Summary
concluding that "to hold that service on an employer of two garnishment notices within a period of one year in violation of a company rule to that effect, without more is a discharge for just cause in connection with work would be unreasonable and not at all what was contemplated by the Legislature in enacting Section 4141.29, Revised Code."
Summary of this case from TALLEY v. COE MFG. CO.Opinion
No. A-215650
Decided July 27, 1967.
Unemployment compensation — Not available if employee discharged for just cause — Discharge for breach of company rule — Rule must be fair and administered fairly — Garnishment.
1. Section 4141.29 (D) (2) (a), Revised Code, denies unemployment compensation benefits to an employee who "has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work."
2. If an employer wishes to discharge an employee for a breach of employer's rules and expects to claim the discharge is "for just cause in connection with the employee's work," such rules must be fair and they must be administered fairly.
3. If an employee is to be discharged because of garnishments and is to be deprived of unemployment benefits on the ground that the discharge was for just cause, the employer must fairly consider whether the garnishments were justified and were due to irresponsibility on the part of the employee.
4. Service on an employer of two garnishment notices within a period of one year in violation of an employer's rule to that effect, without more, is not a discharge for just cause.
Mr. Arthur G. Zoecklein, for appellant.
Mr. Arthur J. Reid, Jr., for appellees.
Mr. Robert F. Mitchell, for The Kroger Company.
This matter is before the court on an appeal from the decision of the Board of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. The matter turns on a correct interpretation of Section 4141.29(D) (2) (a), Revised Code, which denies unemployment compensation benefits to an employee who "has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work."
The facts are that appellant, Alma F. Harp, was employed by The Kroger Company for more than nine years. On March 29, 1965, Kroger received a notice of garnishment of Mrs. Harp's wages by Public Finance Company. On September 13, 1965, Kroger received notice of a garnishment by Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company. Mrs. Harp was forthwith discharged pursuant to a company rule that any employee who received two garnishments within one year would be subject to discharge. According to the testimony of the company representative, Mrs. Harp obtained a release of both of these garnishments and there was no other reason for discharging her.
Mrs. Harp testified relative to the garnishment by Public Finance that she had made the required payment but the company had neglected to advise its attorney. As to the garnishment by the Gas and Electric Company, she testified that the bill was the result of her husband permitting another man to obtain gas and electricity in his name. No testimony contradicting these statements by Mrs. Harp was introduced and it was apparent from the record that no effort was made by the company to determine the veracity of Mrs. Harp's statements. Mrs. Harp testified that she knew about the "two garnishment rule," and had been warned but was under the impression that the first garnishment notice did not count as it was promptly released.
The referee ruled:
"This claimant was aware of the company policy concerning garnishments, and her failure to keep her affairs in order resulted in the garnishments. Prior decisions have held that a discharge because of garnishments in violation of an established company policy, which is universally enforced and which is a reasonable policy, is a discharge for just cause in connection with work."
Claimant's application to institute a further appeal was disallowed by the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and appeal to this court was duly made.
In considering any case of this type one must bear in mind certain underlying factors:
(1) The issue is not the employer's right to discharge an employee. Barring contractual rights, employers have a right to discharge employees for any reason or for no reason at any time.
(2) Section 4141.46, Revised Code, provides that the Unemployment Compensation Act "shall be liberally construed." This means that the Act, being a remedial statute, is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons to be benefited. The philosophy of the Act was and is that the public welfare will be served if employers generally contribute to a fund to provide minimum subsistence for an employee temporarily without work where his nonemployment is not due to culpability on his own part.
(3) Under Ohio law wages can be attached at the time of filing suit where the claim is alleged to be one for necessaries. Cognovit notes are lawful in Ohio. Credit in our society is widely extended and most widely extended to persons in the lower levels of the economic scale who are most likely to frequently change residences. As a result, in many if not the majority of cases, an employer receives a garnishment notice before the employee is even aware that a suit has been filed against him.
Bearing these factors in mind, to hold that service on an employer of two garnishment notices within a period of one year in violation of a company rule to that effect, without more, is a discharge for just cause in connection with work would be unreasonable and not at all what was contemplated by the Legislature in enacting Section 4141.29, Revised Code.
The fact that the company has a rule and that the employee violated the rule does not in and of itself make the handling of the matter just. Just means righteous, equitable and fair. In Section 4141.29, Revised Code, "just cause" means that if an impartial person examined all the facts and circumstances of the case, he would conclude that the discharge was merited.
In the case at bar we have an employee of nine years, who until 1965 had no garnishments. According to her testimony, the first garnishment against her was due to an oversight by the garnishor's attorney. The employer made no attempt to find out whether this was true or not. The second garnishment, according to the employee, was for someone else's bill. The employer discharged the employee forthwith. No attempt was made to determine the legality, propriety or fairness of either of these garnishments. Furthermore, both garnishments were released so that the employer's only inconvenience was temporarily holding its employee's checks. On these facts, would any impartial arbiter say that the discharge was merited; that Mrs. Harp's discharge was just and fair? Obviously not.
In Chester v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (1959), 82 Ohio Law Abs. 182, 11 O. O. 2d 359, the court set out the principle involved as follows:
"Where there is no deliberate violation of the employer's rule, no willful disregard of the employer's interest, and no suggestion of unsuitability for the work performed, the claimant should be allowed unemployment benefits."
This same principle was applied in Chalker v. First Federal Savings Loan (1955), 71 Ohio Law Abs. 87.
If an employer wishes to discharge an employee for a breach of company rules and expects to claim the discharge is "for just cause in connection with the employee's work," such rules must be fair and they must be administered fairly. If the employee is to be discharged because of garnishments and the employee is to be deprived of the benefits of the Unemployment Compensation Act on the ground that the discharge was for just cause in connection with his work, the employer must fairly consider whether the garnishments were justified and were due to irresponsibility on the part of the employee.
The decision of the Board of Review in this matter is unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence and must be reversed.
Decision reversed.