Finally, because questions should be confined to those designed to elicit possible prejudice against the accused or juror bias or interest in the outcome, the court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in disallowing the remaining disputed questions. White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 337 (5) (a) ( 196 S.E.2d 849) (1973); Harper v. State, 222 Ga. App. 393, 393-394 ( 474 S.E.2d 288) (1996).Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713 (3) ( 285 S.E.2d 687) (1982);Harper, supra, 222 Ga. App. at 394; Smith v. State, 148 Ga. App. 1 (1) ( 251 S.E.2d 13) (1978).
[Cits.]" Harper v. State, 222 Ga. App. 393, ( 474 S.E.2d 288) (1996). We have reviewed the questions about which appellant complains and find that each of them properly explored "any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action," domestic violence, including "any opinion as to which party ought to prevail."
See, e.g., State v. Cere, 125 N.H. 421, 480 A.2d 195 (1984); People v. Zehr, 103 Ill.2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984); State v. Lumumba, 253 N.J. Super 375, 601 A.2d 1178 (1992); Jones v. State, 378 So.2d 797 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973). Other courts have reached the same conclusion as Maryland See, e.g., Harper v. State, 222 Ga. App. 393, 394, 474 S.E.2d 288, 289 (1996); State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 602-03, 512 A.2d 906, 915 (1986); United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 519-20 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Robinson, 804 F.2d 280, 281 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Miller, 758 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994, 106 S.Ct. 406, 88 L.Ed.2d 357 (1985). In any event, it is up to the Court of Appeals, not this Court, to decide, as appellant suggests, that the reasoning of Twining is "now outmoded."