Opinion
No. 274, 2010.
Submitted: November 12, 2010.
Decided: February 4, 2011.
Court Below — Family Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, File No. CK01-04747, Pet. No. 09-33990.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 4th day of February 2011, it appears to the Court that:
(1) After a hearing on March 24, 2010 at which both the appellant, Robert Harper ("Father"), and the appellee, Jennifer Carr-Wilson ("Mother") appeared pro se, the Family Court granted Mother's petition to modify visitation. On March 30, 2010, Father filed a timely motion for reargument.
(2) By order dated April 12, 2010, the Family Court denied Father's motion for reargument, ruling as follows:
Motion [for reargument] is [d]enied. Motion is not for restating arguments which were made or could have been made during the hearing. [Father] was given the same Saturday visitation he had previously enjoyed. It appears that is all he is asking in this Motion. To allow the child to go back home at 6 p.m. Saturday allows the child to routinely participate in the child's Sunday activities as before.
(3) Father filed an appeal from the Family Court's April 12, 2010 and March 24, 2010 orders. Father's opening brief, filed on August 10, 2010, consists of a one-page letter stating that he is not in agreement with the change in visitation. Mother did not file an answering brief. On September 30, 2010, the parties were notified that the appeal would be considered on the basis of the appellant's opening brief and the Family Court record.
(4) We recognize that some degree of leniency should be granted for pro se appeals. At a minimum, however, an appellant's opening brief must be adequate so that the Court may conduct a meaningful review of the merits of the appellant's claim.
See, e.g., Gunzl v. R K Motors Machine Shop, 2004 WL 1058367 (Del. Supr.) (denying motion to dismiss on the basis that the pro se opening brief, although deficient under Del. Supr. Ct. Cr. 14 and would be stricken as improper if filed by an attorney, adequately set forth substantive arguments to permit this Court to conduct a meaningful review of the merits of the appellant's claims on appeal).
Id.
(5) In this case, Father does not point to any particular error in the Family Court's decision nor does he cite any legal authority. Construing the opening brief broadly, Father's argument appears to be that the Family Court's March 24, 2010 modification of visitation failed to uphold an aspect of a prior visitation agreement between Mother and Father.
(6) The scope of this Court's review of a Family Court judgment includes a review of both law and facts. If the Family Court correctly applied the law, we review under an abuse of discretion standard. The Family Court's factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. When the determination of facts turns on the credibility of the witnesses who testified under oath before the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial judge.
See Banks v. Ashburn, 2008 WL 420-697 (Del. Supr.) (citing Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979)).
Id. (citing Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186-87 (Del. 1991)).
Id. (citing Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983)).
Id. (citing Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979)).
(7) Upon consideration of Father's opening brief and the Family Court record, including the transcript of the hearing held on March 24, 2010, we conclude that the judgment of the Family Court should be affirmed for the reasons set forth in the bench ruling and order of March 24, 2010 and the order of April 12, 2010 denying Father's motion for reargument. There is nothing in the record supporting Father's suggestion that the Family Court erred when modifying Father's visitation.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.