HARO v. HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL

Full title: ANA MARIA HARO v. HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL, et al

Court: United States District Court, D. Maryland

Date published: Dec 21, 2004

Civil Action No. DKC 2003-3558 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. DKC 2003-3558.

December 21, 2004

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH CHASANOW, District Judge

On October 28, 2004, in response to the motion for judgment on the pleadings or to stay this action filed by Defendants, this court directed Plaintiff Ana Maria Haro to show cause why this court should not dismiss her real estate loan complaint against Defendants Household International, Inc. and Household Finance (collectively "Household") "without prejudice to the right of Plaintiff to pursue her claim in the Northern District of California." Paper no. 29, at 4. That court currently exercises jurisdiction over a related consolidated action and members of its settlement class. In re Household Lending Litig., No. C 02-1240 CW (N.D.Cal. 2004), Final Approval Order, at ¶ 2. That court "retains continuing jurisdiction to implement the Settlement and to construe, enforce and administer the Settlement Agreement and the Settlement." Id. at ¶ 15. It is not disputed that Plaintiff is a member of the settlement class. Defendants contend Plaintiff did not timely exercise her opportunity to opt out of the class. Plaintiff asserts she did not receive adequate notice of the opt out mechanism and should therefore be allowed to opt out now.

In the Order to Show Cause, this court cited with approval another court, which stated, under analogous circumstances:

Assuredly, the California Court rather than this Court is the proper forum for determining whether parties like [Plaintiff] received proper notice and were therefore bound by the settlement. It would make no sense for the California court to retain jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own judgment but permit another court to construe what it meant in that judgment.

Magnolia v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 157 F.Supp.2d 583, 587 (D.Md. 2001) (citing Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 545 (9^th Cir. 1998)).

Nothing in Plaintiff's response to this court's Order to Show Cause demonstrates that dismissal is inappropriate. Plaintiff's argument that her case is distinguishable from Magnolia because she filed her suit before, rather than after, final settlement approval, is unavailing. None of the California court's language asserting jurisdiction is limited to cases not yet underway. Moreover, the Final Approval Order specifically contemplates related suits already in progress, and states that "all Released Claims, as described in the Settlement Agreement, currently being asserted by any Settlement Class Member in any forum are permanently stayed. . . ." Final Approval Order, at ¶ 8. Whether Plaintiff filed her complaint before or after final settlement of the class action is therefore immaterial.

Plaintiff also argues that "the expense of pursuing Plaintiff's claim in [California] would cause Plaintiff an insurmountable expense and inconvenience. . . ." Paper no. 30, at 2. The court's decision today, however, does not rest on law that allows the court to weigh convenience to the parties against another court's assertion of jurisdiction. The California court's jurisdiction in this matter is exclusive, despite the absence of that word in the Final Approval Order. As explained in Flanigan:

The Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have ruled upon similar language that did not include the word "exclusive," and have held that the language amounted to retention of exclusive jurisdiction to enforce a judgment. United States v. American Soc'y of Composers (In re Karmen), 32 F.3d 727, 731-32 (2nd Cir. 1994); United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, 442 F.2d 601, 603 (2^nd Cir. 1971); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 880-81 (11th Cir. 1989). The reason why exclusivity is inferred is that it would make no sense for the district court to retain jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own judgment to the future conduct contemplated by the judgment, yet have [another] court construing what the federal court meant in the judgment. Such an arrangement would potentially frustrate the federal district court's purpose. See American Soc'y of Composers, 32 F.3d at 731-32.

143 F.3d at 545 (denying concurrent jurisdiction to state court). Therefore, as the Magnolia court explained, "[s]ince jurisdiction was retained by the California court as to all matters relating to the administration and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, it is the California court which should determine whether [Plaintiff] received proper notice. . . ." 157 F.Supp.2d at 587.

Furthermore, even if this court were to attempt to retain jurisdiction, Defendants have obvious recourse in the Northern District of California, because the Final Approval Order also states that "[u]pon notice to Class Counsel, Defendants may seek from this Court . . . such further orders or process as may be necessary to prevent or forestall the assertion of any of the Released Claims in any other forum, or as may be necessary to protect and effectuate the Settlement. . . ." Final Approval Order, at ¶ 15.

For these reasons, Defendants' motion will be granted in part and the case will be dismissed without prejudice to the right of Plaintiff to pursue her claim in the Northern District of California. A separate Order will follow.