury likely occurred within an hour of complainant's arrival at the hospital, which could have been within the 20-30 minute window when appellant was absent. However, the record also contains ample evidence supporting a finding that appellant caused serious bodily injury to complainant: (1) the extensive nature of complainant's injuries, which entitled the fact finder to conclude that they could not have been inflicted in only 20-30 minutes; (2) appellant's status as the only adult with complainant from the time Boudreaux dropped complainant off on April 6, 2004, until Traylor returned home from work, a period of approximately eight to nine hours; (3) complainant's arm injury suffered while in appellant's care on April 4, 2004, and appellant's lack of an explanation for the injury; (4) appellant's lack of any explanation for complainant's condition on April 6, 2004, despite being solely responsible for complainant's care for eight or nine hours; (5) the brevity of the afternoon period during which complainant was left in Traylor's exclusive care; (6) appellant's admission that he had given an alias instead of his real name during a prior police investigation, thereby raising doubts about his credibility; and (7) appellant's lack of any explanation for the injuries suffered by complainant or by Traylor's daughter during the period in which appellant was the children's primary caregiver. The facts here parallel Kemmerer v. State, 113 S.W.3d 513, 515-16 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). The appellant in Kemmerer was the complainant's primary caregiver during the day and was with the complainant during nearly the entire time during which complainant could have been injured. Id. at 514-15. The State put forth medical evidence that the complainant would have become unconscious immediately after having sustained her injuries, and that those extensive injuries must have been caused by a forceful blow or severe shaking, rather than a mere fall from a sofa. Id. at 515. The court characterized this as circumstantial evidence that the appellant inflicted the complainant's injuries. Id. The appellant offered evidence that the complainant had briefly been left alone in her older brother's care before being dropped off with the appellant. Id. at 515-16. The court held that the jury was free to believe the State's evidence and discount any contrary evidence, and that such contrary evidence did not render the State's evidence factually insufficient. Id. at 516. The same conclusion applies here. Choosing between the two theories put forth in this case was within the exclusive province of the trial judge as the finder of fact. See Goodman, 66 S.W.3d at 287 (even if appellant offers plausible competing theory, fact finder may choose not to believe it). The evidence in this case is factually sufficient to justify the trial court's finding that appellant inflicted complainant's injuries. The trial court's finding is neither "clearly wrong and manifestly unjust" nor against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We overrule appellant's issue regarding factual sufficiency of the evidence. III. Constitutional Right to Present a Defense
Appellant challenges the trial court's exclusion of a videotaped statement given by Traylor to police. Appellant argues that the exclusion of this evidence violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. The trial court excluded the videotape on hearsay grounds, but did allow it to be used for impeachment purposes or to refresh Traylor's memory. After the court's evidentiary ruling, appellant chose not to use the videotape at all. Appellant's brief offers no explanation for the decision not to use the videotape for the allowed purposes. There is no constitutional right for a defendant to present all favorable evidence. Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 316 (1998)). A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to present evidence of a defense so long as that evidence is relevant and not excluded by an established evidentiary rule. Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). A defendant does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under the standard rules of evidence. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996). A criminal defendant is rarely prevented from exercising his fundamental constitutional right to present a meaningful defense by virtue of a trial court's evidentiary ruling. Ray v. State, 178 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (citing Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 663). A criminal defendant bears a heavy burden to prove that his constitutional rights have been violated by the exclusion of a particular piece of evidence. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 43. A defendant's constitutional right to present a defense is abridged only by evidentiary rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and which are arbitrary and disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Holmes v. S. Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324-25 (2006); Conerly v. State, No. 14-07-00542-CR, 2008 WL 2841678, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Evidentiary rules offend the United States Constitution only when they (1) disadvantage the defendant more severely than they do the State without any rational basis for doing so, or (2) arbitrarily exclude reliable defensive evidence without achieving a superior social benefit. Cheek v. State, 119 S.W.3d 475, 482 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.) (citing Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 208 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (en banc)). The dispute here focuses on the hearsay rule, an established evidentiary rule trial courts may invoke to exclude otherwise relevant and admissible evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 802. The rule is applied equally to the State and to the appellant, and is not arbitrary in its exclusion of defense evidence; rather, the rule exists to ensure the reliability of the statements introduced into evidence by both sides. See Green v. State, 876 S.W.2d 226 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, no pet.). Excluding as hearsay the videotaped statement complainant's mother gave to police does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Ray, 178 S.W.3d at 835-36 (exclusion of direct witness testimony supporting defense did not rise to level of constitutional violation); Sauceda v. State, 162 S.W.3d 591, 594-95 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (exclusion of sole defense witness's testimony does not violate constitutional right to present a complete defense when defendant has opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses through cross-examination); Cheek, 119 S.W.3d at 479-83 (exclusion of videotaped interview of child witness did not deprive defendant of constitutional right to defend herself). We overrule appellant's issue regarding violation of his constitutional right to present a defense. IV. Non-Constitutional Error in Exclusion of Videotaped Statement of Complainant's Mother
In addition to appellant's constitutional argument, appellant also challenges the trial court's exclusion of Traylor's videotaped statement to police on non-constitutional grounds. Appellant argues that the exclusion of this evidence constituted reversible error as a violation of his substantial rights. We review a trial court's ruling on admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Again, the dispute here focuses on hearsay grounds for exclusion. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and is inadmissible unless a statute or rule of exception applies. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d), 802. A statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). Where there is an inescapable conclusion that evidence is being offered to prove statements made out of court, one may not circumvent the hearsay rules through artful tactics designed to elicit hearsay indirectly. Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). Otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admitted to establish a declarant's then-existing state of mind or emotion. Tex. R. Evid. 803(3). Otherwise inadmissible hearsay may not be admitted to establish why the declarant had that particular state of mind or emotion. Menefee v. State, 211 S.W.3d 893, 906 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. ref'd) (statements of complainant that defendant had been partying and smoking marijuana are beyond scope of Rule 803(3)); see also Buhl v. State, 960 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, pet. ref'd) (distinguishing between statements showing mental or emotional condition of fear and such statements being offered to prove truth that complainant had pulled guns on defendant). A declarant's statement that is not limited to his state of mind, but explains the reason for or implies that state of mind, is not admissible under Rule 803(3). See Rogers v. State, 183 S.W.3d 853, 860 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, no pet.) (citing Barnum v. State, 7 S.W.3d 782, 790 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. ref'd)). A party may not use a declarant's purported mental condition to introduce evidence that events allegedly occurred or conditions allegedly existed to produce the supposed mental condition. Vann v. State, 853 S.W.2d 243, 250 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref'd) (citing Gibbs v. State, 819 S.W.2d 821, 837 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)). As already noted, the trial court excluded the videotape in question on hearsay grounds. Appellant challenges this ruling on two alternative theories: (1) the videotape was not hearsay because it was not offered to show the truth of the actual statements made therein; and (2) the videotape was admissible under Rule 803(3) to show Traylor's mother's state of mind. Appellant's stated purpose in offering the videotape was to show the circumstances in which Traylor's statements about appellant changed from being supportive of him to being accusatory and inculpative of him. Appellant's theory is that police acted improperly or suggestively during the videotaped interview in a successful effort to change Traylor's attitude toward appellant from positive to negative so that she would implicate him in the abuse of complainant. Evidence offered under a similar theory has been analyzed in terms of whether the evidence satisfies a hearsay exception. See Menefee, 211 S.W.3d at 906; Rogers, 183 S.W.3d at 860; Buhl, 960 S.W.2d at 933; Vann, 853 S.W.2d at 250. Such an analysis unavoidably starts with the proposition that the evidence at issue is hearsay in the first place. See also Cheek, 119 S.W.3d at 478 (videotaped interview of complainant's sibling conceded by defense counsel to be hearsay). Appellant analogizes to authority that it is not hearsay for a police officer to testify to events or statements which lead an investigation in a certain direction. See Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 499 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Maxwell v. State, 48 S.W.3d 196 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); McCreary v. State, 194 S.W.3d 517, 521 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 673, 675-76 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see also Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 347 (appointment book and application form with defendant's name admissible to show how defendant became a suspect, not for truth of matter asserted). Appellant reads this line of cases too broadly and his reliance on these cases is misplaced. These cases merely hold that statements offered to explain how a defendant originally became a suspect may qualify as non-hearsay when not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See Davis, 169 S.W.3d at 675. Such testimony may assist a jury's understanding of events by providing context for the actions of police. Id. at 676. Appellant attempts to extrapolate this narrow principle so that statements of the police during an interview of one criminal suspect to elicit information against a fellow suspect are not hearsay. Such an extrapolation would allow exactly the type of circumvention Schaffer warns against, and would eviscerate the hearsay rule. Schaffer, 777 S.W.2d at 114. We decline to permit such circumvention. The videotape at issue here contains hearsay. The evidence does not fit the narrow Davis exception to explain how a person originally became a suspect because both appellant and Traylor already were suspects when Traylor made the videotaped statements. Having determined that the trial court properly characterized the videotape as hearsay, we must determine if the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the videotape was inadmissible under Rule 803(3). We hold that it did not. A criminal defendant may not use Rule 803(3) to introduce hearsay evidence purporting to show the reason why a declarant possessed a particular state of mind or emotion. See Menefee, 211 S.W.3d at 906; Rogers, 183 S.W.3d at 860; Buhl, 960 S.W.2d at 933; Vann, 853 S.W.2d at 250. Additionally, we are to disregard non-constitutional errors that do not affect substantial rights. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Such rights are affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). In determining harm, we must consider the entire record. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). The record in this case reflects that (1) appellant was permitted to use the videotape in question for purposes of impeachment and of refreshing recollection; (2) appellant chose not to use the videotape for any purpose; and (3) defense counsel extensively cross-examined Traylor about the videotaped interview in question. As previously noted, appellant offers no explanation for the conscious decision not to use the videotape for any of the permitted purposes. Also, appellant cites no specific information from the videotape that he was unable to elicit through vigorous cross-examination of Traylor _ which he did pursue _ or by subpoenaing the testimony of the questioning officer _ which he did not pursue. Under the circumstances of this case, even if appellant had proven error by the trial court in excluding the videotape, such error would have been harmless. See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271; see also Sauceda, 162 S.W.3d at 597-98. We overrule appellant's issue regarding exclusion of the videotaped statement of complainant's mother as violative of appellant's substantial rights. Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.