1998). Citing Brimhall v. Home Ins. Co., 694 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. 1985), and Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, 815 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. App. 1991), the defendants contend that any injuries suffered by the plaintiff did not arise out of her employment since they resulted from conduct that was purely personal between the plaintiff and her supervisor. In Brimhall, the plaintiff, an auto mechanic, witnessed a co-worker appropriating a substantial amount of hand cleaner from the plaintiff's personal container.

Id. Generally, when an employee is injured at work, his sole remedy against the employer is to file a complaint under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law. Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519, 524 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991). "Our Worker's Compensation Law generally is the sole tort remedy available to a worker who is injured in a fashion that falls within the broad scope of the Workers' compensation statute."

Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). The term "injury" is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-102 as "an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. . . ." Courts have broadly construed the definition "beyond the limited language contained in the statute" "in keeping with the liberal construction accorded the Worker's Compensation statute."Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) For example, Tennessee courts have held that workers' compensation covers emotional injuries, including those which result from non-physical trauma.

Put another way, "the injury must have substantially originated from the `time and space' of work, resulting in an injury directly linked to the work environment or work-related activities." Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, 815 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991) (citation omitted). Thus, the course of employment requirement focuses on the time, place and circumstances of the injury. Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997).

Put another way, "the injury must have substantially originated from the `time and space' of work, resulting in an injury directly linked to the work environment or work-related activities." Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, 815 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991). Accordingly, the course of employment requirement focuses on the "time, place and circumstances" of the injury. Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997).

Statutes are to be construed with reference to pre-existing law and should not be interpreted to change it further than the express terms or the necessary implications. Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991). Here, the plain language of section 33-7-303 establishes the standard by which a person acquitted based on his or her insanity may be compelled to participate in a mandatory outpatient treatment program.

1997) ("Worker's Compensation Act must be liberally construed and any reasonable doubt as to whether an injury was caused by work, must be resolved in favor of the employee."); Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991) ("In keeping with the liberal construction accorded the Worker's Compensation statute, the term `accident arising out of and in the course of employment' has been construed by our courts beyond the limited language contained in the statute."). Therefore, a worker's compensation definition of premises would seem to encompass more territory than would a definition based upon general tort liability.

Such a rule reflects Tennessee's policy that "sexual harassment [and associated claims] should not and cannot be recognized as a risk inherent in any work environment." Vanover v. White , No. 3:07-CV-15, 2008 WL 2713711, at *16 (E.D. Tenn. July 10, 2008) (quoting Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ) (emphasis added). Although sexual harassment may, as a factual matter, be common or even "endemic," Tennessee courts have rejected the premise that it presents an "inherent or necessary risk of employment" of the type contemplated by workers' compensation law.

See Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102. Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Continental Ins. Co. v. Dowdy, 560 S.W. 2d 619, 621 (Tenn. 1978).

In other words, "sexual harassment [and associated claims] should not and cannot be recognized as a `risk' inherent in any work environment" and, thus, does not meet the first prong of the test. Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991) (citation omitted). Because the two-pronged TWCA test has not been satisfied, Plaintiff's state law claims are not barred by the TWCA's exclusivity provision.